

Oil Market Outlook

Painful time for the oil industry

Particularly painful for the service industry as 70 \$/b
no better than 50 \$/b for global oil investments

The DNB oil story in pictures & graphs

Flere vil dessverre miste jobben (DN 18 oktober 2013)


- Oljepriser på 70-80 dollar vil ikke forhindre at flere mister jobben langs kysten de neste 12-18 månedene



- Folk vil miste jobben, og det vil bli mindre trøkk på boligmarkedet, sier oljeanalytiker Thorbjørn Kjus i DNB

Cash Flow Was In Trouble At 110 \$/b – 80 \$/b The New 110 \$/b?


- An oil price of 70-80 \$/b will not help much for the global offshore service industry. Pain will continue for a while.



MARKETS

Enormous Cuts In Global Oil Investments

- This sets the stage for lower production/lower production growth in the future



Peer group	2014 upstream E&D capex (US \$m)	2015 upstream E&D capex (US \$m)	y-o-y change in upstream E&D capex (US \$m)	y-o-y change in upstream E&D capex (%)
MLP	2,025	780	- 1,245	-61%
Major	193,376	170,500	- 22,876	-12%
Mid/Small-Cap	95,584	60,279	- 35,306	-37%
Large-Cap	118,968	82,604	- 36,364	-31%
NOC	109,778	79,819	- 29,959	-27%
	519,731	393,982	- 125,749	-24%

Source: Wood Mackenzie, company announcements

MARKETS

The Battle Is On

- Saudi has decided to test the price levels for the US shale industry

Last updated: December 22, 2014 7:36 pm

Opec leader vows not to cut oil output even if price hits \$20

Opec will not cut production even if the price of oil falls to \$20 a barrel, the cartel's de facto leader said, spelling out a dramatic policy shift that will have far-reaching implications for the global energy industry.



MARKETS

The Saudi Royal Family (Source Wikipedia)



Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud)

- King: 1902-1953
- Founded Saudi Arabia in 1932
- 22 wives (4 at a time)
- 45 sons of which 6 have been kings



King Saud

- King: 1953-1964
- Forced out



King Faisal

- King: 1964-1975
- Killed



King Khalid

- King: 1975-1982
- Heart Attack



King Fahad

- King: 1982-2005
- Stroke



King Abdullah

- King: 2005-2015
- Regent since 1995
- Unifying and popular
- 6 sons



King Salman

- 80 years old
- Full brother of King Fahad
- 25th son of Ibn Saud
- Well regarded
- Trusted mediator
- Had a stroke in 2010
- Pro economic reforms
- , but slow for social reasons
- Has 11 sons



Crown Prince Sultan

- Died 23.10.2011



Crown Prince Nayef

- Ultra conservative
- 23rd son of Ibn Saud
- Full brother of King Fahad
- Died 16.06.2012



New Crown Prince Muqrin

- 70 years old, 35th and youngest surviving son of Ibn Saud
- Mother from Yemen (18th spouse of Ibn Saud)
- Was an air force pilot educated at Britain RAF College in Cranwell
- In favour of sanctions instead of military action vs Iran
- Appreciated by the Saudi public, no corruption or negative activities
- Believed by many to be a liberal within the family
- Has 6 sons



New Deputy Crown Prince bin Nayef

- 58 years old, son of late Crown Prince Nayef
- Educated in the US - Political Science
- The most pro-American Saudi minister
- First successor from the third generation

