



## Gold remains expensive insurance

### Pinning down the paradoxical nature of gold

We contend that in order to determine whether gold is cheap or expensive, one must first define what gold actually is. At first glance this may seem simple, but gold can be many things to different people, which changes over time; ranging from a simple commodity to a store of value and even an insurance policy against global uncertainty. We find that the metal is full of paradoxes – as a commodity the metal is very scarce compared to others, but yet the market is always in a surplus. In trying to capture the various facets of gold, we have valued the metal against a number of metrics as well as developing our own simple regression model to determine the fair value.

### Expensive by any number of measures...

At the current spot price of USD1,260 – 1,265/oz, gold screens as expensive against almost all other metrics. The average of nine metrics suggests that the fair value for gold is USD1,015/oz. At the bottom end of the range G7 per capita income (gold's affordability) would suggest a fair value of USD735 – 740/oz. At the upper end of the range and the only measure whereby gold looks cheap is treating gold as a reserve currency. Here the size of the big four central bank balance sheets (ECB, BoJ, PBoC and Fed) would suggest a fair value of USD1,650/oz. As a blunt gauge of relative value, this approach is okay, but the spread is too wide to be of any real use as a serious forecasting tool. Instead, we prefer to synthesize the main price drivers into a four factor regression model.

### The current gold price suggests that heightened risk perceptions persist

Although the correlation coefficient on our model is 87%, there are very discrete periods when gold trades above the model forecast as well as below. Our interpretation is that when gold trades above, the market is going through a period of heightened risk perceptions, be it the expectation of a collapse in the global financial system or rampant inflation. Over the past 10 years, we have had an extended "bull market" period lasting 3 and half years and an equivalent "bear market" of 3 and a half years. Our model suggests that gold should be trading at USD1,185/oz, 6% below the current spot price. The current "premium" period for gold started in February 2016. We expect this environment to continue into 2018. Nevertheless, we retain our cautious to neutral view on gold with the Deutsche Bank house view on the model inputs pointing to a year end price of USD1,150/oz even when factoring in further political and financial uncertainty. Our Q4 price forecast is USD1,230/oz, which already incorporates a risk premium.

### A short term insurance policy for those who want it

Although gold screens as expensive, there is a short term scenario (3 month) which would justify gold trading higher, in our view. In the near term, our US rates economist Dominic Konstam sees scope for the US 10-year bond yield to fall to 2% (before rising to 2.75% by year-end), as falling excess liquidity points to softer US growth momentum ahead. If we apply a US 10 year bond yield of 2%, a USD 2% weaker from current levels (not our FX strategist view) and the S&P500 down 5% from current levels, our fair value model points to a gold price of USD1,320/oz.



## A metal full of paradoxes

### Pinning down the true nature of gold

Before we even try to value gold, we should try to pin down what gold actually is! At its simplest form and yes we are stating the obvious, gold is a shiny yellow metal, relatively scarce and mined from the earth's crust. Valuing the metal should then be just as easy? Gold is a simple commodity, governed by supply and demand, and valuing it should bear some relationship to the cost of digging it out of the earth? But it turns out; gold's nature is far more mercurial. Gold can be many things to many different people – a store of value, a financial asset, a medium of exchange, a currency, an insurance policy against disruptive events or global uncertainty and even a “*barbarous relic*” according to John Maynard Keynes. (*\*As with any famous quote, there are suggestions that the term was not originally coined by Keynes himself, nor that he was actually referring to gold, but rather to the constraints of the gold standard at the time*). All of this means that finding an absolute valuation method which will be accepted by all is rather optimistic; and that the value of gold is more likely to be determined on a relative basis depending on the individual's perception of gold.

