January 1, 2021

Technical Analysis: *Inflection Points*

Big Numbers for 2021

The S&P's Road Map to 4,150: We expect the S&P 500 to rally toward 4,150 in 2021 based on the index's median gain in the second year following a major market low. Early-cycle leadership is also a key positive reinforcing our bullish outlook.

Keeping with one of our long-standing traditions, today's report offers our year-ahead outlook by identifying what we expect to be 10 of the most important market numbers for 2021:

1. **4,150:** Upside for the **S&P 500** in 2021
2. **11%:** Median gain in the second year of a bull cycle
3. **60%**: Participation at a market top
4. **90%:** Optimism at a market top
5. **1991**: Small over Big following the post-1990 recovery
6. **1.35%:** Key resistance for the **10-year US Treasury Yield**
7. **88:** Key support for the **US Dollar DXY**
8. **$2,075**: Upside for the price of **Gold**
9. **$400:** Upside for the price of **Copper**
10. **4:** No sector has been the bottom performer for four consecutive years. Energy will attempt to avoid this dubious distinction.

Key Portfolio Themes: US over World, Small over Big, Cyclicals over Defensives, Growth over Value, Industrial Metals over Energy

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2020 In Review

Our OPCO Technical Research team came into 2020 expecting the S&P 500 to finish the year at 3,600. We think we were in the ballpark in terms of the closing level, and we know we were ***way off*** in terms of the path. Our initial expectation was based on the typical trajectory in the second year following a major market low (Dec. 2018). Instead, the S&P's 15% gain developed by way of a 1987-style collapse of 35% and ensuing 2009-style recovery of 70%. Most of our reasoning for a second-year advance is applicable again for our 2021 outlook following the March 2020 reset. Before introducing this, let's revisit our *10 Big Numbers for 2020 (Jan 1, 2020)*.

1) **3,600**. The key positive underpinning our expectation for a second-year bull market in 2020 was that global breadth, as measured by the percentage of stocks above their 200-day average in the MSCI All-Country World, was starting to break higher. We were still positive when the S&P peaked in February because we didn't see the glaring internal cracks that typically occur at a major top. We stayed the course through the collapse, which included maintaining a core position in US Large-cap Growth, and noted that patience was warranted in what was becoming a once-in-a-decade opportunity at the depths of the March low.

2) **11%**. The median gain in year 2 following an 18-month low has been 11%, by our analysis. This projection was based on our view that the 18-month low in December 2018 reset the equity cycle.

3) **33 months**. The median bull cycle has historically lasted 33 months. This led us to believe the risk of a major market top didn't become considerable until 2021 barring any changes in our tactical indicators. The Feb. 2020 top concluded a bull cycle that lasted only 14 months. This was the 5th cycle out of 22 since 1928 with a duration of less than 20 months.

4) **77%**. Since 1929, the S&P 500 has traded higher 77% of the time in an election year with an incumbent candidate vs. 67% during an open-seat election, and 66% for any given year. The S&P 500 ended 2020's election year with a gain.

5) **17**. Since 1978, the initial 2/10 yield curve inversion led the peak in the S&P 500 by a minimum of 17 months with an additional 23% gain occurring in the intervening period, by our analysis. The Aug. 2019 inversion developed 6 months before the peak in the S&P, and the index gained 18% between the inversion and its Feb. high.

6) **5 months**. The NYSE Advance-Decline peaked ahead of the S&P 500 11 times out of 16 major tops since 1950 usually with a 5-mont,-lead time based on the median length of time between peaks. This indicator failed to be an exceptional leading warning in 2020 because the January peak in breadth occurred nearly concurrent with the February price high.

7) **2.35%**. The 10-year US Treasury yield started 2020 around 2.00%, and we saw the case for marginal upside to 2.35% believing that global growth concerns would continue to limit upside at the long-end of the yield curve. The 10-year subsequently crashed to its lowest level in at least a century (0.3137%) during the COVID-19 collapse.

Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance.