MARKETS

Nobody Were More Bearish Than DNB In October

- But we were not bearish enough

INDIVIDUAL FORECASTS - REUTERS MONTHLY POLL ON OIL PRICES										
Organisation	Q414	Q115	2014	2015	2016	Q414	Q115	2014	2015	2016
ABN Amro	90.0	95.0	105.0	90.0	85.0	90.0	90.0	95.0	85.0	80.0
ANZ	94.0	98.0	94.0	105.0	98.0	90.0	94.0	90.0	97.0	93.0
Barclays	89.0	88.0	103.0	93.0	-	81.0	78.0	95.0	85.0	-
Banco BPI	89.0	94.0	105.0	90.0	99.0	87.0	92.0	98.0	86.0	95.0
Bernstein	-	-	106.0	104.0	109.0	-	-	100.0	98.0	104.0
BNP Paribas	96.0	100.0	104.0	97.0	-	89.0	91.0	97.0	88.0	-
BofA Merrill	93.0	95.0	104.0	98.0	-	85.0	86.0	95.0	90.0	-
Capital Economics	93.0	90.0	103.0	85.0	80.0	88.0	87.0	97.0	85.0	80.0
Citigroup	92.0	92.0	103.4	95.5	95.0	83.0	84.0	95.6	87.5	85.0
Commerzbank	85.0	85.0	-	85.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
CRISIL	87.0	90.0	101.7	92.5	92.5	84.5	87.5	96.0	90.5	90.5
Credit Suisse	92.0	87.0	103.3	91.5	90.0	85.0	77.0	96.0	84.5	82.0
Deutsche Bank	87.0	88.0	102.0	88.8	90.0	82.0	81.0	95.2	80.5	80.0
DNB Markets	85.0	-	102.0	80.0	85.0	-	-	-	-	-
Economist Intelli	98.0	101.0	104.4	97.6	96.0	88.2	91.9	97.0	88.4	84.5
Goldman Sachs	-	-	-	83.8	90.0	-	-	-	73.8	80.0
JBC Energy	91.6	99.0	102.8	100.0	105.9	87.6	91.8	96.7	93.1	100.4
Jefferies	89.0	87.0	95.6	90.0	98.0	-	-	-	-	-
LBBW	90.0	90.0	102.0	88.0	93.0	84.0	86.0	87.0	84.0	90.0
Morgan Stanley	106.0	-	107.0	98.0	102.0	97.0	-	99.0	87.0	-
NAB	90.0	100.0	103.0	103.0	105.0	85.0	94.0	96.0	97.0	102.0
Natixis	93.0	98.0	103.5	99.3	103.8	87.0	92.0	96.6	93.5	97.8
Nomisma Energia	85.9	83.3	101.4	80.5	75.3	80.9	78.3	97.4	77.5	72.3
Intesa Sanpaolo	87.0	90.0	102.0	96.2	102.0	85.0	87.0	94.3	91.4	94.6
Raymond James	90.0	90.0	102.5	90.0	90.0	84.0	80.0	96.0	75.0	82.0
Raiffeisen Bank	87.0	90.0	102.0	98.0	110.0	84.0	86.0	96.0	94.0	106.0
Santander	90.0	93.0	102.5	92.0	90.0	85.0	83.9	96.1	82.0	82.0
Societe Generale	88.0	92.0	102.3	91.0	95.0	82.0	85.0	95.2	83.0	86.5
Standard Chartere	88.0	94.0	103.0	105.0	115.0	90.0	96.0	97.0	99.0	104.0
UBS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	95.0	95.0	95.0	95.0	95.0
Unicredit	90.0	95.0	103.0	98.0	98.0	86.0	91.0	97.0	94.0	91.0

MARKETS

Now We Are Among The Most Bullish

- We forecast 65 \$/b for 2015 and that is currently among the most optimistic forecasts


INDIVIDUAL FORECASTS - REUTERS MONTHLY POLL ON OIL PRICES										
Organisation	Q215	Q315	2015	2016	2017	Q215	Q315	2015	2016	2017
ABN Amro	55	-	60	75	-	50	-	55	70	-
ANZ	44	49	49	64	68	42	47	47	61	65
Barclays	47	50	51	-	-	39	47	46	-	-
Banco BPI	54	53	54	60	65	48	47	48	54	59
Bernstein	-	-	80	90	95	-	-	75	85	90
BNP Paribas	55	63	60	75	-	48	58	55	70	-
BofA Merrill	-	-	52	58	-	-	-	50	57	-
Capital Economics	56	60	60	65	65	51	56	55	60	65
CIBC	58	80	69.5	82.5	-	48	62	57	70.5	-
Citigroup	45	55	54	69	-	35	45	46	61	-
Commerzbank	55	65	62	78	-	43	60	56	75	-
Credit Suisse	54	-	58	76	80	53	-	56	72	75
CRISIL	57	60	59.5	64.5	70	52	56	55.5	61.5	68
DNB Markets	55	63	65	80	84	-	-	-	-	-
EIU	52	58	58	71.38	-	46.28	51.62	51.93	65.51	-
First Energy Capi	57	60	58.7	72.25	79.5	50	53	52	67.25	74.5
Global Risk Manag	55	60	58	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Goldman Sachs	42	-	50.4	70	-	40.5	-	47.15	65	-
Intesa Sanpaolo	60	60	60	69	75	53	58	55.3	66.5	72
JBC Energy	53.33	58.81	58.32	74.81	-	46.66	55.6	53.32	70.37	-
Jefferies	45	53	50.25	67.5	77.25	43	49	47.25	62.5	72.25
LBBW	55	60	58	65	75	50	55	50	60	70
Morgan Stanley	57	71	70	88	100	-	-	59	-	-
NAB	54	58	57	69	-	49	54	53	67	-
Natixis	50	60	57.3	63.3	69	43	56	52.4	60	66
Nomisma Energia	59.55	61.19	59.09	64.91	67.18	51.55	54.19	52.09	59.91	63.18
Raiffeisen Bank I	53	60	59	77	85	51	57	55	73	82
Raymond James	60	72	68	82	87	55	65	62	75	80
Santander	55.5	56.5	56.5	65	70	50.59	51.5	51.5	57	63
Societe Generale	51.3	55	55.2	65	70	45	50	49.3	60	65
Standard Chartere	71	83	76	100	112	58	75	67	93	106
Thomson Reuters	56	57	57	70	-	-	-	-	-	-
UBS	50	-	52.5	67.5	80	48	-	49	62.5	75
Unicredit	60	60	60	70	-	54	54	54	66	-

