



May 17, 2017

Miningball

Long-term data suggests mining is poised for a sustained up-cycle

The mining sector is a volatile sector with rapid macro influenced short-term cycles overlaying difficult to judge long-term cycles. Using *Moneyball* as inspiration, we have created an industry database that aggregates long-term financials and production. From this, we show how new statistics like ExCap/EV and CC/MT can help to peg where we are in the cycle. In our view, the data suggests that the sector is in a very compelling starting point with global long-term demand for metals likely to remain robust. On the back of this analysis we upgrade Rio Tinto to Top Pick.

Miningball - looking at the sector in a different way

Whilst recognising that individual management strategies and different commodity exposure can have a large impact on individual share performance, the sector tends to move through periods where the wider environment becomes a main driver of performance. Such is the nature of producing in a price and cost taking environment. In order to isolate the noise from individual company decisions we have aggregated large liquid mining company financials going back to 1994 and have aggregated production into equivalent copper units. This produces a full set of implied financials which provide a series of insights.

In the spirit of *Moneyball*, the film about an American baseball team using detailed statistics to improve performance both via player acquisition and onfield performance, we have created some statistics which we think should help investors with the wider investment decision for the mining space.

- ExCap/EV vs. forward 4-year return has provided a reasonable inverse signal historically. Current industry expansion capex to EV is the lowest that it's been since 1994, indicating forward equity returns could average ~30% over the coming 4 years.
- CC/MT - Cash costs to million tonnes of copper eq. production has moved from \$4bn/mt to a peak of \$10bn/mt in 2012. It has now fallen to \$6bn; however, historically this has lagged EBITDA margin changes, indicating there may still be further cost compression to come.
- TC/PB - Total capex to production base has also been falling since 2012 and a low level tends to mean higher ROCE as lower capex activity means better capital efficiency.

We have also analysed the relationship between metals demand and GDP per capita growth on a global basis. This analysis shows that although Chinese metals consumption should remain stable, other emerging economies are on the cusp of seeing sharp upticks in metal consumption that should underpin demand at least for another decade.

Upgrading Rio Tinto to Top Pick

Rio Tinto rates very highly on many company-specific metrics including balance sheet, margins, long-life assets and growth. We attribute the recent sell-off to a derating as investors continue to remain wary of China. At ~2 standard deviations below its recent valuation averages, we expect this will normalise. Stability in iron ore prices, a structurally improving aluminium market and increasing potential for special dividends, will, in our view, allow RIO to outperform over the coming months.

Anglo American estimate and price target changes

We are adjusting Anglo American numbers post Q1, marking-to-market which reduces our target price to 1800p from 1850p previously. Please see page 14 for details.

Miningball – Assessing the long-term cycles using statistics

Since 1994, despite a rapid increase Chinese growth that created a raw materials demand super cycle, the MSCI World Mining Total Return Index is only up 96% vs. the MSCI World Equity index up by 376%. The mining industry has come under substantial criticism for this underperformance. The industry has historically been unable to prove that it can move away from the pro-cyclical capex trap that causes money to be spent when it costs more to build, and then for growth to be delivered when prices and margins fall, causing balance sheet pressure, write-downs and ill-timed asset sales.

However, the mining sector is not always a bad place for investment. Between 2003 and 2013, on a rolling 5-year cumulative return basis, the mining sector outperformed. The supply response in the mining sector can take years with large greenfield projects taking ~7-10 years to come onstream. Due to the long cycle times that arise with such long-dated supply responses, we see the sector as providing significant opportunity for sustained outperformance, if you get the timing right. Our analysis suggests that one of these times is currently upon us.


We have aggregated:

- the financials for the major Western listed mining companies going back to 1994; and
- total production and converted it to a copper equivalent basis based on average prices between 2000 and 2016.

See page 17 for notes and methodology and an explanation and background of *Moneyball*.

This aggregation of data has provided a full set of implied industry financials, yields and ratios. From this, there are many insights, which help to provide some context for long-term investors in what can be an almost unbearably volatile sector, especially at sector turning points.

Exhibit 1: Miningball provides an overview of secular industry trends; we see material upside on a 12-month to 4-year view



Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates


In analysing the data, we have created some new metrics, in the style of *Moneyball*, to attempt to provide a better understanding of investing in the mining sector. **Some of our RBC Miningball metrics include:**

- Industry-wide **ExCap/EV (expansion capex to EV)** as compared to the forward 4-year return, provides a clear relationship between contrarian investing and future equity performance. ExCap/EV is currently the lowest it has been since 1994. Were historical relationships to hold, this would imply **30-50% average sector equity returns** over the coming 4 years, signalling a compelling long-term entry point.

- The production aggregation combined with cost data allows us to create **CC/MT (cash cost per million tonnes)** which shows substantial pro-cyclical changes in the cost base through the cycle. It also tends to lag behind industry EBITDA margin (as lower margins shift mine plans towards higher margin production). This suggests the recently declining costs may still have further to go before their eventual turnaround (although consensus has them increasing over the next 2 years).
- **TCC/PB (total capital cost to production base)** shows that capital inefficiency peaked around 2013 at over \$2,100/t but has now retraced to nearly \$610/t which bodes well for future expansions, once the demand for new metal capacity is required. ROCE tends to be higher when this number is lower.

We see the sector poised for a cycle even stronger than the last. The starting point is more robust and the conservatism that was generated from the 2012-2016 downturn will continue to weigh on boards and management teams for some time. This should increase the forward tension on supply and demand dynamics as new investment will require higher returns to satisfy what is likely to remain a skeptical investor base.

Exhibit 2: Historical industry production by commodity



Based on average prices, 2000-2016.
Source: Company reports and RBC Capital Markets estimates

As we point out through this note, the metrics almost universally point to a relatively constructive cyclical starting point. Macro twists and turns will continue to keep the sector volatile, especially with increased financialisation of commodities, something that we expect will continue. This is especially true with metals price-setting power increasingly shifting to Asia. However, over the medium term and long term, data suggests the underlying cyclical factors will outweigh the short-term macro oscillations. Even though the sector has performed very well over the past year, and undergone a sharp correction, the data suggests there is substantial upside potential, especially with attractive fundamental valuations for new long-term mining sector equity investment.


RBC is 15% ahead of consensus EBITDA for the London diversifieds over the next 2 years, implying an average 48% 12-month upside (versus consensus at 26%). We see potential for Rio Tinto to rerate sharply in the near term. Following the recent pullback, with RIO's EV/EBITDA now trading 2.3 standard deviations below its consensus 2-year average, combined with our still positive view of the iron ore market, and increasing confidence in the aluminium market, **we raise our recommendation on Rio Tinto to Top Pick (see page 14).**

ExCap/EV (expansion capex to EV)


The enterprise value of the listed mining sector has followed a volatile path, increasing ten-fold between 1994 and 2011 before falling to the current ~\$488bn. The initial growth was due both to the super cycle, but also to the series of the listings which occurred in the 2000s. Although the data set is missing government or private companies like Codelco, Hancock Prospecting, as well as domestic Chinese production, the data captures a representative sample of the industry as a whole.

Exhibit 3: Enterprise value, and spending on future growth, have pulled back significantly

Industry Enterprise Value



Industry Capital Expenditure




Note – see page 17 for explanation on the future years enterprise value and market cap placeholder assumptions.
Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates

Total capex follows a similar path. If we assume depreciation is at a representative level for sustaining capex, the implied level of expansion capex has moved to sharply lower levels, almost negligible into 2018 based on current company guidance.


Combining these two data sets, we calculate **ExCap/EV**. Exhibit 4 shows the forward 4-year annualised equity return plotted against ExCap/EV. The exhibit on the right shows ExCap/Assets to ROCE. It is clear that there is a historical relationship between lower levels of capital spending and future returns and we would expect this to continue over the medium term.

Exhibit 4: Annualised forward total equity return could be pushing into the ~30%+ level

ExCap/EV vs. Forward 4-year annual total return



ExCap/Assets vs. ROCE



Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates

- 1) The low expansion capex places a constraint on meeting medium-term demand, indicating commodity prices should move higher (all else equal).




- 2) The lower capex activity reduces the risks of the equities with less delivery, budget and financing risk.
- 3) The more growth the sector pushes, the more pressure on the cost spiral, which reduces returns across the board (not just making capex more expensive, but all costs).

Should historical relationships hold, the ExCap/EV, based on 2017E-2018E consensus overall capex levels, suggests that there may be 30-50% average 4-year returns on the horizon until ExCap/EV recovers. Investors are further protected from what is likely to be a growing EV into higher prices, pressuring the ratio going forward. The ExCap/Assets vs. ROCE suggests that the industry is already underinvesting, creating a parallel in the chart to the 2003 period.

Without overlaying demand forecasts, it is impossible to judge what level of expansion capex is actually required going forward. As we highlight in the demand section below, long-term global per capita GDP growth has been a good indicator of long-term metals demand, and it continues to grow. In summary, for many reasons, ExCap/EV ratio has been a good indicator of forward equity returns.

Valuations remain stubbornly low. The equities are pricing current cash flows at a very modest level, which could provide further equity uplift moving forward. Exhibit 5 shows historical forward EV/EBITDA (consensus). The peak levels seen in 2002 and 2014 likely edge the average up a little higher than is warranted (we see fair value for diversified as 6.5x-7.0x EV/EBITDA). Regardless, the current levels remain compelling from an entry point perspective. This is especially true in that consensus levels do not by-and-large price-in the potential uplift to industrial metals and minerals prices over the medium term if our long-term cyclical analysis on likely underinvestment is correct.

