

Deutsche Bank Research: Themes in 2013

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Themes in 2013

In place of 'The House View' publication this month we close out the year by outlining twelve themes that could shape the global economy and markets in 2013. The themes are by no means exhaustive, and are designed to be thought-provoking rather than a summary of our forecasts (which will be covered by our outlook piece in January)

Downside risks

- The state strikes back: highly indebted governments become more interventionist and target corporate profits
- Bubble trouble: a sell-off in core government bonds could leave investors nursing significant losses
- **Sovereign risk the next frontier:** France, Japan and the UK lose their safe-haven appeal
- Known unknowns: things that we "know we don't know", such as natural disasters and geopolitics, remain a wild card

Swing Factors

- Fiscal cliff-hanger: fiscal cliff outcomes range from a recession to a growth spurt
- The Great Escape or QEternity: will we get back to conventional monetary policy, or will we venture deeper into the unknown?
- United we stand: will domestic politics in Europe hinder or help the path to crisis resolution?
- EM re-boot: can emerging economies reform to deliver balanced growth in line with their full potential

Upside risks


- The return of Equities: investors return to equities amid a fall in risk aversion and rising confidence around global growth
- End of the oil super cycle: the era of rising oil prices comes to an end
- Yankee bulls: the US stages a stronger-than-expected recovery
- Crisis... what crisis?: the Euro-crisis takes a back seat in 2013

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
Editors: Raj Hindocha, Marcos Arana, Sahil Mahtani, Erin Urquhart

The state strikes back: indebted governments become more interventionist and target corporate profits

Effective global corporate tax rate: significant fall in tax levels over the past decade lend an argument to those calling for hikes



US corporate profits and wages as a share of GDP: profits have risen to record levels while wages have fallen for decades



- Corporates are in good shape, facing lower tax rates while profits and cash are at record highs
- Conversely, labour's share of the pie (wages / GDP) has declined steadily since the 1970's
- Governments, in a difficult fiscal position, may target corporate / private wealth for economic or social reasons
 - **Tax reform**, e.g., US may tax foreign profits when earned (not repatriated), Italy raises property tax
 - **Nationalisation**, e.g., of natural resources or corporates in Latin America, French government threat to nationalise ArcelorMittal plant
 - **Influence strategy**, e.g., French government opposition to Peugeot restructuring plan / layoffs
 - Rising social pressure, e.g., Starbucks UK offers to pay more corporation tax amid public pressure
 - **Pressure on home-bias**, e.g., pressure on European banks to support domestic sovereign
 - **Nearshoring**, e.g., Apple to manufacture Macs in the US for the first time since 90s as CEO says "we do have a responsibility to create jobs"
 - Currency wars, e.g., countries compete to weaken their currencies to promote export growth

Bubble trouble: a sell-off core government bonds could leave investors nursing significant losses

US 10 year bond yields: 30-year secular bull market in bonds has seen yields steadily fall




Source: FRB, Haver Analytics Deutsche Bank Research Core government bond yields have

fallen steadily since the 1980's

- UK, US, German 10Y yields all hit record lows in 2012
- 10Y German and US real yields (after inflation) were negative all year i.e., investors willing to lose money in real terms
- Negative short-term nominal yields e.g., Germany, Switzerland (i.e., investors willing to pay governments to lend to them)


Since the crisis, inflows into all bonds have surged way above trend-rates



Since the crisis, flows into bonds have surged; several triggers could reverse this trend


- Negative ratings action and / or investor concern over high debt
- Reduction in risk aversion
- Buyers strike as investors shun low yielding bonds or see central banks as behind the curve
- Economic recovery triggers the end of central bank bond purchases


End-2013 Total Return scenarios for investors in US 10Y bonds



- A sell off in bonds in 2013 could leave investors nursing heavy losses
 - A rise in US 10Y yields to 3%, equates to a total return of -9%
 - A rise to 4% (average since 2000), equates to a total return of -16%
 - To replicate the 2012 YTD performance (~3%), yields would need to fall to 1.57% (from 1.77 now)
- A sell off would result in mark-tomarket losses for bond mutual funds, which rise and fall to reflect the market value of the bonds within it

Sovereign risk - the next frontier: France, Japan and the UK lose their safe-haven appeal





■ France, the UK and Japan have worrying fiscal metrics combined with very weak recoveries

- Public debt will rise to 245% of GDP in Japan and above 90% in the UK and France in 2013
- Deficit consolidation has been limited in France and the UK, while Japan's deficit is rising
- GDP in France, the UK and Japan is below its precrisis level and will remain so until 2014

■ These conditions have led rating agencies to lower their risk assessments

- France has lost 2 of 3 AAA-ratings in 2012
- UK AAA-downgrade likely in 2013
- Japan has been downgraded by all three agencies

■ Sovereign debt markets face revaluation risks

- Central banks in Japan and UK may have to step up purchases significantly to keep yields low
- Successful reforms in the periphery could weaken France's relative position as a safe haven