MARKETS


Long Term Oil Price Forecast – Current

(The forecast is for the average of the rolling 1st month ICE Brent future contract)

	Historical Nominal \$/b	Historical Real (2015) \$/b
2001	24.4	32.2
2002	25.0	32.4
2003	28.8	36.5
2004	38.3	47.2
2005	54.5	65.0
2006	65.1	75.3
2007	72.4	81.3
2008	97.3	105.2
2009	61.7	67.0
2010	79.5	84.9
2011	111.3	115.2
2012	111.7	113.3
2013	108.7	108.7
2014	99.5	99.5
	Forecast Nominal \$/b	Forecast Real (2015) \$/b
Q1-15	55	55
Q2-15	63	63
Q3-15	69	69
Q4-15	74	74
2015	65	65
2016	80	79
2017	84	81
2018	88	84
2019	90	84
2020	90	82




Trend Line Growth Favors Supply – Not Demand




Shale Crude Output Growth Has Been Offset By Outages

- Shale crude production growth is starting to catch up – What happens next three years with unplanned outages??




Conventional vs Unconventional

- Moving to the “kitchen” instead of the “living room” (Source: USGS)




World Technically Recoverable Risked Resource of Shale/Tight Crude/Condensate Totals 0.9 Trillion Bbls

PIRA




US Crude Production Back On The Rise – The Shale Revolution

- After more than 20 years of steep production decline, US production is rising again




IEA's Forecasts For US Production Growth Far Too Low So Far

- IEA's first take on 2012 US production growth was at 45 kbd - now 2012 growth is estimated to have been 1.04 million b/d
- For 2013 the forecasted growth was 479 kbd, now the number is revised up to 1.14 million b/d
- For 2014 the initial estimate was 700 kbd, now the estimate is revised up to 1.57 million b/d




Over Supplied Market in 2014

- Global oil stocks (excl. Chinese strategic stocks) are now 253 million barrels above a year ago.




OECD Stocks Are High




We Are Not Set To Return To The Trend Line

- All the changes to oil demand in recent years are not all cyclical, there are also structural elements to them like efficiency improvements and substitution





Better Oil Demand Growth At Prices Below 100 Dollars



The Oil market Is Now Very Dependent On Oil Demand From EM


- OECD oil demand would have been 16 mbd higher had we not left the trend line as oil prices started to increase



MARKETS

Oil Is Too Expensive – Coal Is Too Cheap

- When oil prices are running away from other energy prices it will initiate switching where possible



Petroleum Subsidies Have Supported Oil Demand In Non-OECD


- Emerging Markets economies heavily subsidize oil prices for their consumers, but some large countries are now forced to cut back