Exhibit 5: As expected, lower EV/adj EBITDA has also meant promising future returns



Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates


The dawn of the Megacycle?

The data shows, unsurprisingly, that the sector is cyclical. What we find fascinating is that the downturn from 2012-2016 was so intense that most of the data sets are now showing extreme cyclical levels. As we have anecdotally pointed out at numerous times, the behaviours of the mining management has changed (for now). Starting with the success from cutting excess thermal coal and zinc production, Glencore was able to take leadership in focusing on meeting market demand rather than “maximising” sunk capital utilization. This has spread to the iron ore industry where Rio Tinto’s “Value over Volume” mantra is a noticeable shift in strategic culture following the change of CEO. We are seeing more rationality in production across the board and financing remains sparse for greenfield projects. Investors are demanding discipline and management teams are largely delivering.


Although the rhetoric suggests that this time is different, and an appropriate level of skepticism is advised, the data does back up the above anecdotal trends. In our view, the sector has rarely been positioned in as constructive a position as it is now and will take time to unwind with the inflexibility of certain data sets (for instance, total production is likely to fall over the medium term if expansion capex is nearing zero) as well as vastly improved cash situations (free cash flow yields have never been higher).

Exhibit 6: Total production has stabilised and production growth potential is low

Total copper equivalent production



Rolling 3-year production growth




Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates

Total copper equivalent production has stayed relatively flat through the 2013-2016 period as the initial impacts of slowing capex levels began to reduce growth trends. Additionally, the removal of production has reduced the production base (either via some small divestments or by closure due to lower prices). This should increase the productivity of the remaining assets as it would be presumed these are better assets and there is more management focus that can be applied where it matters.


The rolling 3-year production growth is now down to sub-2% growth rates and we would not expect (beyond a copper and iron ore led production uptick in 2018) that this will be able to grow with such low levels of planned expansion capex and the lead times that it takes from project start to finish.

Exhibit 7: EBITDA margins have normalised but FCF in 2017 likely to be the highest since 1994

Implied Industry EBITDA margin



Implied FCFY and Dividend Yield




Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates


Consensus forecasts that EBITDA margins will return to their historical averages in 2017. The potential coming tightness in metals markets is, in our view, likely to push up margins towards 2003-2007 levels. From an equity perspective, this is even more interesting considering that with the low capex levels and only normalised margins, free cash yields are the highest that they've been over the past 20+ years. This should allow dividend yields to increase, supporting our thesis that high cash payout ratios will help to provide a rerating for the sector over time.

Exhibit 8: Net debt to EBITDA is low and balance sheets are set to get stronger

Implied debt to equity and ND/EBITDA



Implied FCF generation and retained cash



Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates

Balance sheets have improved as well, leaving the sector in a more flexible starting point than in the 2003-2007 cycle – debt to equity, and net debt to EBITDA should stay close to 1x, if not improve further as consensus prices move upwards. Based on consensus estimates, we calculate balance sheets will improve by an additional \$27bn bringing total net debt to below \$100bn by the end of 2018. This is a much different environment than over the past 10 years, whereby the sector generated a total \$66bn and retained negative \$76bn in cash.


Total cash cost to MT production (CC/MT)

CC/MT shows that the P&L cost per MT of production has moved from ~\$5.4bn in 2002 to a peak of \$12.0bn in 2012, before falling again to \$7.0bn/mt (based on consensus estimates) for 2017 and 2018. There is likely more than just cost inflation and deflation working through this data set, although we would speculate that this is the majority of the causation. With asset divestments and asset closures, the average levels could reasonably be assumed to


have fallen over the past couple of years as the quality of the production has increased (also via the delivery of lower cost new production, especially in iron ore). This said, there appears to be a clear lagged relationship between CC/MT and the EBITDA margin – showing the procyclicality of investment in better times. Should this trend hold going forward, the lack of overall spend in the industry could potentially indicate that the cost savings, either through environmental factors, or more likely, improved productivity, could see further unit cost gains before turning around.

Exhibit 9: Cost of production has rolled but the lagged association with EBITDA margin means there is still more potential deflation to push through

Cash cost per Mt of production and EBITDA margin



Total capital cost to production base vs. ROCE



Source: Bloomberg, company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates

Total capital cost to production base (TC/PB)


The capex intensity of production is another factor which has dampened returns. TC/PB has also returned to lows, suggesting that eventual capital spending may not cost as much as recent history might suggest (see Exhibit 9, RHS). Much like other cyclical forces in the sector, there is a substantial impact that comes from spending alongside with the cycle. The above chart helps to explain the increasing capex blowouts in the early part of the decade, the poor equity returns, and the limited new capex spending since. We would anticipate this to rise relatively sharply into the next cycle as there are few low cost, large-scale assets available for development, but for now it should remain tempered.

But what about the demand in this volatile sector?


The mining sector has a persistent and substantially higher beta than the wider market. The macro linkages are obvious with the interactions between interest rates, commodity prices, speculation and a high sensitivity to short-term cyclical growth changes. This makes the sector relatively more difficult to assess as returns and certainty need to be outsized for the sector to take an average share of its long-term global equity value.

Exhibit 10: The mining sector’s volatility is here to stay

Standard deviation of total returns – rolling 5 yrs



Mining vs market absolute performance



Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates

Volatility stayed well ahead of the wider market over the past 17 years. We do not expect this to change. We do however expect that the lower relative volatility seen between 2003 and 2007 is likely to repeat through the next few years. Stronger balance sheets, higher dividends, rising margins, and persisting cost stability should help to reduce the earnings and share price volatility going forward.


However, a problem that besets many investors when looking at the sector, even after assessing the above analysis, is that all of this presumes that metals demand is sustainable. This is especially important now, with the ongoing shift in the Chinese growth model. This creates uncertainty (rightly so), as well as misconceptions, of what is happening to metals demand.

The 2000s super cycle was linked inexorably with China. We think the next cycle will be different. China will remain a key constituency in global metals demand, but wider EM GDP per capita growth brings more countries to the level where we should expect a sharp uptick in their metal intensity. China’s “One Belt, One Road” program looks increasingly likely to provide the initial capital to help fund metal-intensive projects in Southeast and Central Asia (potentially bringing forward increased metal intensity that is not captured in our current estimates). In the medium term, countries with large populations like India and Indonesia, will begin to reach critical mass.


Metals demand has exhibited a close historical relationship with world GDP growth, with a pick-up in consumption rates in the 2000s as more of the world’s population moved to middle income levels. (We have used long-term consumption growth rates from the World Steel Association and ICSG for 2021-2040.)

Exhibit 11: We expect that growing world GDP and the emergence of more EM countries reaching lower-middle income will underpin metals demand

Global steel consumption vs. world GDP




Global copper demand vs. world GDP



Source: Bloomberg, RBC Capital Markets, World Steel Association, ICSG, World Bank

On a per capita consumption basis, there has been a consistent edging up of demand levels in steel and copper since the late 1990s vs. more modest consumption in energy.

Exhibit 12: Global per capita metals consumption has continued to rise, even after the end of the Chinese super cycle




Source: RBC Capital Markets, World Bank, WSA, ICSG, Bloomberg


We think this can be explained by the chart below. According to analysis from E&Y, metal intensity in more mature economies has tended to peak at GDP per capita levels of USD15,000 and above. Over the long term, GDP per capita has increased at a very constant rate. Even global economic disruptions, like that in 2008, hardly appear in the data. (We have forecasted long-term global GDP growth based on World Bank and OECD projections for population and economic growth.)

Exhibit 13: Even without another China, growing global economic activity should still allow for metals consumption growth

Global steel consumption growth rate vs. GDP per capita



Apparent steel consumption vs. GDP per capita




Source: Bloomberg, RBC Capital Markets, E&Y

As can be seen from our global steel consumption growth rate chart, forecast growth rates are not expected to go through another global boom like the one that China caused. But as other EM countries see increasing per capita steel consumption from the last decade, there is unlikely to be a peak in global steel demand for some time. Historically, per capita steel consumption has peaked at ~USD15,000 p.a. Based on the World Bank GDP growth forecasts this will only be reached by 2041. We would expect other metals demand to not peak until later.

In regards to steel consumption, there are many middle income countries like Turkey (USD11,523 p.a.), Brazil (USD11,212 p.a.), Russia (USD11,145 p.a.), who should see stable consumption rates in relatively higher structural growth environments. Growth should be bolstered by large population bases in Indonesia (USD3,834 p.a.) and India (USD1,752 p.a.), which combined are bigger populations than China (with higher growth rates). China itself, although having had a higher-than-normal steel consumption intensity, is not expected to reach USD15,000 p.a. until 2032 (assuming 0.5% population growth and 6% GDP growth).

Exhibit 14: Contribution to GDP growth in China remains stable, even with rebalancing



Source: World Bank, RBC Capital Markets

We therefore expect that with still positive GDP growth, metals demand growth will stay positive for some time.

It is beyond the scope of this note, but with technological innovations, in our view, there is a risk going forward that technology and maturing growth could cause diverging demand rates within the commodities complex, with oil or platinum or even iron ore seeing their relative usefulness dissipate, whilst others increase. There will also be underlying shifts in relative supply and demand within the complex that will cause varying returns based on the commodity and this is certainly to continue. We realise that there will be better and worse exposures within the industry at various times. **Unless there is a dramatic shift in long-term growth rates, however (perhaps as was seen during World War I or World War II), regardless of the oscillations of China in the short term, long-term commodity demand is likely to remain robust. This, combined with initial underinvestment in supply to meet this growing demand should create strong future returns in the 2017-2022 period.**

When to sell?