Whilst we contend that there is something of an art to valuing gold, we have used a more scientific framework to come up with that true fair value. There are flaws in any one of the individual approaches, and even averaging out the different approaches still seems like a bit of a cop out. However, in our table below the average of all the selected metrics would suggest that gold should trade around USD1,015/oz, with relative G7 per capita income valuing gold at USD735/oz, whilst the bloated size of the big four central bank balance sheets suggesting that gold should travel at USD1,648/oz. Our own simple four factor model points to a value of USD1,185/oz. Our conclusion is that gold is still trading at a premium versus a wide variety of metrics; 20% versus the average or 6% versus our fair value model. This suggests to us that the certainly through the lens of gold, there is a heightened perception of risk or uncertainty in the broader markets.

Figure 1: Assessing the “Fair value” of gold versus a variety of metrics

	Metric	May-17	% difference to spot
Econometric model	DB Commodity team four factor model	1,185	-6%
Gold as a store of value	In real terms (PPI)	735	-42%
Gold as a store of value	In real terms (CPI)	810	-36%
Gold as a store of value	Relative to per capita income	735	-42%
Gold as a store of value	Relative to the S&P500	991	-22%
Gold as a medium of exchange	Relative to the big four central bank balance sheets	1,648	30%
Gold as a commodity	Versus the global mining cost curve	1,240	-2%
Gold as a commodity	Versus copper	956	-24%
Gold as a commodity / inflation proxy	Versus crude oil	838	-34%
	<b>Average</b>	<b>1,015</b>	<b>-20%</b>

Source: Deutsche Bank


### Gold as a commodity – scarce but always in surplus?

Many investors are uncomfortable with treating gold as a commodity in that gold is not “consumed” like other commodities – it is not eaten, or burned or forged as food, energy or industrial metals would be. At first glance the price of gold relative to the marginal producer on the cost curve would provide a perfect yardstick to determining the fair value of gold. There are however two




fundamental problems with this method. The first is that the conventional supply demand analysis does not work very well for gold. Partly due to its value and enduring nature (and high incentive to recycle), very little gold is actually consumed or lost every year. Thus every year, we add to the stocks of gold, with the industrial surplus being “consumed” by financial investors. We would argue that even the jewellery market is not “pure” consumption and the motivation is linked to a store of wealth.

Figure 2: The gold market has been in an industrial surplus since 2001...



Source: Deutsche Bank, GFMS, World Gold Council


Figure 3: ...and yet the gold price seems almost positively correlated to the annual surplus



Source: Deutsche Bank, GFMS, World Gold Council


Gold’s price trajectory relative to the marginal producer on the cost curve should be reasonable determinant of value. However, the mined supply of gold is relatively stable and only responds to pricing signals with a four to five year lag. Gold has been falling since 2012, the bump in 2016 notwithstanding and we only forecast mined supply to finally decline in 2017. It turns out, the gold miners are very good at adjusting their cost bases to the prevailing gold price, not least by targeting the richer parts of their ore bodies. The practice of “high grading” is much frowned upon in the industry, as certain less economic parts of the ore body may be sterilized thereby reducing the NPV of the mine. However, when faced with significant cash burn, many miners have little choice.

Figure 4: Gold price versus the cost curve: Beware of trying to glean spurious support levels. Costs adjust to the price.



Source: Deutsche Bank, Wood Mackenzie, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 5: The average cash (all in sustaining cost) margin of the 90th percentile gold miner versus the average weekly gold price – super normal margins post the GFC




Source: Deutsche Bank, Wood Mackenzie, Bloomberg Finance LP



Our cost curve margin analysis would suggest that gold should trade anywhere between USD1,080/oz to USD 1,300/oz for 2017, with an average price around USD1,240/oz.


If indeed gold is a commodity, gold’s perceived value relative to copper and oil should revert to a long run equilibrium level, based on the relative abundance of various commodities in the earth’s crust. There is no doubt that gold is scarce relative to copper for instance (10,000x less abundant). However the perception of utility will vary according to global growth. In a high global growth environment, copper should be seen as more valuable relative to gold.