Country	% of Government Revenues	Population Million	Oil demand kbd	Country	% of Government Revenues	Population Million	Oil demand kbd
FSU				MENA			
Armenia	2.1	3		Algeria	10.8	37.3	396
Azerbaijan	1.9	9		Bahrain	19.0	1.2	
Georgia	2.0	5		Egypt	30.6	83.6	756
Kazakhstan	2.3	17		Iran	17.0	79	1721
Kyrgyzstan	10.4	5		Iraq	12.7	31.1	777
Turkmenistan	31.8	5		Jordan	8.1	6.2	139
Emerging Asia				Kuwait	4.6	2.6	459
Bangladesh	7.6	153	106	Libya	16.6	1.8	269
Bhutan	1.4	0.7		Morocco	2.4	32.3	297
Brunei	3.8	0.4	18	Oman	7.3	3.1	184
India	6.8	1270	3427	Qatar	3.2	1.9	229
Indonesia	14.5	246	1636	Saudi Arabia	14.0	26.5	3026
Malaysia	5.7	29	746	Sudan	7.3	34.2	98
Myanmar	9.4	60	27	Tunisia	2.4	10.8	86
Pakistan	1.0	179	453	UAE	1.4	5.3	699
Sri Lanka	8.0	21	106	Yemen	19.0	24.8	138
Thailand	0.7	67	1310	Africa			
Latin America				Angola	2.7	21	129
Antigua	2.4	0.1		Cameroon	8.9	20	38
Bolivia	6.6	10.3	72	Congo	2.8	75.5	16
Ecuador	15.4	14.7	263	Equatorial G.	0.9	0.7	
St. Kitts	0.6	0.1		Ethiopia	1.1	83	54
St. Lucia	0.7	0.1		Ghana	3.2	25	79
Trinidad	7.5	1.3		Madagascar	1.0	22	
Venezuela	15.8	29.7	709	Nigeria	4.8	166	336

Source: IMF, IEA, Wikipedia





Almost All Demand Growth From The Subsidizing Countries

- Almost all growth in global oil demand since 2002 has been coming from subsidizing countries





US Oil Demand Improving On Lower Oil Prices

- Gasoline demand very strong since the autumn – People driving more coupled with lower fuel efficiency



Driving Distance On The Rise Gasoline Prices Drop


- Lower oil prices are incentivizing more driving



Efficiency Improvements In The US Car Fleet Now Visible


- But every time the oil price drops, the fuel efficiency drops as well – People buying more gasoline hungry cars again

US Car Efficiency In MPG For New Car Sales (Average fuel economy for a new light-duty vehicle in the US)




Source: University of Michigan - Transportation Research Institute

US SUV Market Share Expanding Again





Lower Gasoline Price To Positively Affect US Gasoline Demand

- But not a large enough impulse to change the world oil balance...





Chinese Gasoline Demand Accelerating

- Our take: Lower prices coupled with record car sales looks more important than lower GDP-growth
- Diesel continues its weak performance from the past couple of years however on a weaker construction growth



Chinese Retail Prices Reduced Massively Since The Summer

- Are we seeing a price response from Chinese consumers of petroleum products?




Chinese Oil Demand Growth Improving

Year on Year Calculated Chinese Demand

(Demand is refinery runs plus net product imports.


Figures are adjusted for inventory changes since Feb 2009)



Source: China OGP, Xinhua News, The Chinese General Administration & Customs, National Bureau of Statistics

Reduced Oil Burden May Support Oil Demand Growth


- The lower oil burden may increase the oil intensity back to 0.4 from 0.2 in 2014 (oil demand as a factor of GDP-growth)



Last Autumn: 60-80 \$/b Brent Required For Further Growth


- But costs are now coming significantly down, ref EOG and others

Exhibit 1: North American shale production split by Brent equivalent break-even oil prices through 2015 (thousand barrels per day, including NGLs)




US Shale Break Even Oil Prices By Field

50 Estimates from a combination of analysts - September/October 2014




Source: J.T. Gabrielsen Consulting, Morgan Stanley, UBS, Credit Suisse, Robert Baird, Goldman Sachs

Western Eagle Ford Current Returns Versus 2012



EOG Resources Deferred Completions



MARKETS

CAPEX Now Guided Down 35% - YoY Output Will Still Be Up

- But entry vs exit is guided flattish

	2015 Vs 2014			2015 Avg Vs 4Q14		% of 2014 Production in the US	
	CAPEX Growth	Total BOE Growth	Oil Growth	Total BOE Growth	Oil Growth	Total BOE/D	Oil
Anadarko						91%	74%
Apache						45%	42%
Chesapeake						100%	100%
Cimarex						100%	100%
Concho						100%	100%
ConocoPhillips						47%	59%
Continental ¹						100%	100%
Devon						86%	61%
Encana						44%	73%
EOG						87%	98%
Hess						56%	60%
Marathon ²						66%	69%
Newfield						94%	98%
Noble						60%	66%
Pioneer						100%	100%
Whiting ³						100%	100%
Weighted Average	-35%	3%	9%	-1%	1%		

	Increase	Decrease
	Flat	Insufficient data


Prices Have Reached Unsustainable Levels For Shale

- Will the shale players be able to service their debt and continue to invest at 50 \$/b WTI prices?