8) **$1,400**. We had expected the price of gold to consolidate above $1,400 support in 2020 in anticipation of a continued backup in interest rates, and noted that the bullish case for gold ($1,700) was aligned with US rates moving toward the zero bound. As the latter scenario unfolded, we reversed our stance and recommended buying gold miners in April.

9) **$60**. For WTI crude oil futures, we expected directionless trading similar to how oil traded throughout the 1990s, and believed the price would average the midpoint of its prior range at $60. Amid a laundry list of odd idiosyncratic events in 2020, the May futures contract traded down to *negative* $37/bl., when the supply of oil built up to the point where storage reached a limit and willingness to own the physical commodity disintegrated. The price of oil averaged about $40/bl. for the year.

10) **96.** Amid a larger DXY range between 92 and 100, we expected the US dollar to average the midpoint of this zone, 96, in 2020. DXY's average price for the year was close to this approximation within a wider range between 90 and 103.

Without further ado, we present our *Big Numbers for 2021...*

The S&P's Road Map to 4,150

Key takeaway: **We expect the S&P 500 to rally to 4,150 in 2021** based on the median gain in the second year following a major market low (March 2020). **Early-cycle leadership is also a key positive reinforcing our bullish outlook**. For instance, the S&P High-Beta vs. Low-Volatility ratio has cleared eight-year resistance in a surge-like manner that **resembles market behavior off the 2009 low**, in our view. Since 1995, we've found **the S&P has posted above-average returns following periods of high-beta outperformance**. While near-term extended, we side with the fact this ratio is still accelerating.



S&P 500: Avg Forward Returns — *Monthly data since 1991*

When:	3m	6m	12m	*Frequency*
High-Beta Leading	2.4%	5.5%	10.8%	*60%*
Low-Vol Leading	1.4%	2.3%	5.6%	*40%*

Based on HB vs. LV: 6-month rate-of-change

Source: Oppenheimer & Co. and Bloomberg. Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance. Return data excludes applicable costs, including commissions and interest.

Our Outlook Is Based on the Equity Cycle

How do we quantify our view of the bull cycle? We've found that the best one-rule definition of a cycle bottom is an 18-month low because, unlike a 20% decline, it considers time spent moving sideways. As shown by the yellow dots in the chart, we think this successfully screens for what are generally considered history's major market bottoms. Similar to Feb. 2016 and Dec. 2018, **the S&P 500 reached an 18-month low in March 2020—with a reset in the economy to boot**. The median duration of an S&P 500 bull cycle has been 32 months since 1932. This means, barring any changes in our tactical indicators, **the next market top is likely 12+ months away**, in our view.



Bull Cycle	Duration (months)	% Change
2009-2015	74	220%
1994-2000	64	249%
1982-1987	61	231%
2002-2007	60	105%
1942-1946	49	158%
1962-1966	43	80%
1949-1953	43	97%
1990-1994	40	64%
1953-1956	35	119%
1978-1980	33	62%
1987-1990	33	71%
1970-1973	32	74%
2016-2018	31	62%
1966-1968	26	48%
1935-1937	24	128%
1974-1976	24	73%
1957-1959	21	56%
2018-2020	14	44%
1960-1961	14	39%
1932-1933	14	177%
1947-1948	13	24%
2020-	9	70%
1938-1938	7	62%
Average	**34**	**102%**
Median	**32**	**73%**

Source: Oppenheimer & Co. and Bloomberg. Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance. Returns data excludes applicable costs.