Figure 6: Gold’s relative scarcity



Source: Deutsche Bank, USGS

Figure 7: Valuing gold versus crude oil and copper



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP


If we assume that gold reverts to the long run ratio of these two commodities, then at an oil price of USD50/bbl, gold should be trading at USD840/oz, and at a copper price of USD5,600/t, gold should be trading at USD960/oz. Gold remains expensive versus other commodities.

**Gold as Money – a medium of exchange with little intrinsic value?**

Gold is often seen as a medium of exchange and one that is officially recognized (if not publically used as such) in our view. Simply, gold is widely held by most of the world’s larger central banks as a component of reserves. The ideal medium of exchange must balance the paradox of representing value while having little intrinsic value itself. Fiat currencies physically have no use other than that which is ascribed to them by government and accepted by the public. Arguably, gold is a purer form of money because it actually costs something to produce, compared to fiat currencies which cost very little. However, the concept of relative scarcity or abundance comes into play. If the rate at which fiat currencies have been printed exceeds that rate at which gold has been mined, then ceteris paribus, gold should become scarcer and re-rate versus fiat currencies. Since 2005, central bank balance sheets have expanded nearly fourfold. In contrast the global above ground stocks of gold have expanded a mere 20%. The gold price has re-rated accordingly, but not enough to keep the value of gold at parity with the global (big four central banks to be precise) money stock. The average ratio since 2005 between global money stocks and the value of global gold stocks is c.1.8x. In order for gold to get back to this level, the price should appreciate to USD1,648/oz, nearly USD300/oz above the current spot price.




Figure 8: The aggregate balance sheets of the big four\* central banks has expanded nearly fourfold since 2005




Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP, \*Fed, PBoC, BOJ and ECB

Figure 9: In contrast Above ground gold stocks have expanded a mere 20%.




Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 10: The gold price is sensitive to the rate at which Central Banks expand their balance sheets



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 11: The average ratio of the big four central banks balance sheet to the value of gold stocks is c.1.8x



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP


Gold as a store of value – capital appreciation but no yield

We all need ways to store the fruits of our physical or intellectual labour for use at a later stage. We all have our preferences, be it bricks and mortar, the equity markets or gold. It depends on your confidence in how well you believe your asset of choice will preserve and in many instances grow your wealth or capital. We have examined the level of the gold price in real terms i.e. versus US CPI, relative to the per capita income and versus an alternative financial asset, the US equity market.

In terms of the relationship between gold and the S&P500, we have adjusted both for inflation and applied a further equity time value adjustment. Both should rise with inflation, but the S&P 500 should rise more and its retained and reinvested earnings should generate real EPS growth. We find that the adjusted gold to S&P500 ratio at 0.65x is still above its historical average of 0.54x. To bring this ratio back to its long run average would require the gold price to fall to USD990/oz. The average G7 per capita income since 1971 could buy just over 62 ounces of gold. Currently the average per capita income can purchase 47 ounces which implies that gold should trade at USD740/oz.




Figure 12: The adjusted Gold/ S&P 500 ratio – gold still looks overvalued



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP


Figure 13: Gold relative to the G7 per capita income



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

The real gold price average since 1971 when the gold standard was relinquished in the US is USD735/oz in PPI adjusted terms and USD810/oz in CPI adjusted terms.

Figure 14: Gold prices in real terms (US CPI adjusted and US PPI adjusted)



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP


Distilling the drivers into a simple model – a non-yielding grudge purchase?

Gold is a non yielding asset for the average person. The exceptions are the Central banks who can lease out gold for a very modest return. Therefore the higher the opportunity cost of holding gold, the lower its perceived value should be. In a high interest rate (real interest rate) environment, gold’s value should be perceived as lower given that the opportunity cost is higher. The only reason to hold gold then is for the anticipated price appreciation. The time when gold should appreciate in value is when global financial risk perceptions rise. Many investors perceive holding gold a bit like purchasing an insurance policy, and as we all know, insurance policies are a bit of a grudge purchase. There is no one measure that perfectly encapsulates global risk perceptions. We have used the US equity risk premium as a proxy, although volatility as measured by the VIX could have been an alternative.