Lifting costs in \$/b (incl. G&A costs & County/State tax)	15
Interest rate:	5%
WTI price (\$/b)	50
NGL's price as percentage of crude price:	35%

Company name:	EOG	Chesapeake	Pioneer	Whiting	Continental	Concho	Noble	Cimarex	Crescent	Oasis	Average
Crude production 2015 kbd (Q4 plus 10%)	339	133	110	117	150	79	108	52	140	50	128
Crude diff average to WTI in Q2/Q3/Q4 (\$/b)	-0.4	-8.0	-7.3	-10.6	-11.4	-10.9	-1.8	-9.5	-6.1	-9.7	-7.5
Achieved crude price at assumed WTI price \$/b	49.6	42.0	42.7	39.4	38.6	39.2	48.3	40.5	43.9	40.3	42.5
Revenue from crude sales million USD	6,141	2,039	1,716	1,682	2,115	1,129	1,902	769	2,242	736	2,047
NGL's production kbd	84	100	45	10.5	0	0	35	34	0	0	31
NGL price \$/b	17.4	14.7	15.0	13.8	13.5	13.7	16.9	14.2	15.4	14.1	14.9
Revenue from NGL's sales million USD	533	537	246	53	0	0	216	176	0	0	176
Natural gas production (million cubic meters/day)	37.0	88.0	10.0	2.7	10.0	7.5	32.0	15.0	2.2	0.9	21
Natural gas price \$/cm	0.10	0.06	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.20	0.12	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.14
Revenue from natgas sales million USD	1,351	1,927	475	148	548	548	1,402	767	128	56	735
Revenue pr year million USD	8,024	4,503	2,436	1,883	2,662	1,676	3,519	1,712	2,371	792	2,958
Total production in oil equivalents (Q4)	610	729	201	131	193	120	302	158	141	50	264
Lifting costs USD (based on total oil equivalents output)	3,340	3,991	1,100	717	1,057	657	1,653	865	772	274	1,443
Long Term debt by Q4-2014 (million USD)	5,910	11,555	2,665	5,629	5,998	3,610	6,103	1,500	2,850	2,700	4,852
Interest rate costs 2015 (million USD)	296	578	133	281	300	181	305	75	143	135	243
Total Debt Ratio (Q4- 2014) LT debt to total capital	25%	38%	24%	50%	55%	40%	37%	25%	22%	59%	37%
Calculated free cash flow 2015:	4,389	-66	1,202	884	1,306	839	1,561	772	1,456	383	1,273
CAPEX 2014	8,247	5,307	3,576	2,968	4,716	2,589	4,871	2,108	2,168	1,400	3,795
Calculated change in CAPEX for 2015	-3,858	-5,373	-2,374	-2,084	-3,410	-1,750	-3,310	-1,336	-712	-1,017	-2,522
Debt/Free cash flow	1.3		2.2	6.4	4.6	4.3	3.9	1.9	2.0	7.0	3.7
Calculated decrease in CAPEX if no new debt/equity	47%	101%	66%	70%	72%	68%	68%	63%	33%	73%	66%





Oil Production From 7 Key Shale Regions – Model & Reported



Oil Production From 7 Key Shale Regions – Model & Reported




Horizontal Oil Rigs & US Calculated Shale Oil Output




Prices Have Reached Unsustainable Levels For Shale

- Will the shale players be able to service their debt and continue to invest at 50 \$/b WTI prices?



The Market Has Been Over-supplied Through 2014

- The red line is our view on 2015



The Adjustment Will Not Be Without Pain For Many Players

- The tone is set - CAPEX in the oil industry will be lowered – A lot!!!

Last updated: January 14, 2015 6:46 pm

Oil projects worth billions put on hold

Christopher Adams and Michael Kavanagh [Author alerts](#)



Billions of dollars of spending on oil and petrochemicals projects has been scrapped or put on hold, with [Royal Dutch Shell](#) and UK-based [Premier Oil](#) announcing the first big cost-cutting moves of 2015 after a brutal slide in crude prices.

Halliburton requests 25% discount from its suppliers in reaction to reduced capital spending

PRAMOD KULKARNI, Editor

HOUSTON – Oilfield services giant Halliburton has issued a memorandum to its suppliers, asking for a 25% discount effective immediately. The vendors must confirm the discount no later than Dec. 31, 2014.

The memo cites recent decline in commodity prices and how it has created uncertainty for their operator clients and, consequently, for companies like Halliburton in the oilfield services sector. "Given these conditions, we must adjust our costs in order to continue to successfully manage our business through this period," according to the memo dated Dec. 17, 2014.