We have been positive on the diversified miners in London over the past year, and maintain our constructive outlook on the space. This analysis has bolstered our expectations that equity values will start rising once again, into a new cycle where the potential for the industry to deliver the required supply to meet global demand is low, which should mean higher prices and new growth opportunities. Our current upside expectation for the group on a 12-month basis is 48%, but we would expect mining equities to achieve significant upside over the coming years beyond this.

Unfortunately, this won't last forever. The above analysis shows the various ways that this sector has lended to long-term cycles. The current data suggests we are at the cusp of a new cycle (and probably a large one) but as we progress through the cycle the dynamics listed throughout this note will invariably change. As EBITDA margins rise, costs will rise as mines chase lower margin production. Growth will creep back (at first helping sentiment and NAV valuations) and then accelerate as balance sheets and market opportunities allow for more returns. This will see capex costs increase causing ROCE to begin to fall. Production will likely overshoot and some short-term economic dislocation will cause further destruction of equity value. Therefore, investments in this sector, even for the medium term, need to be watched closely. *We believe that there will come a time, albeit not likely for a few years, where Miningball analysis suggests the opposite of what it does now.*

Whilst accepting that every cycle will be different, and that valuations can oscillate up and down within the wider long-term cycle framework, the RBC Miningball analysis tells us that it would be advisable to sell when:

- 1) **ExCap/EV moves above 4-5%** – the forward returns historically have moved negative (or at least will begin to fall triggering a de-rating).
- 2) **EV/EBITDA moves above ~8x** – the forward 4-year average return begins to fall. This is likely to be tricky to assess in practice as the market expectations around commodity prices is likely to reach a peak right before the cycle turns (skewing EV/EBITDA forecasts). However, any high readings on valuation, like in any sensible sector, should be followed.
- 3) **CC/MT is above \$10,000** – With generally falling grades/asset quality and a lack of Tier I projects available, we would expect that the CC/MT metric would increase as time goes on (i.e., this should be increasing independently of the sector cycles). The varying amount of low cost production that can be brought online depending on the commodity also likely skews this data set. The increase in the near term may be partially offset by what we think could be a relatively high level of productivity improvement in the mining sector with different technologies (big data, better operational controls, new improvements in metallurgy, etc.) and more capacity to spend on R&D driving capex costs down. However, we would suggest that when this returns above \$10,000 that caution should start to be warranted – if history is a guide, this will be happening when prices are higher, making the decision to sell more challenging.
- 4) **TC/PB above \$1,500/t** – For the coming cycle, capex is likely to increase structurally as larger, lower-grade projects become more compelling options with prices moving back up to incentive levels. This will likely be faced with significant consternation from shareholders who will still have very fresh memories from the 2011-2016 period. That said, TC/PB above \$1,500 should be a reasonable exit target as it would indicate production is starting to grow and capital efficiency is beginning to fall, putting pressure on ROCE.



Estimate, price target and rating changes

Anglo American

We have not made any material changes to our estimates in this note, with the exception of pushing through our Anglo American numbers post Q1, marking-to-market which reduces our target price to 1800p from 1850p previously.

Our target price of 1800p is based on a blend of 0.9x NAV (2016E) and 5x 2017E-2018E EV/EBITDA. Our EV/EBITDA multiple of 5x reflects the geopolitical risk discount that Anglo trades at vs. peers due to South African exposure. Our P/NAV multiple of 0.9x also reflects the heightened risk of operating in South Africa. Our price target supports our Outperform rating.

Exhibit 15: Anglo American estimate changes

	2017E	2018E	2019E
EPS, Adj Diluted			
New	\$3.45	\$2.90	\$2.34
Old	\$3.72	\$2.72	\$2.31
CFPS, Adj Diluted			
New	\$5.50	\$5.00	\$4.38
Old	\$6.01	\$4.93	\$4.61
FCFPS			
New	\$3.73	\$3.16	\$2.63
Old	\$4.11	\$3.09	\$2.76

Source: RBC Capital Markets estimates


Our commodity price forecasts remain ahead of consensus. Across the sector, we are currently 15% ahead of consensus for calendar 2017E EBITDA and 14% in 2018. This drives implied average 48% upside within our London diversifieds coverage universe vs. consensus at 26%.

Rio Tinto – Upgrading to Top Pick (from Outperform), 4400p target

We are moving Rio Tinto to Top Pick, previously Outperform, following the recent pullback. At 3.3x 2018 EV/EBITDA on our forecasts (3.9x at spot prices) and 0.72x NAV we see significant valuation upside both in rerating potential and from longer-term uplift to our RBC 4,208p NAV. We highlight this is before factoring in the medium-term implications from the low **ExCap/EV** sector multiples, which should help medium-term iron ore prices with the substantial leverage found in this division (which accounts for 66% of our NAV). We also highlight a vastly improved outlook on aluminium as Chinese supply side reforms, both via environmental regulations and overcapacity regulations, should help to push the market back into a stronger structural position. We expect the reshaping and cost-cutting in the smelting division and the expansions in bauxite will begin to take more notice. On 2018E numbers, only iron ore, aluminium and coking coal are below spot consensus estimates, which bodes well for relative mark-to-market upgrades in RIO – even following the recent weakness in commodity prices.

The majority of the recent pullback has been due to a de-rating which we do not see as warranted in the context of the above analysis. Consensus EPS estimates are largely unchanged (which is an implicit upgrade considering the strength in sterling). Based on spot prices, RIO could announce an interim dividend of 90 cents – implying a full-year dividend of 280 cents (vs. consensus of 257 cents) and a gearing ratio of 14%, well below the 20% low end of target gearing levels and may open the potential for a special dividend, or an increased buyback at the half-year results.

Exhibit 16: Rio Tinto’s recent sell-off has been due to multiple de-rating



Source: Bloomberg, RBC Capital Markets

There is no question that the iron ore market, Chinese steel industry and Chinese financial conditions are creating uncertainty in the near term. We continue to expect uncertainty to persist. However, we expect that Chinese authorities maintain support for the economy and will provide liquidity from the PBOC when necessary. We continue to expect that Chinese steel demand will be better than expected through 2017 (currently running at +10% YTD) and that improving structural margins for Chinese steel as well as the potential for iron ore supply to continue to underwhelm as we approach a well understood surplus, will allow prices to settle higher than expected.

We continue to remain constructive on the sector as a whole and this can be seen by significant upside we calculate across the board. We see Rio Tinto’s strong balance sheet, its long-life, low cost asset base and its recent sharp de-rating into what we expect will be stable Chinese growth through the year drive heightened investor interest. We do forecast higher upside in Glencore and Anglo American on a 12-month view, and continue to recommend investors invest in these companies. However whether it’s the time it takes for Glencore to prove-out our ahead-of-consensus marketing profits and to transact more accretive deals or for Anglo’s low-multiple holding pattern in advance of any South African restructuring, **we see a straightforward investment story for Rio Tinto in the short term, especially into the half-year results in August.**



Exhibit 17: Value across the board; we expect RIO to recoup some of its recent valuation losses

RBC Base Case											2017E								2018E									
Ticker	Rating	Price	Target price	Upside	Mkt Cap (US\$ M)	Net Debt 2016A (US\$ M)	EV (US\$m)	adj NAV	P/NAV	Net Debt (US\$m)	EBITDA	EPS	P/E	P/CFPS	FCF Yield (%)	EV/EBITDA	ND/EBITDA	Div yield	Net Debt (US\$m)	EBITDA	EPS	P/E	P/CFPS	FCF Yield (%)	EV/EBITDA	ND/EBITDA	Div yield	
BHP Billiton	BLT	SP	1191p	1525p	28.1%	89,207	20,057	115,045	1470p	0.81x	11,984	24,052	\$1.96	7.8x	4.4x	15.0%	4.4x	0.4x	6.4%	5,999	21,482	\$1.59	9.7x	4.8x	12.3%	4.1x	0.1x	5.2%
Rio Tinto	RIO	TP	3020p	4400p	45.7%	72,296	10,191	88,927	4208p	0.72x	4,147	22,444	\$6.21	6.3x	4.6x	14.2%	3.3x	0.2x	9.6%	2,738	18,147	\$4.65	8.4x	5.6x	10.5%	3.3x	0.2x	7.2%
Glencore Plc	GLEN	OP	294p	450p	53.1%	53,992	15,526	67,147	411p	0.71x	10,048	15,007	\$0.40	9.4x	3.1x	14.2%	4.5x	0.7x	4.2%	4,816	15,226	\$0.42	9.1x	5.1x	15.1%	4.4x	0.3x	4.4%
Anglo American	AAL	OP	1075p	1800p	67.5%	17,868	8,487	31,664	1908p	0.56x	3,305	9,457	\$3.45	4.0x	2.5x	28.6%	3.3x	0.3x	12.4%	2,788	8,514	\$2.90	4.8x	2.8x	22.9%	3.1x	0.3x	10.4%
Average				48.6%					0.70x				6.9x		18.0%	3.9x	0.4x	8.2%				8.0x		15.2%	3.7x	0.2x	6.8%	