We continue to believe that the main drivers for the gold price are US real interest rates, specifically the US 10 year inflation adjusted bond yield; the US S&P equity risk premium; the USD and the weakest driver on a consistent basis, Central bank buying or selling. We could add a myriad of other variables such as M2 money supply, but we think this complicates the picture too much. This assertion does come with caveats, these four variables do not explain the gold price movements fully over all periods. The period 2001 – 2007 should have seen much higher gold prices according to both the US 10 year TIPS yield and the US equity risk premium. This period coincided with a sustained period of central bank selling which slowed down the recovery in the gold price in our view. We use the IMF holdings as a proxy as this is the one source that publishes data on a monthly basis.

Figure 15: The gold price has tracked the inverse movements of the US 10 year TIPS yield quite closely, especially over the past 10 years.




Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 16: The gold price has also tracked the US equity risk premium fairly well. There are periods when there is quite a wide divergence.




Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 17: The USD has less explanatory powers with respect to gold. The change in the USD is perhaps more useful than the absolute level.



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 18: We use the IMF gold holdings as a proxy for the broader Central bank gold holdings. A sustained period of selling ended in 2008/09.



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP


Our simple four factor model shows that there are periods when the gold price has deviated significantly from that which the four underlying drivers would suggest. In fact the model does not work very well in the period 1998 – 2008. This highlights the risk that the gold price may be driven by different factors over time. Over the last 10 years, there have been four distinct periods – two when gold has traded below the value suggested by the underlying drivers and






two when gold has traded above. There are a number of ways to interpret this in our view; firstly that during these periods, global risk perceptions were elevated or depressed, secondly that gold was a lead indicator to interest rates, inflation expectations and the equity market performance, or alternatively that the gold was simply in favour during certain periods (a bull market) and out of favour during others (a bear market).

Figure 19: Our 20 year four variable gold model does highlight two periods when there was a big divergence between the actual price and the fitted price




Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 20: Our 10 year four variable gold model shows that gold is still expensive versus the underlying drivers




Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 21: We note that in periods of a bull market, gold tends to trade above "fair value" and in a bear market gold tends to trade below.



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 22: The R-squared for our model is 87%, although we note that this faded over time.



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

### Gold as a measure of market uncertainty


In order to adjust for the current gap between the actual gold price and our model forecast, we have adjusted our model (yes all models have dummy variables to account for the periods when they don't quite work) for global risk perceptions. The adjustment we apply is simply a risk perceptions adjustment factor derived by plotting the model residual against the VIX index. We note that any significant period above 20 on the VIX index causes gold to trade above its "fair value". The scale we apply ranges from -20 to 20, with each point accounting for USD10/oz. This is the minimum and maximum range of the deviation. The current gap of USD80/oz or 8 on our scale would suggest an






above average sense of risk or uncertainty in the market. If we apply the DB house view forecasts at year end for the US 10 year bond yield of 2.75%, a US 10 year break even of 2.15%, an S&P year-end target of 2600, IMF gold purchases of 5 tonnes and a USD up 7.6% versus the broad trade weighted basket, then gold should trade all the way down to USD1,031/oz. Even if we increase our risk perception index from 8 to 12, this brings us back to USD1,150/oz by year end. In the near term however, our US rates economist Dominic Konstam sees scope for the US 10-year bond yield to fall to 2% (before rising to 2.75% by year-end), as falling excess liquidity points to softer US growth momentum ahead. If we apply a US 10 year bond yield of 2%, a USD down 2% from current levels and the S&P500 down 5% from current levels, our fair value model points to a gold price of USD1,320/oz.