Median Gain in Year 2 of a Bull Cycle: 11%

What is expected upside in 2021 based on the equity cycle? **The S&P's 70% gain since March 2020 marks the strongest start to a bull cycle on record**, by our analysis. This prompts the question if strong returns have been pulled forward. The plot below shows there's little relationship between returns over the first 9 months of a bull cycle (to compare to the current period) vs. the subsequent 12. Regardless of the initial performance, we found that a near-majority of the subsequent returns were between 7% and 14%. **Our 2021 target is therefore based on the median forward return of 11% at this stage of the cycle.**



S&P 500 Returns Following an 18m Bear Market Low

	First 9m	Next 12m
Jun-32	55%	53%
Mar-35	58%	32%
Mar-38	56%	-4%
Apr-42	38%	14%
May-47	1%	6%
Jun-49	29%	24%
Sep-53	28%	38%
Oct-57	19%	29%
Oct-60	28%	-13%
Jun-62	27%	19%
Oct-66	26%	7%
May-70	39%	10%
Oct-74	52%	10%
Mar-78	11%	10%
Aug-82	61%	-4%
Oct-87	14%	24%
Oct-90	29%	9%
Oct-02	25%	11%
Mar-09	61%	11%
Feb-16	18%	19%
Dec-18	27%	9%
Avg	**33%**	**15%**
Median	**28%**	**11%**
Mar-20	**70%**	**?**

Source: Oppenheimer & Co. and Bloomberg. Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance. Returns data excludes applicable costs

The US Presidential Cycle: A Summertime Top?

Does the market face the risk of a post-election year top? The four-year equity cycle has historically aligned with the four-year US presidential cycle: **it was once common for the equity cycle to top in a post-election year and bottom in a mid-term year**, though we think it's become less common due to changes in the implementation of monetary policy. In addition, we've found **post-election weakness has been more likely to occur during a first-term presidency, and usually starts in August**. Our outlook suggests a mid-cycle correction is more likely than a major top. Regardless, we'll next discuss what indicators would give us concern looking ahead.



Source: Oppenheimer & Co. and Bloomberg. Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance.

Internal Breadth at a Market Top: 60%

What are we watching to indicate a market top? Internal breadth, as measured by the percentage of NYSE stocks above their 200-day average, has been one of our most reliable leading indicators. In general, rallies with many stocks participating are rallies that continue, and conversely, participation typically narrows into a market top. Looking ahead, we believe **a new S&P high undermined by fewer than 60% participation would warn of a market top as it did in 1999, 2007, 2015, and 2018**. As it stands, November's surge in breadth (89%) **offered a high-conviction buy signal and confirmation that the bull cycle should continue in 2021**, in our view.



Source: Oppenheimer & Co. and Bloomberg. Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance.

Optimism at a Market Top: 90%

How about frothy sentiment? The difficulty in using sentiment as a contrarian indicator is that high levels of optimism can linger through a bull market. We think it's not until either **1)** sentiment reaches an extreme or **2)** high optimism is combined with narrow breadth that a compelling signal is offered. As it stands, our **OPCO Bullish Composite**, a gauge of four popular investor surveys, has climbed to a two-year high near 80% indicating that optimism is indeed on the rise, by our analysis. However, **given bullish breadth readings, we'd like to see an extreme closer to the January 2018 peak of 96% before believing *there's no one left to buy***.



S&P 500 Avg Forward Returns					*Weekly data since 1987*
OPCO Bullish Comp.	**4w**	**13w**	**26w**	**52w**	*Frequency*
ABOVE 85%	0.3%	-0.1%	1.6%	4.8%	*5%*
20%-80%	0.5%	2.0%	4.2%	8.8%	*89%*
BELOW 15%	2.0%	4.7%	9.4%	17.1%	*7%*

Source: Oppenheimer & Co., Investors Intelligence, Consensus Inc., Market Vane, American Association of Individual Investors (AAII), and Bloomberg.
Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance. Return data excludes applicable cost.

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Cyclical Bears in Secular Bulls

Will the next bear cycle be devastating? The table below lists the bear markets in the S&P 500 since 1929 (economic recessions are colored in red). We've found that **whether there's a recession or not, cyclical bears in secular bulls** (in white) **are usually either long-and-shallow** (1953, 1959, 1994, 2015, 2018) **or short-and-sharp** (1961, 1987, 1990, 2020). We present this analysis to conclude our discussion of the complete equity cycle. Again, we believe that a market top is likely 12+ months away given the median duration of a bull cycle.