■ The US is less likely to come under pressure


- Growth is positive; private sector is deleveraging
- But, a negative outcome to debt reduction negotiations could weaken sentiment

Known unknowns: things that we "know we don't know¹", such as natural disasters and geopolitics, remain a wild card

Natural Disasters


Geopolitical hot-spots in 2013

Insured real losses from natural disasters: losses are on the rise although can fluctuate wildly from year-to-year



Source: Swiss Re, Munich Re, Deutsche Bank Research

- Insured losses from natural disasters have risen eight-fold in economic terms since the 1980's
 - Freak weather events are occurring more often than can be explained by natural variability alone
 - Rising urbanisation, which increases the concentration of wealth and people, exacerbates the impact of such events
 - Losses can fluctuate wildly from year to year



¹ Former US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, February 12 2002

Fiscal cliff-hanger: fiscal cliff outcomes range from a recession to a growth spurt

Economic and **December** Q1 2013 financial impact** Option 1: Go over the cliff Meltdown **S&P target:** 1200 December 31 deadline breached Political gridlock prevents agreement to **2013 GDP:** -2% avoid the cliff before 2-Jan* Fiscal cliff (USD 650bn in spending cuts / tax No agreement on long-term debt rises) kicks-in on 2-Jan sustainability Q1 negotiations stall, no mitigation Retroactive agreement December 31 deadline breached ■ Fiscal cliff kicks-in on 2-Jan Congress agrees to reverse some of the measures with retroactive effect **S&P target:** 1450 Option 2: Cliff delayed Delay, discuss, fail to resolve Temporary extensions agreed, only Fiscal cliff mostly avoided ■ 2013 GDP: 1% some cuts / tax hikes allowed Discussions continue in 2013 Can happen with or without agreement Gridlock persists, Congress fails to agree on framework for long-term debt long-term tax and entitlement reform Likely to see serious US debt downgrade sustainability **S&P target:** 1500 Delay, discuss and agree (base case) Fiscal cliff mostly avoided **2013 GDP**: 2% Discussions continue in Jan/Feb Credible framework for long-term fiscal overhaul reached **Option 3: Grand Bargain** Compromise reached **S&P target:** 1600 Cliff avoided Congress irons out details **2013 GDP:** >3% Agreement on principles for debt US debt put on downward trajectory, with a reduction, details worked out in 2013 comprehensive tax and entitlement reform

(*) First working day of 2013; (**) 6-12m S&P outlook

The Great Escape or QEternity: will we get back to conventional monetary policy, or will we venture deeper into the unknown?

Conventional

Unorthodox

Monetary Policy

Increasingly Unorthodox

	Central bank policies	Fed	ECB	BoE	BoJ
•	Adjust policy interest rates in line with mandate , i.e., inflation, or inflation and unemployment	✓	✓	✓	✓
•	Liquidity Provision - Emergency liquidity provision for banks	✓	✓	✓	
	 Term funding for banks (e.g., ECB LTRO, UK funding for lending) 		✓	✓	
-	Asset purchases				
	 Credit easing, i.e., buying specific securities to repair credit channel e.g., ECB (SMP, OMT, covered bonds), Fed (MBS) – note that ECB's sovereign purchases also stabilise sovereign bond markets 	✓	✓	✓	✓
	 Quantitative easing, i.e., supporting asset prices, boosting liquidity, lowering rates, to support economy 	✓		✓	✓
•	Verbal guidance, conditional targets , e.g., Fed commitment to keep rates low until late 2015 or "at least	√			
	as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5%"	·			
•	Negative interest rates on central bank deposits to incentivise lending to the economy	?	?		
•	Change / modify mandate				
	 Temporarily raise inflation target to lower real 			?	?
	rates and reduce debt burdens			•	•
L	 Set target for nominal GDP Outright debt monetisation 				
ľ	 Soft measures: transfer interest payments from 				
	bond purchases back to government		✓	✓	
	 Cancelling debt: central banks 'write-off' 				
	government debt on their balance sheet				

? = speculated

The Great Escape

- Halt asset purchases
- Withdraw liquidity
- Raise interest rates



- More asset purchases
- Greater policy experimentation

A key risk is that overstimulus fuels dangerous asset price bubbles

United we stand: will domestic politics in Europe hinder or help the path to crisis resolution?

Domestic politics: what to watch in 2013

Increasing Euro-scepticism

- Ongoing tension with EU partners
- Threat of referendum on EU exit?

Government under pressure

 Government torn between serving left-wing of socialist party and pushing ahead with much-needed structural reforms

Tension between central government and regions


- Slippage on budget deficits
- Opposition to austerity
- Separatist threat from Catalonia

■ German elections in autumn 2013

 Could shift focus away from European crisis resolution to domestic issues

■ Italian elections in Q1 2013


- Implementation of structural reforms is essential
- Political uncertainty / government stability -- a pre-requisite for European aid



 Social unrest, rise in anti euro / anti Europe rhetoric



EM re-boot: can emerging economies reform to deliver balanced growth in line with their full potential?