Figure 23: DB gold model residual versus the VIX index – any spike above 20 results in a period of the gold price trading above our four factor model fair value.



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP

Figure 24: Plugging in the DB house forecasts into our gold model combined with rising uncertainty suggests that gold should trade lower into year end.



Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg Finance LP



# Appendix 1

## Important Disclosures

\*Other information available upon request

Prices are current as of the end of the previous trading session unless otherwise indicated and are sourced from local exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors . Other information is sourced from Deutsche Bank, subject companies, and other sources. For disclosures pertaining to recommendations or estimates made on securities other than the primary subject of this research, please see the most recently published company report or visit our global disclosure look-up page on our website at <http://gm.db.com/ger/disclosure/DisclosureDirectory.eqsr>. Aside from within this report, important conflict disclosures can also be found at <https://gm.db.com/equities> under the "Disclosures Lookup" and "Legal" tabs. Investors are strongly encouraged to review this information before investing.

## Analyst Certification

The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of the undersigned lead analyst(s). In addition, the undersigned lead analyst(s) has not and will not receive any compensation for providing a specific recommendation or view in this report. Grant Sporre/Michael Hsueh



## Additional Information

The information and opinions in this report were prepared by Deutsche Bank AG or one of its affiliates (collectively "Deutsche Bank"). Though the information herein is believed to be reliable and has been obtained from public sources believed to be reliable, Deutsche Bank makes no representation as to its accuracy or completeness. Hyperlinks to third-party websites in this report are provided for reader convenience only. Deutsche Bank neither endorses the content nor is responsible for the accuracy or security controls of these websites.

If you use the services of Deutsche Bank in connection with a purchase or sale of a security that is discussed in this report, or is included or discussed in another communication (oral or written) from a Deutsche Bank analyst, Deutsche Bank may act as principal for its own account or as agent for another person.

Deutsche Bank may consider this report in deciding to trade as principal. It may also engage in transactions, for its own account or with customers, in a manner inconsistent with the views taken in this research report. Others within Deutsche Bank, including strategists, sales staff and other analysts, may take views that are inconsistent with those taken in this research report. Deutsche Bank issues a variety of research products, including fundamental analysis, equity-linked analysis, quantitative analysis and trade ideas. Recommendations contained in one type of communication may differ from recommendations contained in others, whether as a result of differing time horizons, methodologies or otherwise. Deutsche Bank and/or its affiliates may also be holding debt or equity securities of the issuers it writes on. Analysts are paid in part based on the profitability of Deutsche Bank AG and its affiliates, which includes investment banking, trading and principal trading revenues.

Opinions, estimates and projections constitute the current judgment of the author as of the date of this report. They do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Deutsche Bank and are subject to change without notice. Deutsche Bank provides liquidity for buyers and sellers of securities issued by the companies it covers. Deutsche Bank research analysts sometimes have shorter-term trade ideas that are consistent or inconsistent with Deutsche Bank's existing longer term ratings. Trade ideas for equities can be found at the SOLAR link at <http://gm.db.com>. A SOLAR idea represents a high conviction belief by an analyst that a stock will outperform or underperform the market and/or sector delineated over a time frame of no less than two weeks. In addition to SOLAR ideas, the analysts named in this report may from time to time discuss with our clients, Deutsche Bank salespersons and Deutsche Bank traders, trading strategies or ideas that reference catalysts or events that may have a near-term or medium-term impact on the market price of the securities discussed in this report, which impact may be directionally counter to the analysts' current 12-month view of total return or investment return as described herein. Deutsche Bank has no obligation to update, modify or amend this report or to otherwise notify a recipient thereof if any opinion, forecast or estimate contained herein changes or subsequently becomes inaccurate. Coverage and the frequency of changes in market conditions and in both general and company specific economic prospects make it difficult to update research at defined intervals. Updates are at the sole discretion of the coverage analyst concerned or of the Research Department Management and as such the majority of reports are published at irregular intervals. This report is provided for informational purposes only and does not take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situations, or needs of individual clients. It is not an offer or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any financial instruments or to participate in any particular trading strategy. Target prices are inherently imprecise and a product of the analyst's judgment. The financial instruments discussed in this report may not be suitable for all investors and investors must make their own informed investment decisions. Prices and availability of financial instruments are subject to change without notice and investment transactions can lead to losses as a result of price fluctuations and other factors. If a financial instrument is denominated in a currency other than an investor's currency, a change in exchange rates may adversely affect the investment. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. Unless otherwise indicated, prices are current as of the end of the previous trading session, and are sourced from local exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors. Data is sourced from Deutsche Bank, subject companies, and in some cases, other parties.