Bear Cycles (18m Lows)

Cycle Peak	Cycle Trough	Duration (months)	% Change
Sep-29	Jun-32	32	-86%
Jul-33	Mar-35	20	-33%
Mar-37	Mar-38	13	-54%
Nov-38	Apr-42	42	-46%
May-46	May-47	12	-28%
Jun-48	Jun-49	12	-21%
Jan-53	Sep-53	8	-15%
Aug-56	Oct-57	15	-22%
Aug-59	Oct-60	15	-14%
Dec-61	Jun-62	6	-28%
Feb-66	Oct-66	8	-22%
Nov-68	May-70	18	-36%
Jan-73	Oct-74	21	-48%
Sep-76	Mar-78	17	-19%
Nov-80	Aug-82	20	-27%
Aug-87	Oct-87	2	-36%
Jul-90	Oct-90	3	-20%
Mar-00	Oct-02	31	-51%
Oct-07	Mar-09	17	-58%
May-15	Feb-16	9	-15%
Sep-18	Dec-18	3	-20%
Feb-20	Mar-20	1	-35%

Cyclical Correctons

Oct-83	Jul-84	9	-15%
Jan-94	Dec-94	10	-8%
Jul-98	Oct-98	3	-22%
May-11	Oct-11	5	-22%

Avg Secular Bull	*7*	*-21%*
Avg Secular Bear	*21*	*-42%*

Avg w/ Recession	*16*	*-37%*
Avg w/o Recession	*11*	*-24%*

Secular bears shaded in gray

Recessionary cycles colored in red

Source: Oppenheimer & Co. and Bloomberg. Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance. **Shaded gray = secular bear. Colored red = US recession.**

Key Portfolio Themes

- **US over World**: Global equities are breaking higher—still trending lower vs. the US.
- **Small over Big**: Small-cap leadership resembles the 1991 post-recession recovery. We're especially bullish on small-cap growth.
- **Cyclicals over Defensives**: Interest rates should remain a key driver of sector rotations, benefitting cyclicals when rising and defensives when falling.
- **Growth over Value**: These swings in rates are occurring around an ongoing bid for high-growth companies, in our view. A definitive turn toward value likely requires an excess of global growth.
- **Industrial Metals over Energy**: The US dollar is trading lower and providing a tailwind for reflationary assets. We believe industrial metals, like copper, are a more compelling idea than energy for exposure to the economy's recovery.

US Leading Broad-Based Global Breakaway

We continue to come back to the same point: **broadening global participation is a key positive that leads us to expect additional market gains in 2021**. For instance, **the MSCI All-Country World (ex. US) has reversed its downtrend dating back to its Jan. 2018 peak**. Consider also that the case for world equities is the case for the S&P 500. That's because **world equities have only outperformed vs. a falling S&P 500 in 17% of all rolling 52-week periods since 1988**. However, **the long-term trend still favors the US** in accordance with our view that higher-growth areas should receive a scarcity premium. Should macro conditions weaken, we'd expect world equities to get sold first.



Source: Oppenheimer & Co., and Bloomberg. Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance.

Small over Big Resembles 1991 Recovery

US over World, Big over Small, and Growth over Value have been dominant portfolio themes in recent years. Of these, **we still think that a reversal in trend is most compelling in terms of size**. One reason for this is based on the duration of prior small vs. big cycles. We've counted 20 minor-and counter-cycles alternating between small- and big-cap stocks over the last 90 years, and **the recent stretch of small-cap underperformance (2013-2020) was the longest since the seven years between 1983 and 1990**. **The Russell 2000's tendency to outperform following an economic recession, as it did after the 1990 recession, adds to the weight of the evidence**, in our view.