Petronas may cut 2015 spending by up to 20%

Malaysian player considering revising capital expenditure as it announces 1% drop in revenue

AMANDA BATES/REUTERS

MALAYSIA'S state-owned oil and gas company Petronas is considering cutting its 2015 capital expenditure by 10% to 20% from the expected \$6 billion plus ringgit (\$1.1 billion) phase in light of the



January 20, 2015 5:39 pm

Total's Patrick Pouyanné vows surgical response to oil price slide

Mr Pouyanné's central aim is therefore to reduce Total's "break-even" price – the minimum level at which the group can profitably produce oil – by \$40 a barrel.

ft.com > companies > energy >

Sign out today

Oil & Gas

Home World > Companies > Markets > Global Economy > Less > Energy > Finance > Health > Insurance > Luxury 360 > Media > Retail & Consumer > Tech >

December 2, 2014 9:49 pm

Schlumberger cuts seismic survey fleet as oil weakens

Ed Crooks in New York [Author alerts](#)



Schlumberger, the world's largest oil services group, is cutting back its fleet for offshore geological surveys and taking on \$100m writedown on the value of its ships, in the first significant cutback in the industry following the recent fall in crude prices.

The company also said it was cutting jobs, without giving a number, in response to lower oil prices and expected slower growth in oil exploration and production company spending.

January 15, 2015 10:59 pm

Schlumberger to axe 9,000 jobs amid oil rout

Ed Crooks in New York [Author alerts](#)



ConocoPhillips plans to spend less in 2015 as crude slides

ConocoPhillips said its 2015 capital budget would be 20 percent, or about \$3 billion, lower than this year's, the biggest spending cut by a U.S. oil and gas producer in dollar terms as oil prices hit five-year lows.

Shares of the company, which set a budget of \$13.5 billion for 2015, fell as much as 3.5 percent to \$65.50 on the New York Stock Exchange on Monday.

ConocoPhillips said it would "defer significant investment" on less developed projects in the Montney and Duvernay fields in Canada, the Permian Basin in Texas and the Niobrara shale field, which extends over Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska and Kansas. ConocoPhillips, which is focusing on the Eagle Ford shale in Texas and North Dakota's Bakken shale, said it would also spend less on major projects, many of which are nearing completion.

More than \$150 bln of oil projects face the axe in 2015

Global oil and gas exploration projects worth more than \$150 billion are likely to be put on hold next year as plunging oil prices render them uneconomic, data shows, potentially curbing supplies by the end of the decade.

As big oil fields that were discovered decades ago begin to deplete, oil companies are trying to access more complex and hard to reach fields located in some cases deep under sea level. But at the same time, the cost of production has risen sharply given the rising cost of raw materials and the need for expensive new technology to reach the oil.

Now the outlook for onshore and offshore developments - from the Barents Sea to the Gulf or Mexico - looks as uncertain as the price of oil, which has plunged by 40 percent in the last five months to around \$70 a barrel.

Next year companies will make final investment decisions (FIDs) on a total of 800 oil and gas projects worth \$500 billion and totalling nearly 60 billion barrels of oil equivalent, according to data from Norwegian consultancy Rystad Energy.

BG Group responds to low oil prices. Reduces capex

The company has said that planned capital expenditure on a cash basis in 2015 will fall to between \$6 - 7 billion in 2015. For comparison, capital investment in 2014 was \$9.4 billion, almost entirely spent in the Upstream segment (\$9 387 million) and concentrated primarily on BG's key growth projects in Australia and Brazil.

December 7, 2014 6:00 pm

BP considers job cuts in face of plunge in oil price

By Henry Sanderson [Author alerts](#)

BP is accelerating plans to reduce its headcount, in a sign of how global oil companies are looking to control costs in the face of a lower oil price.

The oil major is looking at its non-operations staff, including back-office employees, that have been kept on as the company has shed production assets in its portfolio.

BP hit by \$3.6B charge, cuts capex on oil prices

This week, [Cnooc](#) announced plans to reduce capital spending as the government and large state-owned enterprises respond to the collapse in oil prices. China's third-largest oil producer said it would cut development spending by 67 per cent and, albeit less dramatically, reduce exploration and production capital expenditure.

January 20, 2015 5:35 pm

Baker Hughes to axe 7,000 jobs

Ed Crooks New York



Oil drilling is falling faster in North America than in the rest of the world, according to [Baker Hughes](#), which on Tuesday announced plans to cut 7,000 jobs in the first quarter of this year in response to the plunge in oil prices.

