

Outlook for the US Consumer With a closer look at how much wealth declined during the crisis across the income distribution



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Main messages in this presentation



- The 55-64 year olds saw their net worth decline by almost \$100k from 2007 to 2010 (p. 4)
- Median net worth declined \$50k from 2007 to 2010 for couples with children (p. 5)
- College educated families saw their net worth decline by a third from 2007 to 2010 (p. 6)
- Families on the West Coast experienced the biggest wealth decline during the crisis (p. 8)
- The most important reason for saving money is no longer retirement but liquidity (p. 9)
- The median value of stock holdings for all households has fallen from \$43k in 2001 to \$30k in 2010 (p. 10)
- Housing makes up 50% of all household assets, except for the 90th percentile of income (p. 14)
- Leverage, i.e. household debt divided by household assets, is highest for the middle-income groups (p. 17)
- Leverage for <35 year olds is more than 50% (p. 18)
- Mortgage debt went up for high income families from 2007 to 2010, but fell for middle-income families (p. 21)
- Average credit card balance for high-income families is \$8k (p. 22)
- Household debt is falling and assets are slowly edging up, i.e. balance sheet repair continues (p. 32 and 48)
- The number of people who are going into foreclosure is falling (p. 46)
- Households' financial obligations ratio now at the lowest level since 1984 (p. 54)
- Overall, we have seen a continued improvement in consumer demand for loans and banks' willingness to lend (p. 71)


Bottom Line: Household sector balance sheet repair continues and household deleveraging could come to an end in late 2012 as the housing market continues to improve and home prices start rising modestly.



How much did household wealth decline during the crisis across the income distribution?

Median net worth of the 90th percentile of income is around \$1mn






The 55-64 year olds saw their net worth decline by almost \$100k from 2007 to 2010




Median family net worth, by age of head of families, 2001–10 surveys



Median net worth declined \$50k from 2007 to 2010 for couples with children




Median family net worth by family structure, 2001–10 surveys



College educated families saw their net worth decline by a third from 2007 to 2010




Median family net worth, by education of head of family, 2001–10 surveys



Net worth for self-employed declined \$100k during the crisis








Families on the West Coast experienced the biggest wealth decline during the crisis




Median family net worth, by region, 2001–10 surveys



The most important reason for saving money is no longer retirement but liquidity




Reasons respondents gave as most important for their families' saving, distributed by type of reason, 2001–10



The median value of stock holdings for all households has fallen from \$43k in 2001 to \$30k in 2010




Direct and indirect family holdings of stock, by selected characteristics of families, 2001–10 surveys



For families in the 90th percentile of income the median holding of stocks is \$270k




Direct and indirect family holdings of stock, by income distribution, 2001–10 surveys



For high-income groups the homeownership rate is higher




Percentage of family holdings of primary residence by percentile of income, 2007 and 2010 surveys



For the 90th percentile of income the median value of their home is around \$500k




Median value of holdings for families holding asset of primary residence by percentile of income 2007 and 2010




Housing makes up 50% of all assets, except for the 90th percentile of income House value as a percentage of all assets in group





Most household debt is mortgage debt






Leverage, i.e. debt as a share of assets, was 16% in 2010









Leverage is highest for the middle-income groups





Leverage for <35 year olds is more than 50%






College degree families have the lowest leverage








Families in the West and Midwest have the highest leverage




Leverage ratio of group by selected family characteristics, 2010 surveys. Education of head



Mortgage debt went up for high income families from 2007 to 2010, but fell for middle-income families




Family holdings of debt, by selected characteristics of families and type of debt, primary residence, 2007 and 2010



Average credit card balance vary from \$1k to \$8k, and high income families increased their average balance from 2007 to 2010





Family holdings of debt, by selected characteristics of families and type of debt, Credit card balance, 2007 and 2010




50% of families with credit cards have a store or gasoline credit card













For people who don't have banking accounts 28% say that it is because they don't like dealing with banks






Location is the most important factor when households choose which bank to use





Less than 20% of families with directly held stocks have more than 10 stocks in their portfolios








The consumer's postcrisis balance sheet


A lot of potential for consumer spending to move up toward the pre-crisis trend, but more employment and household balance sheet repair is needed to get there





US consumer confidence no longer rising...






Source: Conference Board, Univ. of Mich., Haver Analytics, DB Global Markets Research

...but confidence is still higher than the average lows of previous recessions






Source: Conference Board, Haver Analytics, DB Global Markets Research

Household debt is falling and assets are slowly edging up, i.e. balance sheet repair continues






Note: Latest data for 2012Q1.