Major EMs are performing below potential

- Of the BRICs, only Russia is performing above potential output
- India, Brazil and China, have estimated output gaps anywhere from 1% to 3%

■ Not all EMs face the same challenges

- In India, supply-side issues (e.g. power cuts, high regulation) are limiting growth.
- In China, there is a need to boost household consumption and lower investment spending
- In Brazil, structural reforms could boost competitiveness (Brazil ranks126/183 in the ease of doing business, according to World Bank)
- In Russia, diversification away from an oil & gas-based growth model will require structural **reforms** to foster rule of law and privatisation

■ Until politically difficult reforms are enacted, EM equities will continue to under-perform

 Real earnings in EM equities today are 5% below 2006 and 19% below 2007 levels


The return of Equities: investors return to equities amid a fall in risk aversion and rising confidence around global growth

US S&P 500: two of the largest market crashes ever are in recent memory



- Equity investors may be suffering from 'post-traumatic financial crisis stress disorder'
- Two of the largest market adjustments since the Great Depression remain in recent memory
 - March 2000-July 2002 (S&P down 48%)
 - Oct 2007-Mar 2009 (S&P down 57%)


Global equity and bond fund flows



■ Since 2009, equity inflows have lagged bond inflows

- Bond funds have seen a cumulative 70% of inflows compared to only 3% for equities
- Asset allocation has shifted dramatically in favour of bonds
 - UK pension funds are holding more bonds than equities for the first time in 50 years

The ERP* is over 700bps: EPS yield of ~7.0% - 10yr TIPS yields are negative




82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 Source: Bloomberg Finance LP, Deutsche Bank Research *The ERP is the difference between the real 10 year yield and the earnings yield (EPS/P) priced in the equity market.

■ Equities cheap relative to bonds


- The ERP (Equity Risk Premium) is at its highest multi-year level since the early 1980's, a period that was followed by positive S&P gains
- Suggests investors continue to fear either a collapse in EPS (sharp deflation) or a surge in long-term real interest rates (sharp inflation)

End of the oil super cycle: the era of rising oil prices comes to an end







Oil production (million barrels / day): non-OPEC is expected to contribute an increasing share of production



- Oil prices have been rising steadily since the end of the 1990s – with the notable exception of 2008-10
 - Trend has in 2012, with Brent oil flat for the year
- As incremental oil production increasingly comes from non-OPEC, the balance of power will start shifting
 - Shale oil and gas to transform the US' energy position, with the US set to overtake Saudi Arabia as the world's top oil producer by 2017
- Shale oil / gas boom could cap oil prices and reduce global inflationary pressure
- However a significant fall in oil prices is unlikely
 - Brent oil prices well below USD 100/bbl would make some production technologies uneconomic thereby cutting supply
 - Many key oil producers are reliant on high prices to finance their budgets and maintain political stability.

Yankee bulls: the US stages a stronger-than-expected recovery





S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Index: prices are rising, and

■ The US could stage a powerful recovery

- With banks recapitalised and an adjustment in the housing market, the economy has stabilised
- Reduction in fiscal policy uncertainty will be supportive of growth in H2 2013
- **Deleveraging** is well underway
 - The US has been the fastest to reduce total leverage (public, financial, corporate and household)
- Housing sector now an upside risk
 - Housing inventories at lowest since 2002
 - Home prices have bottomed
- Consumer spending remains resilient
 - Household balance sheets improving thanks to deleveraging and higher house / equity prices
 - Labour market recovery supports spending
- Manufacturing revival driven by cheap energy costs due to shale oil and gas boom
 - US shale to give chemicals and manufacturing sectors competitive advantage

2001

2003

Source: Standard and Poor's Haver Analytics. Deutsche Bank Research


2008


2010


2012

2005

Crisis... what crisis?: the Euro-crisis takes a back seat in 2013







- The euro crisis could well move out of market focus for 2013
- Overall context is improving
 - Peripheral stress indicators (sovereign yields, CDS) have retreated
 - Macro adjustment underway, e.g., rebalancing of peripheral current account deficits
 - Fiscal austerity and credit contraction to continue in 2013 but at slower pace, but H2 2013 should see a return to growth
- Region more resilient to shocks with significant risk having transferred to the official sector
 - Greek debt held largely by official sector
 - I TRO's have enabled countries to better fund themselves domestically via their banks and ECB
- Crisis containment to be the dominant strategy
 - Leadership has shown commitment to preserve the euro (Greek exit avoided, OMT, LTRO)
 - German election in Autumn is set to avoid euro topics and keep lid on crisis during campaigns
- By end-2013, the state of the economy and progress at the country and institutional level will determine whether the euro-crisis regains centre stage

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