Spot commodity and currencies											2017E								2018E									
Ticker	Rating	Price	Target price	Upside	Mkt Cap (US\$ M)	Net Debt 2015A (US\$ M)	EV (US\$m)	adj NAV	P/NAV	Net Debt (US\$m)	EBITDA	EPS	P/E	P/CFPS	FCF Yield (%)	EV/EBITDA	ND/EBITDA	Div yield	Net Debt (US\$m)	EBITDA	EPS	P/E	P/CFPS	FCF Yield (%)	EV/EBITDA	ND/EBITDA	Div yield	
BHP Billiton	BLT	SP	1191p	1525p	28.1%	89,207	20,057	115,045	1255p	0.95x	14,045	19,430	\$1.36	11.3x	5.4x	11.7%	5.5x	0.5x	4.4%	8,534	19,404	\$1.31	11.7x	5.3x	10.5%	4.7x	0.3x	4.3%
Rio Tinto	RIO	TP	3020p	4400p	45.7%	72,296	10,191	88,927	3677p	0.82x	6,269	18,206	\$4.66	8.4x	5.6x	10.6%	4.3x	0.3x	7.2%	4,460	16,775	\$4.14	9.4x	6.0x	9.1%	3.9x	0.3x	6.4%
Glencore Plc	GLEN	OP	294p	450p	53.1%	53,992	15,526	67,147	401p	0.73x	11,016	14,512	\$0.38	10.1x	3.2x	13.5%	4.6x	0.8x	4.1%	6,732	14,349	\$0.37	10.4x	5.4x	13.8%	4.7x	0.5x	4.2%
Anglo American	AAL	OP	1075p	1800p	67.5%	17,868	8,487	31,664	2140p	0.50x	3,961	8,196	\$2.86	4.8x	2.9x	23.8%	3.9x	0.5x	10.3%	3,167	8,440	\$2.82	4.9x	2.8x	22.5%	3.2x	0.4x	10.2%
Average				48.6%					0.75x				8.7x		14.9%	4.5x	0.5x	6.5%				9.1x		14.0%	4.1x	0.3x	6.2%	

Mark-to-market changes											2017E				2018E			
Ticker	Rating	Price	Target price	Upside	(US\$ M)	2015A	EV (US\$m)	adj NAV	P/NAV	EBITDA	EPS	EBITDA%	EPS%	EBITDA	EPS	EBITDA%	EPS%	
BHP Billiton	BLT	SP	1191p	1525p	28.1%	89,207	20,057	115,045		-4,622	(\$0.60)	-19.2%	-30.8%	-2,078	(\$0.28)	-9.7%	-17.4%	
Rio Tinto	RIO	TP	3020p	4400p	45.7%	72,296	10,191	88,927		-4,237	(\$1.54)	-18.9%	-24.9%	-1,372	(\$0.51)	-7.6%	-11.0%	
Glencore Plc	GLEN	OP	294p	450p	53.1%	53,992	15,526	67,147		-494	(\$0.03)	-3.3%	-6.8%	-877	(\$0.05)	-5.8%	-11.8%	
Anglo American	AAL	OP	1075p	1800p	67.5%	17,868	8,487	31,664		-1,261	(\$0.59)	-13.3%	-17.0%	-73	(\$0.08)	-0.9%	-2.6%	
Average											-13.7%	-19.9%			-6.0%	-10.7%		

Consensus											2017E - RBC vs. Consensus					2018E - RBC vs. Consensus						
Ticker	Rating	Price	Target price	Upside	Mkt Cap (US\$ M)	2015A (US\$ M)	EV (US\$m)	Avg. Rating	Net Debt (US\$m)	EBITDA	EPS	EBITDA%	EPS%	Cons EV/EBITDA	Cons P/E	Net Debt (US\$m)	EBITDA	EPS	EBITDA%	EPS%	Cons EV/EBITDA	Cons P/E
BHP Billiton	BLT	1191p	1430p	20.1%	89,207	25,921	115,045	3.31	20,973	\$1.35	14.7%	45.7%	5.5x	11.4x	20,198	\$1.35	6.4%	18.0%	5.7x	11.4x		
Rio Tinto	RIO	3020p	3805p	26.0%	72,296	13,697	88,927	3.97	18,117	\$4.60	23.9%	35.0%	4.9x	8.5x	15,151	\$3.43	19.8%	35.7%	5.9x	11.4x		
Glencore Plc	GLEN	294p	371p	26.2%	53,992	25,889	67,147	4.14	14,140	\$0.33	6.1%	22.1%	4.7x	11.5x	13,857	\$0.29	9.9%	41.7%	4.8x	13.0x		
Anglo American	AAL	1075p	1419p	32.1%	17,868	12,901	31,664	3.63	8,250	\$2.33	14.6%	47.9%	3.8x	5.9x	7,001	\$1.68	21.6%	72.8%	4.5x	8.3x		
Average				26.1%							14.8%	37.7%	4.7x	9.3x			14.4%	42.0%	5.2x	11.0x		

Priced as of market close, May 15, 2017, BST.
Source: Bloomberg, Company reports and RBC Capital Markets estimates

Methodology

Our Miningball title is a play on *Moneyball*, an Academy Award nominated film from 2011. The film details the story of Billy Beane, the General Manager of the Oakland Athletics baseball team. In the 1970s, an advanced statistical analysis of baseball, coined *Sabermetrics*, emerged. This strategy utilised historical regressions between on-field performance and various in-game statistics, some of these underappreciated by traditional scouting techniques. There is a typically high connection between wages paid to players and success in most sports leagues. The use of this method in the early 2000s allowed for the Oakland As to compete for the title, despite vastly lower resources. In more “investment friendly” terms, it allowed the team “to generate alpha in player acquisition”. We hope that in the spirit of *Moneyball*, that some of these alternate statistics in the analysis above help investors to better assess long-term investments in the mining industry.

The database

We have created a database which has downloaded the historical financials, where available, from Bloomberg and from company websites and then aggregated the data. This data is not meant to be a holistic assessment of the global mining industry, but more as a representative of the larger listed entities, especially where data is available for long periods of time.

Company data used

Company name	Ticker	First year of data	
		Financials	Production
Rio Tinto PLC	RIO LN	1994	2000
VALE SA	VALE3 BZ	1994	2002
Antofagasta PLC	ANTO LN	1994	2000
Alcoa Corp	AA US	1994	N/A
Teck Resources Ltd	TECK/B CN	1994	1999
Freeport-McMoRan Inc	FCX US	1994	2001
MMG Ltd	1208 HK	1994	2008
Grupo Mexico SAB de CV	GMEXICOB MM	1994	2004
Norsk Hydro ASA	NHY NO	1994	2000
First Quantum Minerals Ltd	FM CN	1995	2004
BHP Billiton PLC	BLT LN	1996	2000
Southern Copper Corp	SCCO PE	1996	2000
Anglo American PLC	AAL LN	1999	2000
Vedanta Resources PLC	VED LN	2001	2003
Fortescue Metals Group Ltd	FMG AU	2001	2008
Xstrata Ltd	XTA LN	2002	2004
Glencore PLC	GLEN LN	2007	2010
South32 Ltd	S32 AU	2014	2014

Average prices used

Average price 2000 - 2016		US\$
Gold	US\$/oz	1,223
Silver	US\$/oz	20.2
Bauxite	US\$/t	50.0
Alumina	US\$/t	300.0
Bauxite/Alumina	US\$/t*	175.0
Aluminium	US\$/lb	0.9
Metallurgical Coal	US\$/t	128.0
Thermal Coal	US\$/t	68.0
Cobalt	US\$/lb	13.8
Copper	US\$/lb	2.4
Iron Ore	US\$/t	70.0
Lead	(US\$/lb)	0.7
Manganese Ore	US\$/t	2.8
Molybdenum	US\$/t	13.7
Nickel	(US\$/lb)	7.3
Uranium	US\$/lb	36.0
Zinc	(US\$/lb)	0.8
Petroleum	(US\$/boe)	80.0
Palladium	(US\$/oz)	488.0
Platinum	(US\$/oz)	1,124

*Average of Alumina and Bauxite

Source: Bloomberg and Company data

We have used the FTSE350 Mining index (converted to USD) for returns data and the MSCI World Mining index for volatility data. Where data has not been available we have calculated a proxy (i.e., total interest rate where we have used USD 10yr +200bp) and have calculated “implied” aggregate numbers based on available data. For cash flow analysis we have added back in write-downs and other adjustments. We are assuming that sustaining capex is equivalent to depreciation (but we highlight in recent times this relationship has not held) and the remaining spend is expansion capex.

Production has been aggregated based on Bloomberg production data (since 2000) or company data where missing. For equivalence purposes, we have calculated an economic value based on the average prices received between 2000 and 2016 annually and then converted this into copper.

We have calculated an aggregated industry P&L and cash flow statement for 2017E and 2018E using Bloomberg consensus revenues, EBITDA, dividend yields, capex and historical



ratios for depreciation. We have assumed that the excess free cash post dividends is used to pay down debt. Assuming enterprise values are constant, this would see a slight increase in expected market cap over the next two years; however, we caveat that the enterprise value is likely to change as well.

We will endeavor to keep this model updated going forward.