Small-caps vs. Big-caps Cycle Stats since 1928

	Leader	Bottom	Top	Duration (Years)
Major Cycle	**SMALL**	**1931**	**1946**	**14**
Minor Cycle	Small	1931	1937	5
Counter Cycle	Big	1937	1939	2
Minor Cycle	Small	1939	1946	7
Major Cycle	**BIG**	**1946**	**1957**	**12**
Minor Cycle	Big	1946	1949	3
Counter Cycle	Small	1949	1951	2
Minor Cycle	Big	1951	1957	7
Major Cycle	**SMALL**	**1957**	**1968**	**11**
Minor Cycle	Small	1957	1961	3
Counter Cycle	Big	1961	1964	3
Minor Cycle	Small	1964	1968	5
Major Cycle	**BIG**	**1968**	**1974**	**6**
Minor Cycle	Big	1968	1970	1
Counter Cycle	Small	1970	1972	2
Minor Cycle	Big	1972	1974	3
Major Cycle	**SMALL**	**1974**	**1983**	**9**
Minor Cycle	-	-	-	-
Counter Cycle	-	-	-	-
Minor Cycle	-	-	-	-
Major Cycle	**BIG**	**1983**	**1999**	**16**
Minor Cycle	Big	1983	1990	7
Counter Cycle	Small	1990	1994	3
Minor Cycle	Big	1994	1999	5
Major Cycle	**SMALL**	**1999**	**2013**	**15**
Minor Cycle	Small	1999	2006	7
Counter Cycle	Big	2006	2008	2
Minor Cycle	Small	2008	2013	6
Major Cycle	**BIG**	**2013**	**?**	**-**
Minor Cycle	Big	2013	2020	6

Source: Oppenheimer & Co., Kenneth R. French, and Bloomberg. These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance.

Value Will Go As Far As Risk Will Take It

Regarding Value/Growth, we don't think market participants appreciate that extreme dispersion readings are being inflated more by value weakness than by growth strength. Based on a five-year rate-of-change, growth's advance has been robust (+155%, August 2020) though still below history's most notable performance extremes in 1946, 1955, 1987, and 2000. Conversely, value is coming off a reading (10%, March 2020) that comps to 1940, 1974, 2002, and 2008. **The implication, in our view, is that aside from a counter-trend correction, a definitive turn toward value likely requires an excess of global growth** (S&P 500 to 5,000?) **to eliminate the premium on the select high-growth companies that have been rewarded in a low-and-slow economy.** We're bullish, but not this bullish.



Source: Oppenheimer & Co. Kenneth R. French, and Bloomberg. Value: Top 30% of book equity/market equity. Growth: Bottom 30% of book /market. Market cap: Top 50% of market equity. Total Return, Value-weighted.

Key Resistance for 10Y UST Yield: 1.35%

For the 10-year US Treasury yield, we expect a near-term breakout above 0.96% (June peak) based on what we see as market behavior consistent with an early-cycle recovery. **However, we think the 10-year is capped below 1.35% resistance marking last February's breakdown below its 2012 and 2016 lows.** This will be important to monitor because interest rates have been a key driver of sector rotations, benefitting high-beta cyclicals when rising and low-volatility defensives when falling—and we think these swings are occurring around an ongoing bid for growth. We've been recommending growth sectors for years due to pro-cyclical exposure and their near-zero correlation to rates. Conversely, our issue with Russell 1000 Value is that there's **1)** not enough Tech and **2)** too much defensive exposure.



Correlation (10y, weekly, %)

Relative to S&P 500	Net Wgt: V-G	10Y UST Yield
Financials	16%	0.52
Energy	3%	0.27
Industrials	9%	0.27
Materials	4%	0.21
Technology	-35%	0.01
C. Discretionary	-9%	-0.06
Comm Svcs	-2%	-0.08
Health Care	0%	-0.31
REITs	3%	-0.31
Cons Staples	3%	-0.47
Utilities	6%	-0.48

Sorted by correlation

Source: Oppenheimer & Co. and Bloomberg. These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance.