The Deutsche Bank Research Department is independent of other business areas divisions of the Bank. Details regarding our organizational arrangements and information barriers we have to prevent and avoid conflicts of interest with respect to our research is available on our website under Disclaimer found on the Legal tab.



Macroeconomic fluctuations often account for most of the risks associated with exposures to instruments that promise to pay fixed or variable interest rates. For an investor who is long fixed rate instruments (thus receiving these cash flows), increases in interest rates naturally lift the discount factors applied to the expected cash flows and thus cause a loss. The longer the maturity of a certain cash flow and the higher the move in the discount factor, the higher will be the loss. Upside surprises in inflation, fiscal funding needs, and FX depreciation rates are among the most common adverse macroeconomic shocks to receivers. But counterparty exposure, issuer creditworthiness, client segmentation, regulation (including changes in assets holding limits for different types of investors), changes in tax policies, currency convertibility (which may constrain currency conversion, repatriation of profits and/or the liquidation of positions), and settlement issues related to local clearing houses are also important risk factors to be considered. The sensitivity of fixed income instruments to macroeconomic shocks may be mitigated by indexing the contracted cash flows to inflation, to FX depreciation, or to specified interest rates – these are common in emerging markets. It is important to note that the index fixings may – by construction – lag or mis-measure the actual move in the underlying variables they are intended to track. The choice of the proper fixing (or metric) is particularly important in swaps markets, where floating coupon rates (i.e., coupons indexed to a typically short-dated interest rate reference index) are exchanged for fixed coupons. It is also important to acknowledge that funding in a currency that differs from the currency in which coupons are denominated carries FX risk. Naturally, options on swaps (swaptions) also bear the risks typical to options in addition to the risks related to rates movements.

Derivative transactions involve numerous risks including, among others, market, counterparty default and illiquidity risk. The appropriateness or otherwise of these products for use by investors is dependent on the investors' own circumstances including their tax position, their regulatory environment and the nature of their other assets and liabilities, and as such, investors should take expert legal and financial advice before entering into any transaction similar to or inspired by the contents of this publication. The risk of loss in futures trading and options, foreign or domestic, can be substantial. As a result of the high degree of leverage obtainable in futures and options trading, losses may be incurred that are greater than the amount of funds initially deposited. Trading in options involves risk and is not suitable for all investors. Prior to buying or selling an option investors must review the "Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options", at <http://www.optionsclearing.com/about/publications/character-risks.jsp>. If you are unable to access the website please contact your Deutsche Bank representative for a copy of this important document.

Participants in foreign exchange transactions may incur risks arising from several factors, including the following: ( i) exchange rates can be volatile and are subject to large fluctuations; ( ii) the value of currencies may be affected by numerous market factors, including world and national economic, political and regulatory events, events in equity and debt markets and changes in interest rates; and (iii) currencies may be subject to devaluation or government imposed exchange controls which could affect the value of the currency. Investors in securities such as ADRs, whose values are affected by the currency of an underlying security, effectively assume currency risk.

Unless governing law provides otherwise, all transactions should be executed through the Deutsche Bank entity in the investor's home jurisdiction. Aside from within this report, important conflict disclosures can also be found at <https://gm.db.com/equities> under the "Disclosures Lookup" and "Legal" tabs. Investors are strongly encouraged to review this information before investing.