Exhibit 18: Rio Tinto financial model

Rio Tinto Plc	LSE: RIO		Target Price	4400p	Rating:	Top Pick
RBC Capital Markets	No Shares (m):	1,797			Risk Specifier:	N/A
Tyler Broda +44 207 653 4866	Liq. (\$m/day)	203	Share Price (p):	3020p	Implied Return (%):	45.7%
	Market Cap. (\$m):	72,296	2017E Dividend (\$/sh):	\$3.72	Implied Total Return (%):	45.8%
	Ent. Value (M \$)	88,927	NAV (GBP/sh):	4208p	P/NAV (x):	0.72x

All USD unless noted						All USD unless noted							
RATIO ANALYSIS		Year End Dec 31				PRICES & EXCHANGE RATES		Year End Dec 31					
		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E			2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	2020E	
Earnings - Adjusted	\$/sh	\$2.84	\$6.21	\$4.65	\$4.71	Alumina price	US\$/t	265	310	300	300	335	
Earnings - Basic	\$/sh	\$2.57	\$6.21	\$4.65	\$4.71	Aluminium price	US\$/lb	0.73	0.83	0.85	0.85	0.95	
P/E Multiple	x	13.7x	6.3x	8.4x	8.3x	Copper price	US\$/lb	2.21	2.64	2.75	2.85	3.50	
EV/EBITDA	x	6.6x	3.3x	3.3x	2.6x	Rutile price	US\$/t	813	900	1,000	1,100	1,100	
CFPS (Operating CF pre WC)	\$/sh	\$4.86	\$8.51	\$6.97	\$7.07	Diamond prices	US\$/ct	60	60	60	60	60	
P/CF Multiple	x	8.0x	4.6x	5.6x	5.5x	Iron Ore fines CFR China (62%)	US\$/dmt	58.33	83.91	65.00	70.00	65.00	
Free Cash Yield	%	7.5%	14.2%	10.5%	10.7%	Hard coking coal	US\$/t	117	179	150	120	120	
Dividends Per Share	\$/sh	\$1.70	\$3.72	\$2.79	\$2.83	Semi-soft coking coal	US\$/t	85	145	115	85	85	
Dividend Yield	%	4.4%	9.6%	7.2%	7.3%	Thermal coal	US\$/t	60	78	75	70	65	
Net Debt	\$m	\$10,191	\$4,147	\$2,738	(\$71)	Uranium price	US\$/lb	40.12	32.50	40.00	45.00	45.00	
Net Debt/EBITDA	x	0.8x	0.2x	0.2x	0.0x	AUDUSD		0.74	0.74	0.73	0.73	0.74	
Net Debt/Total Cap	%	10%	5%	3%	0%	CADUSD		0.76	0.73	0.74	0.75	0.78	
Interest Coverage (EBITDA/Net interest)	x	13.2x	35.1x	30.1x	31.6x								
Gearing (ND/ND+Equity)	x	18%	7%	5%	0%								
INCOME STATEMENT		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	PRODUCTION		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E		
Revenue	\$m	\$33,781	\$42,118	\$37,284	\$37,210	Iron ore (Pilbara)	Mt	329	333	345	349		
Operating Costs	\$m	(\$22,192)	(\$20,997)	(\$20,558)	(\$20,278)	Iron ore (attrib)	Mt	289	297	307	310		
Operating profit		\$6,795	\$16,597	\$12,181	\$12,304	Aluminium	kt	3,644	3,553	3,551	3,551		
D&A	\$m	(\$4,794)	(\$4,525)	(\$4,544)	(\$4,627)	Alumina	kt	8,191	8,143	8,130	8,130		
Statutory EBIT	\$m	\$8,694	\$17,919	\$13,603	\$13,779	Copper	kt	542	463	511	537		
Other		(\$1,329)	(\$575)	(\$654)	(\$681)	Hard Coking Coal	kt	8,141	7,919	7,800	7,800		
Financing Income/Expenses	\$m	(\$1,022)	(\$639)	(\$603)	(\$582)	Semi-soft	kt	4,101	3,577	3,490	3,490		
EBT	\$m	\$6,343	\$16,706	\$12,346	\$12,515	Thermal coal	kt	17,260	16,986	16,857	16,857		
Taxes/minorities	\$m	(\$1,726)	(\$5,553)	(\$3,983)	(\$4,046)	Diamonds	kct	17,952	22,610	25,730	25,684		
Net Income - Reported	\$m	\$4,617	\$11,153	\$8,363	\$8,469	TiO2 feedstock	kt	1,049	1,232	1,100	1,200		
Adjustments	\$m	(\$483)	\$0	\$0	\$0	Borates	kt	503	483	480	480		
Net Income - Adjusted	\$m	\$5,100	\$11,153	\$8,363	\$8,469	Salt	kt	7,578	7,246	8,000	8,000		
Weighted average diluted shares	M	1,797	1,797	1,797	1,797	Uranium	kib	6,341	4,655	2,720	1,646		
Underlying EBITDA	\$m	\$13,488	\$22,444	\$18,147	\$18,406								
CASH FLOW STATEMENT		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	CAPEX BREAKDOWN		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E		
Cash Flows from Operating Activities						Iron ore	\$m	868	1,365	1,384	1,091		
Net Income	\$m	\$4,617	\$11,153	\$8,363	\$8,469	Aluminium	\$m	870	1,220	1,210	823		
D&A	\$m	\$4,794	\$4,525	\$4,544	\$4,627	Copper & Diamonds	\$m	1,449	1,982	2,111	2,687		
Taxes Paid	\$m	(\$1,521)	(\$5,302)	(\$3,941)	(\$3,862)	Energy & Minerals	\$m	137	552	541	423		
Non Recurring/Other/Exploration	\$m	\$575	\$4,769	\$3,696	\$3,414	Other	\$m	-11	0	0	0		
Net Operating Cash Flow	\$m	\$8,465	\$15,145	\$12,663	\$12,648	Product group capex	\$m	3,313	5,119	5,246	5,024		
Cash Flows From Investing Activities													
Capital Expenditure	\$m	(\$3,012)	(\$4,904)	(\$5,085)	(\$4,884)								
Other (excl exploration and disposals)	\$m	\$908	\$116	\$0	\$0								
Net Investing Cash Flow (incl. stripping)	\$m	(\$2,104)	(\$4,788)	(\$5,085)	(\$4,884)								
Cash Flows From Financing Activities													
Net Drawdown/(Repayment)	\$m	(\$4,948)	\$0	\$0	\$0								
Dividends	\$m	(\$2,725)	(\$4,313)	(\$6,169)	(\$4,956)								
Interest, Equity Raise & Other	\$m	\$182	\$0	\$0	\$0								
Net Financing Cash Flow	\$m	(\$7,491)	(\$4,313)	(\$6,169)	(\$4,956)								
Increase (Decrease) in Cash	\$m	(\$1,130)	\$6,044	\$1,409	\$2,809								
Cash at End of Year	\$m	\$8,189	\$14,233	\$15,642	\$18,451								
Free Cash Flow (OPcf - Capex)	\$m	\$5,453	\$10,241	\$7,578	\$7,765								
BALANCE SHEET		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	NET ASSET VALUE		WACC	\$m	GBP/Sh	NAV (%)		
Cash & Equivalents	\$m	\$8,201	\$14,245	\$15,654	\$18,463	Operating Value							
Other Current Assets	\$m	\$6,885	\$6,189	\$5,923	\$6,028	Iron ore	8.1%	\$64,727	27.70	57%			
PP&E & Mining Interests	\$m	\$58,855	\$59,118	\$59,658	\$59,915	Aluminium	8.1%	\$24,349	10.42	22%			
Other Long Term Assets	\$m	\$15,322	\$15,696	\$16,080	\$16,476	Copper & Diamonds	8.1%	\$12,755	5.46	11%			
Total Assets	\$m	\$89,263	\$95,248	\$97,315	\$100,882	Energy & Minerals	8.1%	\$10,977	4.70	10%			
Short term debt	\$m	\$922	\$1,839	\$1,839	\$1,839	Total operating assets		\$112,808	48.28				
Other Current Liabilities	\$m	\$8,478	\$7,623	\$7,496	\$7,550	Corporate		(\$3,237)	-1.39				
Long Term Debt	\$m	\$17,470	\$16,553	\$16,553	\$16,553	Exploration/Evaluation		(\$1,056)	-0.45				
Other Long Term Liabilities	\$m	\$16,663	\$16,663	\$16,663	\$16,663	Cash		\$8,201	3.51				
Total Liabilities	\$m	\$43,533	\$42,678	\$42,551	\$42,605	Debt		(\$18,392)	-7.87				
Shareholder Equity	\$m	\$45,730	\$52,570	\$54,764	\$58,277	Total Net Asset Value		\$98,324	42.08				
Total Liabilities & Shareholder Equity	\$m	\$89,263	\$95,248	\$97,315	\$100,882								
FINANCIAL RATIOS		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E								
Return on Equity (ROE)	%	10.1%	21.2%	15.3%	14.5%								
Return on Capital (ROIC)	%	5.2%	11.7%	8.6%	8.4%								
CFPS (Operating CF pre WC)	\$/sh	\$4.86	\$8.51	\$6.97	\$7.07								
FCFPS (Operating CF-Capex)	\$/sh	\$3.03	\$5.70	\$4.22	\$4.32								

Source: Company reports and RBC Capital Markets estimates



Exhibit 22: Glencore financial model

Glencore plc	LSE: GLEN		Price Target:	450p	Rating: Outperform
RBC Capital Markets	No Shares (m):	14,224			Risk Specifier: N/A
Tyler Broda +44 207 653 4866	Liq. (\$m/day)	228	Share Price (p):	294p	Implied Return (%): 53.1%
	Market Cap. (\$m):	53,992	2017E Dividend (\$/sh):	\$0.16	Implied Total Return (%): 53.1%
	Ent. Value (M \$)	67,147	NAV (GBP/sh):	411p	P/NAV (x) 0.71x