Key Support for US Dollar DXY: 88

Fluctuations in the **US Dollar DXY** have kept inflationary pressures in check in both directions (USD strength is deflationary/weakness is inflationary) and in turn have helped create a stable pricing backdrop, by our analysis. Said differently, equity markets have historically outperformed when inflation is tame, and this has in part been provided by a range-bound USD, in our view. **The greenback is currently trading lower and providing a tailwind for reflationary assets**. **We see downside in the DXY to critical support at 88** marking both its 2014 breakout and 2018 low. This test should prove telling for the recovery, and commodity prices most notably.



Source: Oppenheimer & Co., Consensus Inc., and Bloomberg. Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance.

Upside for Gold: $2,075

The price of gold has corrected into the bullish slope of its smoothed trend which we define as a near-term opportunity to buy long-term strength. The breakout above the yellow metal's 2012 peak at $1,800 should also lend support, and we see $2,075 as resistance marking its August 2020 peak. However, a breakdown vs. the S&P 500 doesn't place this high on our top-pick list. Overall, **we side with the price of gold's positive trend and expect a test of $2,075 in 2021**.



Source: Oppenheimer & Co. and Bloomberg. These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance.

Upside for Copper: $400

The price of **WTI crude oil has been supported by a weak dollar and should trade into $53/b resistance** marking its breakdown level from last January, in our view. We see $42 as support (50-day average). Elsewhere in commodity-land, we believe **industrial metals are a more compelling idea than energy for exposure to the economy's recovery**. **We're especially upbeat on the price of copper which completed a five-year basing pattern** following the breakout above its 2018 peak at $332. We see upside to $400 resistance in 2021 (2012 peak).



Source: Oppenheimer & Co. and Bloomberg. These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance.

Historical Market and Sector Returns: 4

The **S&P 500** (+15%) will attempt to post three consecutive years of gains for the first time since 2012 to 2014. **Technology** (+42%) was the top-performing sector in 2020 for the third time in four years, and **Energy** (-37%) was the bottom performer for the fifth time in seven years. No sector has been the bottom performer for four consecutive years, and Energy will attempt to avoid this dubious distinction.

Year	S&P 500: % Chg	TOP SECTOR	% Chg	BOTTOM SECTOR	% Chg
1928	38%	Technology	74%	Consumer Staples	8%
1929	-12%	Telecom	16%	Consumer Discretionary	-36%
1930	-28%	Telecom	-14%	Financials	-49%
1931	-47%	Health Care	-21%	Industrials	-60%
1932	-15%	Financials	11%	Health Care	-31%
1933	44%	Consumer Discretionary	131%	Utilities	-32%
1934	-5%	Health Care	15%	Utilities	-27%
1935	41%	Technology	74%	Health Care	12%
1936	28%	Industrials	44%	Consumer Staples	9%
1937	-39%	Telecom	-23%	Financials	-49%
1938	25%	Consumer Discretionary	48%	Telecom	4%
1939	-5%	Telecom	14%	Energy	-13%
1940	-15%	Telecom	-2%	Health Care	-23%
1941	-18%	Energy	7%	Utilities	-40%
1942	12%	Financials	28%	Telecom	-1%
1943	19%	Utilities	45%	Materials	6%
1944	14%	Consumer Discretionary	23%	Telecom	5%
1945	31%	Utilities	45%	Telecom	18%
1946	-12%	Health Care	23%	Technology	-23%
1947	0%	Energy	17%	Health Care	-23%
1948	-1%	Financials	4%	Consumer Staples	-13%
1949	10%	Health Care	33%	Telecom	1%
1950	22%	Energy	41%	Utilities	0%
1951	16%	Energy	33%	Consumer Staples	-3%
1952	12%	Financials	16%	Health Care	-16%
1953	-7%	Technology	3%	Consumer Discretionary	-11%
1954	45%	Industrials	67%	Telecom	15%
1955	26%	Consumer Discretionary	31%	Financials	5%
1956	3%	Energy	18%	Consumer Staples	-7%
1957	-14%	Health Care	23%	Consumer Discretionary	-24%
1958	38%	Health Care	69%	Energy	24%
1959	8%	Telecom	27%	Energy	-11%
1960	-3%	Telecom	28%	Consumer Discretionary	-19%
1961	23%	Financials	42%	Industrials	11%
1962	-12%	Energy	5%	Consumer Staples	-25%
1963	19%	Technology	26%	Financials	6%
1964	13%	Energy	23%	Financials	-2%
1965	9%	Technology	32%	Telecom	-8%
1966	-13%	Technology	7%	Materials	-23%
1967	20%	Technology	62%	Telecom	-6%
1968	8%	Financials	51%	Technology	-2%
1969	-11%	Health Care	20%	Energy	-28%
1970	0%	Utilities	10%	Technology	-22%
1971	11%	Health Care	21%	Utilities	-3%
1972	16%	Health Care	27%	Utilities	4%
1973	-17%	Energy	6%	Consumer Staples	-30%
1974	-30%	Telecom	-14%	Financials	-37%