Source: FRB, Haver Analytics, DB Global Markets Research

Asset prices, i.e stock prices and home prices, are a key driver of whether consumers decide to save or spend. Partly through wealth effects partly through confidence effects

Households



Source: FRB, BEA, Haver Analytics, DB Global Markets Research



Understanding the Deleveraging Process

Understanding leverage



Leveraging up

Deleveraging

Easy to borrow/low margins

Hard to borrow/high margins

Leverage rising

Deleveraging

Rise in asset prices

Asset prices fall

Margins fall further

Margins rise further

Leverage enters traditional consumption models via households' net worth. In other words, what happens to equity and home prices is very important for how much more deleveraging is needed




Private consumption is driven by:

Consumption = A1*Income + A2*Net Housing Wealth + A3*Net Financial Wealth + A4*Interest rate

Households' net worth = assets – liabilities. Assets are much more volatile than liabilities. And assets are driven by expectations to the future and Fed policy. As a result, lower interest rates and easier financial conditions (for example as a result of QE/Operation Twist and Fed communication) can lead to higher asset prices, which again can end the deleveraging process and ultimately raise consumer spending growth. If asset prices don't rise then the deleveraging process will take longer to complete.




Banks are more willing to lend to consumers



Average down payment on a house rising recently








How far are deleveraging indicators from their prebubble (=2003/2004) levels?




We are back to the historical trend in debt/income – undershooting likely




Household liabilities to assets now below trend





Consumer credit growth has cut through zero ...






...but because of ongoing problems in the housing market new seriously delinquent loans are only back to their 2007 level and starting to move sideways...



\$ bil

\$ bil


New seriously delinquent balances by loan type*



...and 90+ days delinquent balance near 2008 and 2009 levels and moving sideways...



Percent of Balance 90+ Days Delinquent by Loan Type*




...but we have seen an improvement recently in transition rates for loans that are 30-60 days delinquent...





...and the number of people who are going into foreclosure is falling...






Source: MBA, Datastream, DB Global Markets Research

...and the total number of households in foreclosure slowly coming down...






Source: MBA, Datastream, DB Global Markets Research

...and home prices starting to turn up...







Source: S&P, CoreLogic, FHFA, Haver Analytics, DB Global Markets Research


...and total household absolute debt levels back to the 2007 level...












...and the number of loans that are current are at the 2008 level...




Total balance by delinquency status




...and new foreclosures and bankruptcies still elevated but lower than in 2009 and 2010...






...and still significant collection problems: Average collection amount per person at \$1,500, an all-time high










Financial obligations ratio






Household Deleveraging at the State Level

Per capita debt levels vary by state






Deleveraging has hit housing bubble states particularly hard, but we have come a long way in the adjustment. Bubble states now close to 2006/2007 levels, non-bubble states closer to historical averages




Total Debt Balance per Capita* by State



Seriously delinquent loans: Nevada still elevated, the rest getting better




Percent of Balance 90+ Days Late by State



Delinquency transition rates generally moving down, with most states within 1 percentage point of their historical averages



Quarterly Transition Rates into 30+ Days Late by State*





The Asset Side of the Household Balance Sheet

US homeowners lost on average \$50k during the housing bust



Total housing wealth destruction between Q2 2006 and Q2 2010					
State	Total housing value Q2 2006	Total housing value Q2 2010	Actual wealth loss	Loss per homeowner (in \$)	Loss as a % of total as of Q2 2006
California	\$6.0trn	\$3,7trn	\$2,3trn	231,320	39%
Arizona	\$0.7trn	\$0.3trn	\$0.3trn	157,404	50%
Florida	\$1,8trn	\$1.0trn	\$0.8trn	146,815	46%
New York	\$1,3trn	\$1,1trn	\$0.2trn	76,165	18%
Illinois	\$0.9trn	\$0.6trn	\$0.2trn	74,689	27%
U.S.	\$28.6trn	\$23.1trn	\$5.5trn	49,417	19%


Source: Loan performance/core logic, Freddie Mac, S&P/ Case- Shiller, DB Global Markets Research







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



Source: FRB, DB Global Markets Research






Assets of HH sector: Q1 2012














Liabilities of HH sector: Q1 2012





Measuring credit conditions/financial conditions


10-year real yields negative and well below their historical average





Real mortgage rates far below their historical norm






Deutsche Bank


It is very cheap to buy a home - if you can get credit...








...but not many are buying a home - mortgage purchase applications at 15-year lows



We have seen an improvement in consumer demand for loans and banks' willingness to lend






Bank lending standards easing modestly but from a very tight level...



Bank lending standards



- ---- Prime mortgages to individials
- --- Consumer credit



Source: FRB, Haver Analytics, DB Global Markets Research

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
01

02 03 04

...with the number of credit cards outstanding slowly starting to rise again



Number of Accounts by Loan Type



99:Q100:Q101:Q102:Q103:Q104:Q105:Q106:Q107:Q108:Q109:Q110:Q111:Q112:Q1

Note: Data Exclude Student Loans Source: FRB-New York, DB Global Markets Research





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- Torsten Slok joined Deutsche Bank Securities in the fall of 2005 and is a senior member of the Global Economics Team.
- Mr. Slok's Economics team was ranked No. 1 in fixed income research by Institutional Investor in 2010 and 2011. Slok currently serves as a member of the Economic Club of New York
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- Mr. Slok studied at University of Copenhagen and Princeton University. He has published numerous journal articles and reviews on economics and policy analysis, including in Journal of International Economics, Journal of International Money and Finance, and The Econometric Journal.



Appendix 1

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Risks to Fixed Income Positions

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