All USD unless noted					All USD unless noted						
RATIO ANALYSIS					PRICES & EXCHANGE RATES						
		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E	
Earnings - Adjusted	\$/sh	\$0.14	\$0.40	\$0.42	\$0.45	Copper price	US\$/lb	2.21	2.64	2.75	2.80
Earnings - Basic	\$/sh	\$0.10	\$0.40	\$0.42	\$0.45	Zinc price	US\$/lb	0.95	1.34	1.35	1.38
P/E Multiple	x	26.4x	9.4x	9.1x	8.4x	Nickel price	US\$/lb	4.35	4.98	5.50	5.75
EV/EBITDA	x	6.5x	4.5x	4.4x	4.2x	Alumina price	US\$/t	265	310	300	300
Cash Flow per Share (pre WC)	\$/sh	\$0.42	\$0.73	\$0.75	\$0.80	Gold price	US\$/oz	1,250	1,280	1,300	1,300
P/CF Multiple	x	9.0x	5.2x	5.1x	4.7x	Silver price	US\$/oz	17.11	18.81	19.25	19.25
Free cash yield		3.9%	14.2%	15.1%	17.6%	Coking coal	US\$/t	114.38	179.25	150.00	135.00
Dividends Per Share	\$/sh	\$0.00	\$0.16	\$0.17	\$0.18	Semi-soft coking coal	US\$/t	85.00	145.00	115.00	100.00
Dividend Yield	%	0.0%	4.2%	4.4%	4.8%	Thermal coal	US\$/t	66.68	77.85	75.00	72.50
Net Debt (Glencore reported)	\$m	\$15,526	\$10,048	\$4,816	(\$1,536)	Brent	US\$/bbl	45.09	57.25	63.36	69.11
Net Debt/EBITDA	x	1.5x	0.7x	0.3x	-0.1x						
Net Debt/Total Cap	%	12%	8%	4%	-1%						
Interest Coverage (EBITDA/Net interest)	x	6.7x	12.8x	16.6x	22.3x						
Gearing (ND/ND+Equity)	x	26%	17%	9%	-3%						
INCOME STATEMENT					PRODUCTION						
		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E	
Revenue	\$m	\$152,948	\$188,509	\$208,351	\$231,717	Copper	kt	1,426	1,374	1,574	1,715
Operating Costs	\$m	(\$142,680)	(\$173,502)	(\$193,125)	(\$215,860)	Zinc	kt	1,094	1,166	1,323	1,433
Adjusted EBITDA	\$m	\$10,268	\$15,007	\$15,226	\$15,857	Nickel	kt	115	124	149	156
D&A	\$m	(\$5,401)	(\$6,319)	(\$6,536)	(\$6,715)	Lead	kt	294	300	308	308
Adjusted EBIT	\$m	\$4,867	\$8,688	\$8,690	\$9,141	Total coal	mt	125	128	124	124
Other	\$m	(\$3,883)	(\$263)	(\$303)	(\$295)	Oil	kbbls	7,511	5,600	5,400	5,400
Financing Income/Expenses	\$m	(\$1,533)	(\$1,173)	(\$915)	(\$711)						
EBT	\$m	(\$549)	\$7,252	\$7,472	\$8,135	CAPEX BREAKDOWN					
Taxes/minorities	\$m	\$1,081	(\$1,450)	(\$1,494)	(\$1,627)	Metals & minerals	\$m	2,707	2,811	2,932	2,328
Net Income - Reported	\$m	\$1,379	\$5,802	\$5,977	\$6,508	Energy products	\$m	571	704	469	469
Adjustments	\$m	\$669	\$0	\$0	\$0	Agricultural and other	\$m	44	14	14	14
Net Income - Adjusted	\$m	\$2,048	\$5,802	\$5,977	\$6,508	Corporate and other	\$m	0	0	0	0
Weighted average diluted shares	M	14,224	14,395	14,395	14,395	Product group capex	\$m	3,322	3,530	3,415	2,811
CASH FLOW STATEMENT					Marketing EBITDA by division						
		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E	
Cash Flows from Operating Activities						Metals & minerals	\$m	1,586	2,278	1,978	2,050
Income before taxes	\$m	(\$549)	\$7,252	\$7,472	\$8,135	Energy products	\$m	959	880	998	1,157
D&A	\$m	\$5,632	\$5,521	\$5,736	\$5,915	Agricultural and other	\$m	454	150	250	250
Taxes Paid	\$m	(\$584)	(\$1,450)	(\$1,494)	(\$1,627)	Corporate and other	\$m	-74	-40	-40	-40
Non Recurring/Other/WC	\$m	\$319	(\$3,055)	(\$1,445)	(\$1,387)	Marketing EBITDA	\$m	2,925	3,268	3,186	3,418
Net Operating Cash Flow	\$m	\$4,818	\$8,268	\$10,268	\$11,036						
Cash Flows From Investing Activities						Industrial EBITDA by division					
Capital Expenditure	\$m	(\$3,048)	(\$3,653)	(\$3,542)	(\$2,942)	Metals & minerals	\$m	6,030	7,952	8,657	9,896
Other (incl divestments and associate income)	\$m	\$6,660	\$254	\$908	\$885	Energy products	\$m	1,503	4,082	3,678	2,838
Net Investing Cash Flow	\$m	\$3,612	(\$3,398)	(\$2,634)	(\$2,057)	Agricultural and other	\$m	138	55	55	55
Cash Flows From Financing Activities						Corporate and other	\$m	-328	-350	-350	-350
Equity Issues (net of costs)	\$m	(\$692)	\$0	\$0	\$0	Industrial EBITDA	\$m	7,343	11,739	12,040	12,439
Net Drawdown/(Repayment)	\$m	(\$7,839)	(\$4,000)	(\$4,000)	\$0						
Dividends	\$m	\$0	(\$2,318)	(\$2,402)	(\$2,627)	NET ASSET VALUE					
Interest & Other	\$m	(\$98)	\$0	\$0	\$0	WACC					
Net Financing Cash Flow	\$m	(\$8,629)	(\$6,318)	(\$6,402)	(\$2,627)	Marketing	6.6%	\$24,467			
Increase (Decrease) in Cash	\$m	(\$199)	(\$1,448)	\$1,233	\$6,352	Industrial	8.0%	\$62,345			
Cash at End of Year	\$m	\$2,518	\$1,070	\$2,302	\$8,654	Corporate adjustments	7.2%	(\$10,936)			
Free Cash Flow (Opfcf (pre wrkg cap) - Capex)	\$m	\$2,089	\$7,670	\$8,171	\$9,481	Listed assets		\$1,078			
BALANCE SHEET					NAV (US\$)		\$76,953				
		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E	NAV (E/sh)		4.11			
Cash & Equivalents	\$m	\$2,508	\$1,060	\$2,292	\$8,644						
Other Current Assets	\$m	\$40,904	\$47,488	\$50,562	\$54,363						
PP&E & Mining Interests	\$m	\$53,826	\$52,492	\$50,297	\$47,324						
Other Long Term Assets	\$m	\$27,362	\$27,788	\$27,788	\$27,788						
Total Assets	\$m	\$124,600	\$128,827	\$130,939	\$138,120						
Short term debt	\$m	\$10,030	\$10,030	\$10,030	\$10,030						
Other Current Liabilities	\$m	\$33,337	\$37,655	\$40,191	\$43,490						
Long Term Debt	\$m	\$23,188	\$19,188	\$15,188	\$15,188						
Other Long Term Liabilities	\$m	\$13,802	\$14,228	\$14,228	\$14,228						
Total Liabilities	\$m	\$80,357	\$81,101	\$79,637	\$82,936						
Shareholder Equity	\$m	\$44,243	\$47,727	\$51,302	\$55,183						
Total Liabilities & Shareholder Equity	\$m	\$124,600	\$128,827	\$130,939	\$138,120						
FINANCIAL RATIOS											
		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E						
Return on Equity (ROE)	%	3.1%	12.2%	11.7%	11.8%						
Return on Capital (ROIC)	%	1.1%	4.5%	4.6%	4.7%						
FCFPS (Operating CF pre WC-Capex)	\$/sh	\$0.15	\$0.54	\$0.57	\$0.67						

Source: Company reports and RBC Capital Markets estimates



Exhibit 23: Glencore financial model at spot commodity and currencies

Glencore plc		LSE: GLEN				Rating: Outperform			
RBC Capital Markets	No Shares (m):		14,224						Risk Specifier: N/A
Tyler Broda +44 207 653 4866	Liq. (\$m/day)		228		Share Price (p):		294p		
	Market Cap. (\$m):		53,992		2017E Dividend (\$/sh):		\$0.16		
	Ent. Value (M\$)		67,147		NAV (GBP/sh):		401p		P/NAV (x) 0.73x