**United States:** Approved and/or distributed by Deutsche Bank Securities Incorporated, a member of FINRA, NFA and SIPC. Analysts located outside of the United States are employed by non-US affiliates that are not subject to FINRA regulations.

**Germany:** Approved and/or distributed by Deutsche Bank AG, a joint stock corporation with limited liability incorporated in the Federal Republic of Germany with its principal office in Frankfurt am Main. Deutsche Bank AG is authorized under German Banking Law and is subject to supervision by the European Central Bank and by BaFin, Germany's Federal Financial Supervisory Authority.

**United Kingdom:** Approved and/or distributed by Deutsche Bank AG acting through its London Branch at Winchester House, 1 Great Winchester Street, London EC2N 2DB. Deutsche Bank AG in the United Kingdom is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and is subject to limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority. Details about the extent of our authorisation and regulation are available on request.



**Hong Kong:** Distributed by Deutsche Bank AG, Hong Kong Branch or Deutsche Securities Asia Limited.

**India:** Prepared by Deutsche Equities India Pvt Ltd, which is registered by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) as a stock broker. Research Analyst SEBI Registration Number is INH000001741. DEIPL may have received administrative warnings from the SEBI for breaches of Indian regulations.

**Japan:** Approved and/or distributed by Deutsche Securities Inc.(DSI). Registration number - Registered as a financial instruments dealer by the Head of the Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Kinsho) No. 117. Member of associations: JSDA, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association and The Financial Futures Association of Japan. Commissions and risks involved in stock transactions - for stock transactions, we charge stock commissions and consumption tax by multiplying the transaction amount by the commission rate agreed with each customer. Stock transactions can lead to losses as a result of share price fluctuations and other factors. Transactions in foreign stocks can lead to additional losses stemming from foreign exchange fluctuations. We may also charge commissions and fees for certain categories of investment advice, products and services. Recommended investment strategies, products and services carry the risk of losses to principal and other losses as a result of changes in market and/or economic trends, and/or fluctuations in market value. Before deciding on the purchase of financial products and/or services, customers should carefully read the relevant disclosures, prospectuses and other documentation. "Moody's", "Standard & Poor's", and "Fitch" mentioned in this report are not registered credit rating agencies in Japan unless Japan or "Nippon" is specifically designated in the name of the entity. Reports on Japanese listed companies not written by analysts of DSI are written by Deutsche Bank Group's analysts with the coverage companies specified by DSI. Some of the foreign securities stated on this report are not disclosed according to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law of Japan. Target prices set by Deutsche Bank's equity analysts are based on a 12-month forecast period.

**Korea:** Distributed by Deutsche Securities Korea Co.

**South Africa:** Deutsche Bank AG Johannesburg is incorporated in the Federal Republic of Germany (Branch Register Number in South Africa: 1998/003298/10).

**Singapore:** by Deutsche Bank AG, Singapore Branch or Deutsche Securities Asia Limited, Singapore Branch (One Raffles Quay #18-00 South Tower Singapore 048583, +65 6423 8001), which may be contacted in respect of any matters arising from, or in connection with, this report. Where this report is issued or promulgated in Singapore to a person who is not an accredited investor, expert investor or institutional investor (as defined in the applicable Singapore laws and regulations), they accept legal responsibility to such person for its contents.

**Taiwan:** Information on securities/investments that trade in Taiwan is for your reference only. Readers should independently evaluate investment risks and are solely responsible for their investment decisions. Deutsche Bank research may not be distributed to the Taiwan public media or quoted or used by the Taiwan public media without written consent. Information on securities/instruments that do not trade in Taiwan is for informational purposes only and is not to be construed as a recommendation to trade in such securities/instruments. Deutsche Securities Asia Limited, Taipei Branch may not execute transactions for clients in these securities/instruments.