Year	S&P 500: % Chg	TOP SECTOR	% Chg	BOTTOM SECTOR	% Chg
1975	32%	Consumer Discretionary	48%	Health Care	7%
1976	19%	Energy	33%	Health Care	-2%
1977	-12%	Utilities	-1%	Materials	-16%
1978	1%	Health Care	13%	Utilities	-11%
1979	12%	Energy	53%	Telecom	-8%
1980	26%	Energy	62%	Telecom	0%
1981	-10%	Telecom	23%	Energy	-25%
1982	15%	Technology	40%	Energy	-19%
1983	17%	Consumer Discretionary	27%	Health Care	0%
1984	1%	Telecom	17%	Technology	-12%
1985	26%	Consumer Staples	40%	Energy	14%
1986	15%	Consumer Staples	27%	Technology	-6%
1987	2%	Materials	10%	Financials	-13%
1988	12%	Consumer Staples	28%	Technology	-1%
1989	27%	Health Care	42%	Technology	-5%
1990	-7%	Health Care	14%	Financials	-24%
1991	26%	Health Care	50%	Energy	2%
1992	4%	Financials	20%	Health Care	-18%
1993	7%	Technology	20%	Health Care	-11%
1994	-2%	Technology	19%	Utilities	-17%
1995	34%	Health Care	55%	Materials	17%
1996	20%	Technology	43%	Telecom	-2%
1997	31%	Financials	45%	Materials	6%
1998	27%	Technology	78%	Materials	-8%
1999	20%	Technology	78%	Consumer Staples	-17%
2000	-10%	Utilities	52%	Technology	-41%
2001	-13%	Consumer Discretionary	2%	Utilities	-32%
2002	-23%	Consumer Staples	-6%	Technology	-38%
2003	26%	Technology	47%	Telecom	3%
2004	9%	Energy	29%	Health Care	0%
2005	3%	Energy	29%	Telecom	-9%
2006	14%	Telecom	32%	Health Care	6%
2007	4%	Energy	32%	Financials	-21%
2008	-38%	Consumer Staples	-18%	Financials	-57%
2009	23%	Technology	60%	Telecom	3%
2010	13%	Consumer Discretionary	26%	Health Care	1%
2011	0%	Utilities	15%	Financials	-18%
2012	13%	Financials	26%	Utilities	-3%
2013	30%	Consumer Discretionary	41%	Telecom	6%
2014	11%	Utilities	24%	Energy	-10%
2015	-1%	Consumer Discretionary	8%	Energy	-24%
2016	10%	Energy	24%	Health Care	-4%
2017	19%	Technology	37%	Telecom	-6%
2018	-6%	Health Care	5%	Energy	-20%
2019	29%	Technology	48%	Energy	8%
2020	15%	Technology	42%	Energy	-37%

Source: Oppenheimer & Co., Kenneth R. French (1928-1989), and Bloomberg. Note: These results cannot and should not be viewed as an indicator of future performance. Returns data excludes applicable costs.

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