The oil services company warned of "challenging" conditions ahead, with the industry in the early stages of a downturn of the type seen once or twice every decade.

FirstFT is our new essential daily email briefing of the best stories from across the web


Total, Mr Pouyanné says, will reduce group capital spending by 10 per cent in 2015, from \$26bn last year – a larger cut than expected. Of that reduction, the exploration budget – the easiest area where majors can save money – will be cut 30 per cent to less than \$2bn.

Exxon says it won't reveal 2015 capex plans until March

Chevron : plans \$35 billion capex budget for 2015, a 13 percent cut

Has The World Brought On 5 New Saudi Arabias Since 2000?

- Of course not - which means net decline is much lower than 4%.
- We think IEA's assessment of the efficiency of investments in existing fields must be too low




IEA WEO 2013 page 459:

A small difference in the decline rate makes a large difference to the investment requirement and can, therefore, have a large influence on future market conditions. In the projections, the compound annual decline rate of currently producing conventional fields is around 4%.

If You Invest In Existing Production You Get More Out


- The graph below shows the difference in production between net decline of 4% and the net decline calculated using real startups



MARKETS

Costs Are Already Coming Down For Future Projects


- Some companies already report large cost savings for future projects



MARKETS



Could We See Another 10-15 Year Period Of 30-40 \$/b

- Historically oil prices have trended lower – More volatility after OPEC was formed – Will we again see a period of lower prices?





Spare Capacity Still Much Lower Than In The 1980's

- An equally long period with low prices as in the 1980-90's should not be the most plausible scenario



The Most Expensive Resources Are Being Pushed Out

- Do we need the most expensive resources in the coming 5 years?



Backup

Bullish Arguments





- Large cuts in global oil investments
- Even larger cuts in US shale oil companies – US shale oil growth finance by debt, so CAPEX cuts now needs to be huge
- Rig count in the US is collapsing
- US liquids production growth of 1.5 mbd will cease to about zero within 12-18 months
- Decline rates set to accelerate already into 2016
- Demand is performing very strongly in US and China on lower prices
- Record car sales in China in December
- Americans driving more and buying more gasoline thirsty vehicles again
- 65 \$/b vs 110 \$/b is worth 1500 billion USD to the global oil importers – Translates to better global GDP-growth
- Geopolitical risk in OPEC countries is increasing at low oil prices (and remember we are coming from average 110 \$/b)
 - Key risk is Venezuela and Iraq
- Spare capacity is only 3% compared to 17% in the middle of the 1980's
- Oil price will move higher before supply/demand-balance is moving to stock draw modus

Bearish Arguments

- Over supplied supply/demand-balance in 1H2015
- Global oil stocks are already high and continue to build rapidly – Particularly in the US
- Shale oil resource base looking to be much larger than everybody thought just a few years ago
 - Shale oil production has only surprised to the upside so far
- Delayed response from drop in rig count to drop in production – High grading of acreage – Productivity improvements
- Global demand growth last ten years protected by subsidies – What now when subsidies are removed in many EM?
- Saudi Arabia not set to protect a high price – targeting market share instead
- Costs in the global oil industry set to drop significantly – Slack in the service industry as CAPEX is cut
 - The marginal 2-3 million most expensive barrels are set to be cheaper = lower oil price required
- Libya is already out of the market and cannot get any worse – Can only see barrels returning from here
- Iran already shut out with 700-800 kbd, more chance of barrels coming in than more out


Global Refinery Capacity Additions

- Source: IEA Medium Term Oil Market Report



Refinery Capacity Additions Larger Than Oil Demand Growth

- Source: This is not a bullish picture for refinery margins




MARKETS

60% Of NCS Not Economical At Brent Below 50 \$/b


- Cost of capital 10% and with the current cost base

Break Even Oil Prices Per Project in Norway



Source: Rystad Energy - January 2015

Net Decline Rate Accelerated In 2010 After CAPEX Cuts In 2009



Source: DNB Markets,
Goldman Sachs 400 projects to
change the world – 16 May 2014