**Qatar:** Deutsche Bank AG in the Qatar Financial Centre (registered no. 00032) is regulated by the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority. Deutsche Bank AG - QFC Branch may only undertake the financial services activities that fall within the scope of its existing QFCRA license. Principal place of business in the QFC: Qatar Financial Centre, Tower, West Bay, Level 5, PO Box 14928, Doha, Qatar. This information has been distributed by Deutsche Bank AG. Related financial products or services are only available to Business Customers, as defined by the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority.

**Russia:** This information, interpretation and opinions submitted herein are not in the context of, and do not constitute, any appraisal or evaluation activity requiring a license in the Russian Federation.

**Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:** Deutsche Securities Saudi Arabia LLC Company, (registered no. 07073-37) is regulated by the Capital Market Authority. Deutsche Securities Saudi Arabia may only undertake the financial services activities that fall within the scope of its existing CMA license. Principal place of business in Saudi Arabia: King Fahad Road, Al Olaya District, P.O. Box 301809, Faisaliah Tower - 17th Floor, 11372 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.



**United Arab Emirates:** Deutsche Bank AG in the Dubai International Financial Centre (registered no. 00045) is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority. Deutsche Bank AG - DIFC Branch may only undertake the financial services activities that fall within the scope of its existing DFSA license. Principal place of business in the DIFC: Dubai International Financial Centre, The Gate Village, Building 5, PO Box 504902, Dubai, U.A.E. This information has been distributed by Deutsche Bank AG. Related financial products or services are only available to Professional Clients, as defined by the Dubai Financial Services Authority.

**Australia:** Retail clients should obtain a copy of a Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) relating to any financial product referred to in this report and consider the PDS before making any decision about whether to acquire the product. Please refer to Australian specific research disclosures and related information at <https://australia.db.com/australia/content/research-information.html>

**Australia and New Zealand:** This research is intended only for "wholesale clients" within the meaning of the Australian Corporations Act and New Zealand Financial Advisors Act respectively.

Additional information relative to securities, other financial products or issuers discussed in this report is available upon request. This report may not be reproduced, distributed or published without Deutsche Bank's prior written consent. Copyright © 2017 Deutsche Bank AG



---

## David Folkerts-Landau

Group Chief Economist and Global Head of Research

Raj Hindocha  
Global Chief Operating Officer  
Research

Michael Spencer  
Head of APAC Research  
Global Head of Economics

Steve Pollard  
Head of Americas Research  
Global Head of Equity Research

Anthony Klarman  
Global Head of  
Debt Research

Paul Reynolds  
Head of EMEA  
Equity Research

Dave Clark  
Head of APAC  
Equity Research

Pam Finelli  
Global Head of  
Equity Derivatives Research

Andreas Neubauer  
Head of Research - Germany

Stuart Kirk  
Head of Thematic Research

---

### International Locations

#### Deutsche Bank AG

Deutsche Bank Place  
Level 16  
Corner of Hunter & Phillip Streets  
Sydney, NSW 2000  
Australia  
Tel: (61) 2 8258 1234

#### Deutsche Bank AG

Große Gallusstraße 10-14  
60272 Frankfurt am Main  
Germany  
Tel: (49) 69 910 00

#### Deutsche Bank AG

Filiale Hongkong  
International Commerce Centre,  
1 Austin Road West, Kowloon,  
Hong Kong  
Tel: (852) 2203 8888

#### Deutsche Securities Inc.

2-11-1 Nagatacho  
Sanno Park Tower  
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-6171  
Japan  
Tel: (81) 3 5156 6770

#### Deutsche Bank AG London

1 Great Winchester Street  
London EC2N 2EQ  
United Kingdom  
Tel: (44) 20 7545 8000

#### Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.

60 Wall Street  
New York, NY 10005  
United States of America  
Tel: (1) 212 250 2500

---