RATIO ANALYSIS		Year End Dec 31				All USD unless noted	PRICES & EXCHANGE RATES	Year End Dec 31			
		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E			2016	2017E	2018E	2019E
Earnings - Adjusted	\$/sh	\$0.14	\$0.38	\$0.37	\$0.39	Copper price	US\$/lb	2.21	2.58	2.58	2.58
Earnings - Basic	\$/sh	\$0.10	\$0.38	\$0.37	\$0.39	Zinc price	US\$/lb	0.95	1.19	1.19	1.19
P/E Multiple	x	26.4x	10.1x	10.4x	9.7x	Nickel price	US\$/lb	4.35	4.20	4.20	4.20
EV/EBITDA	x	6.5x	4.6x	4.7x	4.5x	Alumina price	US\$/t	265	335	335	335
Cash Flow per Share (pre WC)	\$/sh	\$0.42	\$0.71	\$0.71	\$0.74	Gold price	US\$/oz	1,250	1,271	1,271	1,271
P/CF Multiple	x	9.0x	5.4x	5.4x	5.1x	Silver price	US\$/oz	17.11	17.84	17.84	17.84
Free cash yield		3.9%	13.5%	13.8%	15.9%	Coking coal	US\$/t	114.38	257.40	257.40	257.40
Dividends Per Share	\$/sh	\$0.00	\$0.16	\$0.16	\$0.18	Semi-soft coking coal	US\$/t	85.00	95.40	95.40	95.40
Dividend Yield	%	0.0%	4.1%	4.2%	4.6%	Thermal coal	US\$/t	66.68	79.50	79.50	79.50
Net Debt (Glencore reported)	\$m	\$15,526	\$11,016	\$6,732	\$1,594	Brent	US\$/bbl	45.09	51.64	51.64	51.64
Net Debt/EBITDA	x	1.5x	0.8x	0.5x	0.1x						
Net Debt/Total Cap	%	12%	9%	5%	1%						
Interest Coverage (EBITDA/Net interest)	x	6.7x	12.3x	15.4x	19.8x						
Gearing (ND/ND+Equity)	x	26%	19%	12%	3%						
						PRODUCTION		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E
						Copper	kt	1,426	1,374	1,574	1,715
						Zinc	kt	1,094	1,166	1,323	1,433
						Nickel	kt	115	124	149	156
						Lead	kt	294	300	308	308
						Total coal	mt	125	128	124	124
						Oil	kbbls	7,511	5,600	5,400	5,400
						CAPEX BREAKDOWN		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E
						Metals & minerals	\$m	2,707	2,811	2,932	2,328
						Energy products	\$m	571	704	469	469
						Agricultural and other	\$m	44	14	14	14
						Corporate and other	\$m	0	0	0	0
						Product group capex	\$m	3,322	3,530	3,415	2,811
						Marketing EBITDA by division		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E
						Metals & minerals	\$m	1,586	2,218	1,857	1,857
						Energy products	\$m	959	793	813	813
						Agricultural and other	\$m	454	150	250	250
						Corporate and other	\$m	-74	-40	-40	-40
						Marketing EBITDA	\$m	2,925	3,121	2,880	2,880
						Industrial EBITDA by division		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E
						Metals & minerals	\$m	6,030	7,214	7,194	7,661
						Energy products	\$m	1,503	4,473	4,571	4,514
						Agricultural and other	\$m	138	55	55	55
						Corporate and other	\$m	-328	-350	-350	-350
						Industrial EBITDA	\$m	7,343	11,391	11,469	11,880
						NET ASSET VALUE	WACC				
						Marketing	6.6%	\$20,048			
						Industrial	8.0%	\$66,784			
						Corporate adjustments	7.2%	(\$12,853)			
						Listed assets		\$1,078			
						NAV (US\$)		\$75,058			
						NAV (E/sh)		4.01			

CASH FLOW STATEMENT		Year End Dec 31			
		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E
Cash Flows from Operating Activities					
Income before taxes	\$m	(\$549)	\$6,757	\$6,593	\$7,024
D&A	\$m	\$5,632	\$5,521	\$5,736	\$5,915
Taxes Paid	\$m	(\$584)	(\$1,351)	(\$1,319)	(\$1,405)
Non Recurring/Other/WC	\$m	\$319	(\$3,680)	(\$1,749)	(\$1,753)
Net Operating Cash Flow	\$m	\$4,818	\$7,247	\$9,261	\$9,781
Cash Flows From Investing Activities					
Capital Expenditure	\$m	(\$3,048)	(\$3,653)	(\$3,542)	(\$2,942)
Other (incl divestments and associate income)	\$m	\$6,660	\$243	\$860	\$821
Net Investing Cash Flow	\$m	\$3,612	(\$3,410)	(\$2,682)	(\$2,121)
Cash Flows From Financing Activities					
Equity Issues (net of costs)	\$m	(\$692)	\$0	\$0	\$0
Net Drawdown/(Repayment)	\$m	(\$7,839)	(\$4,000)	(\$4,000)	\$0
Dividends	\$m	\$0	(\$2,253)	(\$2,295)	(\$2,522)
Interest & Other	\$m	(\$98)	\$0	\$0	\$0
Net Financing Cash Flow	\$m	(\$8,629)	(\$6,253)	(\$6,295)	(\$2,522)
Increase (Decrease) in Cash	\$m	(\$199)	(\$2,416)	\$284	\$5,139
Cash at End of Year	\$m	\$2,518	\$102	\$386	\$5,524
Free Cash Flow (Opfc (pre wrkg cap) - Capex)	\$m	\$2,089	\$7,274	\$7,468	\$8,592
BALANCE SHEET		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E
Cash & Equivalents	\$m	\$2,508	\$92	\$376	\$5,514
Other Current Assets	\$m	\$40,904	\$45,513	\$46,575	\$47,538
PP&E & Mining Interests	\$m	\$53,826	\$52,492	\$50,297	\$47,324
Other Long Term Assets	\$m	\$27,362	\$27,788	\$27,788	\$27,788
Total Assets	\$m	\$124,600	\$125,884	\$125,036	\$128,165
Short term debt	\$m	\$10,030	\$10,030	\$10,030	\$10,030
Other Current Liabilities	\$m	\$33,337	\$35,042	\$35,215	\$35,246
Long Term Debt	\$m	\$23,188	\$19,188	\$15,188	\$15,188
Other Long Term Liabilities	\$m	\$13,802	\$14,228	\$14,228	\$14,228
Total Liabilities	\$m	\$80,357	\$78,488	\$74,661	\$74,692
Shareholder Equity	\$m	\$44,243	\$47,396	\$50,375	\$53,472
Total Liabilities & Shareholder Equity	\$m	\$124,600	\$125,884	\$125,036	\$128,165
FINANCIAL RATIOS		2016	2017E	2018E	2019E
Return on Equity (ROE)	%	3.1%	11.4%	10.5%	10.5%
Return on Capital (ROIC)	%	1.1%	4.3%	4.2%	4.4%
FCFPS (Operating CF pre WC-Capex)	\$/sh	\$0.15	\$0.51	\$0.53	\$0.60

Source: Company reports and RBC Capital Markets estimates



Exhibit 25: Anglo American financial model at spot commodity and currencies

Anglo American plc		LSE: AAL	Rating: Outperform	
RBC Capital Markets	No Shares (m):	1,288	Risk Specifier:	N/A
Tyler Broda +44 207 653 4866	Liq. (\$m/day)	72	Share Price (p):	1075p
	Market Cap. (\$m):	17,868	2017E Dividend (\$/sh):	\$1.43
	Ent. Value (M \$)	31,664	NAV (GBP/sh):	2140p
			P/NAV (x):	0.50x

