Were you annoyed by the "whining" in Jamie Dimon's annual letter to shareholders?

Go download and read the shareholder letter from M&T bank CEO Robert Wilmers. Breakingviews calls it the "must-read missive of the season."

Why? Because rather than whine about government regulation, Wilmers takes it to the banks themselves, and blasts the industry for destroying its own reputation.

The basic gist is that at one point banks were respected industries that facilitated economic progress. In the quest for growth and trading revenue at any cost, the industry became parasitical, ultimately causing the crisis.

Here are some key parts.

On the decline of the bankers' reputation:

"As relatively good a year 2011 was for M&T itself, it was far from an easy one. Indeed, it is difficult, for one who has spent more than a generation in the field, to recall a time when banking as a profession has been publicly held in such persistently low esteem. A 2011 Gallup survey found that only a quarter of the American public expressed confidence in the integrity of bankers. We have reached a point at which not only do public demonstrations specifically target the financial industry but when a leading national newspaper would opine that regulation which might lower bank profits would be "a boon to the broader economy." What's worse is that such a view is far from entirely illogical, even if it fails to distinguish between Wall Street banks who, in my view, were central to the financial crisis and continue to distort our economy, and Main Street banks who were often victims of the crisis and are eager, under the right conditions, to extend credit to businesses that need it."

Basically, there's a rot and loss of trust that's enveloped everyone:

"It is no consolation, moreover, to observe that banks and the financial services industry generally were far from alone in sparking the crisis. Nonetheless, it is true, and very much worth keeping in mind, that major institutions in other sectors of the American system - public and private - must be considered complicit, some in ways we are only beginning to learn fully about. As understandable as a search for particular causes, or villains, might be, the truth is that the economic crisis that began in the fall of 2007 implicated a wide range of institutions - not only bankers but their regulators, not only investors but those paid to advise them, not only private finance but its government-sponsored kin. The wide spectrum of the culpable has left the U.S. and the world with a problem which, although related to the financial crisis, transcends it and must be confronted: the decimation of public trust in once-respected institutions and their leaders. This has created a fear among those responsible for forming the rules and standards that shape the American financial services industry. And the outcome of this fear-driven rulemaking is likely to burden the efficiency of the American financial system for years to come and will potentially have broader implications for the overall economy."

David Fuller's view This is an important article because responsible banking CEOs such as Robert Wilmers of M&T should speak out honestly and candidly. Unless they do, all banks will be tarred with the same brush which should be reserved for the irresponsible firms which have done so much damage to the global economy.

Worse still, banking regulators who have proved so inept will continue to smother the entire industry with burdensome regulations. These have done little to curb reckless gambling but they have succeeded in reducing the flow of capital to legitimate borrowers.

Here is Robert Wilmers on this subject:

BROADER IMPACTS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: In this context, one has to be concerned about the accumulated effects of new mandates beyond the narrow terms of how they affect banks. More broadly, there is reason to believe that regulation may provide incentives that distort the allocation of capital in ways that could be harmful to economic recovery. Specifically, there are incentives for commercial banks to divert from their traditional roles - the same sort of activities which helped spark the housing bubble. The proposed Basel III liquidity rules, for instance, call for banks to significantly increase their investments in government securities, leaving less capital for community-based loans which hold the most promise for potential economic progress. Such an unintended outcome is reminiscent of that which emerged from the 1992 Basel Accord, providing an incentive to invest in government debt, whether domestic or foreign, and in highly-rated derivative securities of all types including those backed by residential mortgages - all of which turned out to be more, not less, risky. The presumption that certain prescribed assets would inherently carry less risk, a thesis clearly disproved in the recent crisis, along with the new proposed minimum level of government bond holdings, would continue the trend of driving resources away from commercial lending - with negative ramifications for fulfilling legitimate credit needs.

New formulae from the FDIC are likely to have similar inadvertent consequences for the economy. Last spring, the FDIC began assessing insurance premiums based on assets rather than deposits, which it had done since its inception in 1933. As a result, a loan to finance the construction of a company's new building, an activity that produces jobs, carries insurance premiums that are three to four times as high as for commercial loans extended for unspecified purposes with no need for employment creation - arguably the greatest necessity of the current economy. Even more troubling is the fact that, under this formula, the mere association with real estate deems construction lending more risky regardless of how sturdy one's underwriting or how much "skin in the game" the entrepreneur is willing to commit.

Here is a copy of Robert Wilmer's excellent letter to shareholders; I commend it to you.