All USD unless noted		Year End Dec 31				All USD unless noted		Year End Dec 31				
RATIO ANALYSIS		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	PRICES & EXCHANGE RATES		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	2020E
Earnings - Adjusted	\$/sh	\$1.72	\$2.86	\$2.82	\$2.54	Copper price	US\$/lb	2.21	2.57	2.54	2.54	2.54
Earnings - Basic	\$/sh	\$1.24	\$2.86	\$2.82	\$2.54	Nickel price	US\$/lb	4.35	4.29	4.16	4.16	4.16
P/E Multiple	x	8.1x	4.8x	4.9x	5.5x	Platinum	US\$/oz	987	1145	1200	1200	1200
EV/EBITDA	x	5.2x	3.9x	3.2x	3.3x	Iron Ore fines CFR China (62%)	US\$/dmt	58.33	67.01	60.80	60.80	60.80
CFPS (Operating CF pre WC)	\$/sh	\$3.89	\$4.78	\$4.89	\$4.45	Hard coking coal	US\$/t	114	165	164	164	164
P/CF Multiple	x	3.6x	2.9x	2.8x	3.1x	Thermal coal	US\$/t	67	81	82	82	82
Free Cash Yield	%	17.0%	23.8%	22.5%	20.4%	USDAUD		0.74	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.74
Dividends Per Share	\$/sh	\$0.00	\$1.43	\$1.41	\$1.27	ZARCAD		0.76	0.74	0.73	0.73	0.73
Dividend Yield	%	0.0%	10.3%	10.2%	9.2%	YERUSD		14.70	13.19	13.18	13.18	13.18
Net Debt	\$m	\$8,487	\$3,961	\$3,167	\$1,209	#						
Net Debt/EBITDA	x	1.4x	0.5x	0.4x	0.2x							
Net Debt/Total Cap	%	29%	15%	12%	4%							
Interest Coverage (EBITDA/Net interest)	x	20.1x	-4081.0x	973.7x	-74.9x							
Gearing (ND/ND+Equity)	x	26%	12%	9%	3%							
INCOME STATEMENT		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	PRODUCTION		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	
Revenue	\$m	\$21,378	\$22,479	\$23,253	\$22,987	Copper	kt	554	538	598	483	
Operating Costs	\$m	(\$15,909)	(\$15,120)	(\$15,608)	(\$16,163)	Nickel	kt	45	42	43	43	
Operating profit		\$3,331	\$4,922	\$5,106	\$4,097	Platinum	koz	2,335	2,342	2,342	2,342	
D&A	\$m	(\$2,138)	(\$2,437)	(\$2,540)	(\$2,727)	Iron ore (attrib)	Mt	58	59	64	71	
Statutory EBIT	\$m	\$3,959	\$5,759	\$5,901	\$4,880	Diamonds	kct	27,339	30,731	31,108	31,108	
Other		(\$262)	(\$329)	(\$316)	(\$313)	Metallurgical Coal	kt	20,979	20,592	24,200	24,200	
Financing Income/Expenses	\$m	(\$304)	\$2	(\$9)	\$102	Thermal coal	kt	77,036	58,599	58,681	58,681	
EBT	\$m	\$3,393	\$5,432	\$5,576	\$4,669							
Taxes/minorities	\$m	(\$1,183)	(\$1,745)	(\$1,944)	(\$1,397)							
Net Income - before special items	\$m	\$2,210	\$3,687	\$3,632	\$3,272	CAPEX BREAKDOWN		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	
Adjustments	\$m	(\$616)	\$0	\$0	\$0	Iron ore	\$m	269	342	369	297	
Net Income - after special items	\$m	\$1,594	\$3,687	\$3,632	\$3,272	Nickel	\$m	62	80	80	80	
Weighted average diluted shares	M	1,289	1,288	1,288	1,288	Copper	\$m	563	481	454	441	
Underlying EBITDA	\$m	\$6,097	\$8,196	\$8,440	\$7,607	Coal	\$m	613	509	578	486	
CASH FLOW STATEMENT		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	Platinum	\$m	253	297	295	300	
Cash Flows from Operating Activities						De Beers	\$m	526	511	481	625	
Net Income	\$m	\$2,210	\$3,687	\$3,632	\$3,272	Other operations	\$m	26	40	40	40	
D&A	\$m	\$2,138	\$2,437	\$2,540	\$2,727	Product group net capex	\$m	2,312	2,260	2,296	2,270	
Taxes Paid	\$m	(\$611)	(\$1,456)	(\$1,589)	(\$1,333)							
Non Recurring/Other/Exploration	\$m	\$1,662	\$1,535	\$1,602	\$1,069							
Net Operating Cash Flow	\$m	\$5,399	\$6,204	\$6,185	\$5,735	SEGMENT BREAKDOWN (EBITDA)		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	
Cash Flows From Investing Activities						Iron ore	\$m	1,540	1,562	1,322	1,167	
Capital Expenditure	\$m	(\$2,418)	(\$2,260)	(\$2,296)	(\$2,270)	Nickel	\$m	54	-20	-36	-36	
Other investment income	\$m	\$1,893	\$454	\$318	\$428	Copper	\$m	910	1,307	1,578	967	
Net Investing Cash Flow (incl. stripping)	\$m	(\$525)	(\$1,806)	(\$1,978)	(\$1,841)	Coal	\$m	1,660	3,440	3,655	3,555	
Cash Flows From Financing Activities						Platinum	\$m	532	469	718	760	
Net Drawdown/(Repayment)	\$m	(\$4,519)	(\$5,000)	\$0	\$0	De Beers	\$m	1,406	1,604	1,370	1,361	
Dividends	\$m	\$0	\$0	(\$2,756)	(\$1,719)	Other operations	\$m	118	0	0	0	
Interest, Equity Raise & Other	\$m	(\$1,261)	(\$602)	(\$518)	(\$570)	Product group EBITDA	\$m	6,220	8,362	8,606	7,773	
Net Financing Cash Flow	\$m	(\$5,780)	(\$5,602)	(\$3,274)	(\$2,290)							
Increase (Decrease) in Cash	\$m	(\$906)	(\$1,204)	\$933	\$1,604	NET ASSET VALUE	WACC	US\$m	GBP/Sh	NAV (%)		
Cash at end of Year	\$m	\$6,044	\$4,840	\$5,773	\$7,377	Operating Value						
Free Cash Flow (OPcf - Capex)	\$m	\$3,043	\$4,248	\$4,015	\$3,650	Iron ore	8.1%	\$4,835	2.89	11%		
BALANCE SHEET		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E	Nickel	8.1%	(\$250)	-0.15	-1%		
Cash & Equivalents	\$m	\$6,051	\$4,708	\$5,477	\$7,260	Copper	8.1%	\$4,261	2.54	10%		
Other Current Assets	\$m	\$6,398	\$5,842	\$6,072	\$6,150	Coal	8.1%	\$21,288	12.71	48%		
PP&E & Mining Interests	\$m	\$28,719	\$28,541	\$28,298	\$27,841	Platinum	8.1%	\$5,235	3.13	12%		
Other Long Term Assets	\$m	\$8,981	\$9,235	\$9,474	\$9,710	De Beers	8.1%	\$9,158	5.47	21%		
Total Assets	\$m	\$50,149	\$48,326	\$49,322	\$50,961	Total operating assets		\$44,527	26.59	100%		
Short term debt	\$m	\$1,806	\$1,225	\$1,225	\$1,225	Corporate		(\$480)	-0.29			
Other Current Liabilities	\$m	\$4,719	\$4,209	\$4,329	\$4,415	Exploration/Evaluation		(\$700)	-0.42			
Long Term Debt	\$m	\$11,363	\$6,944	\$6,944	\$6,944	Cash		\$5,652	3.38			
Other Long Term Liabilities	\$m	\$7,936	\$7,936	\$7,936	\$7,936	Debt		(\$13,169)	-7.86			
Total Liabilities	\$m	\$25,824	\$20,314	\$20,434	\$20,520	Total Net Asset Value		\$35,830	21.40			
Shareholder Equity	\$m	\$24,325	\$28,012	\$28,888	\$30,440							
Total Liabilities & Shareholder Equity	\$m	\$50,149	\$48,326	\$49,322	\$50,961							
FINANCIAL RATIOS		2016A	2017E	2018E	2019E							
Return on Equity (ROE)	%	9.1%	13.2%	12.6%	10.7%							
Return on Capital (ROIC)	%	4.4%	7.6%	7.4%	6.4%							
CFPS (Operating CF pre WC)	\$/sh	\$3.89	\$4.78	\$4.89	\$4.45							
FCFPS (Operating CF-Capex)	\$/sh	\$2.31	\$3.06	\$3.02	\$2.69							

Source: Company reports and RBC Capital Markets estimates



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Ratings

Top Pick (TP): Represents analyst's best idea in the sector; expected to provide significant absolute total return over 12 months with a favorable risk-reward ratio.

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Sector Perform (SP): Returns expected to be in line with sector average over 12 months.

Underperform (U): Returns expected to be materially below sector average over 12 months.


Risk Rating



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
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Distribution of ratings				
RBC Capital Markets, Equity Research				
As of 31-Mar-2017				
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			Serv./Past 12 Mos.	
			Count	Percent
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HOLD [Sector Perform]	679	41.84	149	21.94
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Anglo American plc

Valuation

Our base case price target of 1800p is based on a blend of 0.9x NAV (2016E) and 5x 2017E-2018E EV/EBITDA. Our EV/EBITDA multiple of 5x reflects the geopolitical risk discount that Anglo trades at vs. peers due to South African exposure. Our P/NAV multiple of 0.9x also reflects the heightened risk of operating in South Africa. Our price target supports our Outperform rating.

Risks to rating and price target

Risks to our price target and rating include fluctuations in commodity prices, South African labour volatility, currencies in operating countries, greater-than-expected mine operating and new project construction costs, and increasing energy, material and manpower costs. In a very competitive environment, Anglo American, as with all mining companies, faces challenges finding and replacing mined reserves. South African legislative policy and the outcome or lack of outcome from any restructuring could also impact the shares.

BHP Billiton PLC

Valuation

We value BHP on a blend of 50% on 1.0x NAV and 50% on 6.0x forward 4 half EV/EBITDA, deriving our 12-month price target of 1,525p/share, which supports our Sector Perform rating. This is broadly in line with our methodology for global peers when taking into account current uncertainty around longer-term pricing and volatility.



Risks to rating and price target

The major risks to our price target and rating for BHP are commodity price and the company's exposure to Samarco rehabilitation liabilities. In particular, BHP is exposed to prices of oil and gas as well as iron ore, copper, and metallurgical coal. The value of currencies in producing countries is also a major driver to our valuation, as is political risk in countries where BHP operates.

Glencore PLC

Valuation

We value Glencore on a blend of 50% on 1.0x NAV and 50% on 6.5x forward four half EV/EBITDA, deriving our 12-month target price of 450p/share and therefore we rate the stock Outperform. This is at a slight premium to global peers of 0.5x EV/EBITDA based on lower exposure to bulk commodities and lower volatility in earnings from the marketing business. Our 450p/share target price supports our Outperform rating.

Risks to rating and price target

Commodity price and currency volatility – large changes in either overall direction or individual variance in pricing could increase or decrease our target expectations.

Operational changes – Glencore is a diversified global mining and commodity trading business and as such our price target includes hundreds of estimates for production, costs, interest expense, tax and so on. Should Glencore materially change the scope of its operations, or sell further assets, enter into a material corporate transaction amongst other general risks our price target may not be reached.

Credit rating downgrade risks – Despite recent rating upgrades, should Glencore be downgraded below investment grade, the implications around medium-term funding could see an increased risking of the equity.

Rio Tinto PLC

Valuation

Our valuation is based 50% on 6.0x EV/EBITDA projection on a forward 2-year basis and 50% on our estimates based on our long-term 1.0x NAV forecasts. This provides a 12-month target price of 4,400p per share, which supports our Top Pick rating. This is in line with our methodology for global diversified peers.

Risks to rating and price target

- **World economic growth and commodity prices** - Commodity demand is derived from world economic growth. Consequently, Rio's exposure to aluminium, iron ore, base metals, and coal in particular is vulnerable should world growth, especially China's growth, be slower than we expect.
- **Exchange rates in producing countries** - Rio operates a global portfolio of production units where local costs can be a significant percentage of the total. Thus, any material change in local US dollar exchange rates would affect costs.
- **Political relationships with producing and consumer countries** - Rio is perhaps less affected by risks related to the countries where it operates when compared with some of its peers, because it is so reliant on Australia, Canada, the US, and parts of South America.
- **Trends in operating costs** - Rio Tinto has significant exposure to energy, labour, and input costs, such as steel prices.
- **Retaining key management is imperative for all of the diversified majors.**
- **M&A** - Following the recent deleveraging stage, any material acquisition could pose a risk to our 12 month price target.

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