MARKETS

Fundamental Balances DNB Markets vs IEA, OPEC, EIA

DNB Markets World Oil Supply-Demand Balance:															
	2008	Change	2009	Change	2010	Change	2011	Change	2012	Change	2013	Change	2014	Change	2015
OECD Demand	48.4	-2.0	46.3	0.6	47.0	-0.5	46.4	-0.5	45.9	0.2	46.1	-0.5	45.6	0.3	45.9
Non-OECD Demand	38.1	1.2	39.3	2.5	41.7	1.4	43.1	1.6	44.6	1.1	45.8	1.1	46.9	1.1	48.0
Total Demand	86.5	-0.9	85.6	3.1	88.7	0.8	89.5	1.1	90.6	1.3	91.9	0.7	92.5	1.4	93.9
Non-OPEC Supply	49.1	0.5	49.7	1.2	50.8	0.1	51.0	0.4	51.4	1.3	52.7	2.0	54.6	0.4	55.0
OPEC NGL's and non-conventional oil	4.5	0.6	5.1	0.4	5.5	0.4	5.9	0.3	6.2	0.1	6.3	0.1	6.4	0.2	6.5
Global Biofuels	1.4	0.2	1.6	0.2	1.8	0.0	1.8	0.0	1.9	0.2	2.0	0.2	2.2	0.1	2.3
Total Non-OPEC supply	55.0	1.3	56.3	1.8	58.1	0.5	58.7	0.8	59.4	1.5	60.9	2.3	63.2	0.6	63.8
Call on OPEC crude (and stocks)	31.4	-2.2	29.3	1.3	30.6	0.3	30.8	0.3	31.1	-0.2	30.9	-1.6	29.3	0.7	30.1
OPEC Crude Oil Supply	31.6	-2.5	29.1	0.1	29.2	0.7	29.9	1.4	31.3	-0.8	30.5	-0.2	30.3	0.6	30.9
Implied World Oil Stock Change	0.2		-0.2		-1.4		-0.9		0.2		-0.5		1.0		0.8
IEA World Oil Supply-Demand Balance (April 2015):															
	2008	Change	2009	Change	2010	Change	2011	Change	2012	Change	2013	Change	2014	Change	2015
OECD Demand	48.4	-2.0	46.3	0.6	47.0	-0.5	46.4	-0.5	45.9	0.2	46.1	-0.5	45.6	0.1	45.7
Non-OECD Demand	38.1	1.2	39.3	2.5	41.7	1.4	43.1	1.6	44.6	1.1	45.8	1.1	46.9	1.0	47.9
Total Demand	86.5	-0.9	85.6	3.1	88.7	0.8	89.5	1.1	90.6	1.3	91.9	0.7	92.5	1.1	93.6
Non-OPEC Supply	49.1	0.5	49.7	1.2	50.8	0.1	51.0	0.4	51.4	1.3	52.7	2.0	54.6	0.6	55.2
OPEC NGL's and non-conventional oil	4.5	0.6	5.1	0.4	5.5	0.4	5.9	0.3	6.2	0.1	6.3	0.1	6.4	0.2	6.6
Global Biofuels	1.4	0.2	1.6	0.2	1.8	0.0	1.8	0.0	1.9	0.2	2.0	0.2	2.2	0.1	2.2
Total Non-OPEC supply	55.0	1.3	56.3	1.8	58.1	0.5	58.7	0.8	59.4	1.5	60.9	2.3	63.2	0.9	64.0
Call on OPEC crude (and stocks)	31.4	-2.2	29.3	1.3	30.6	0.3	30.8	0.3	31.1	-0.2	30.9	-1.6	29.3	0.2	29.6
OPEC Crude Oil Supply	31.6	-2.5	29.1	0.1	29.2	0.7	29.9	1.4	31.3	-0.8	30.5	-0.2	30.3	0.6	30.9
Implied World Oil Stock Change	0.2		-0.2		-1.4		-0.9		0.2		-0.5		1.0		1.3
OPEC World Oil Supply-Demand Balance (March 2015):															
	2008	Change	2009	Change	2010	Change	2011	Change	2012	Change	2013	Change	2014	Change	2015
OECD Demand	48.4	-2.0	46.4	0.6	47.0	-0.6	46.4	-0.5	45.9	0.2	46.1	-0.3	45.8	0.0	45.8
Non-OECD Demand	37.7	0.7	38.4	1.9	40.3	1.4	41.7	1.4	43.1	1.0	44.1	1.3	45.4	1.2	46.6
Total Demand	86.1	-1.3	84.8	2.5	87.3	0.8	88.1	0.9	89.0	1.2	90.2	1.0	91.2	1.2	92.4
Non-OPEC Supply (Incl all Biofuel)	50.4	0.7	51.1	1.3	52.4	0.0	52.4	0.5	52.9	1.4	54.3	2.0	56.3	0.9	57.2
OPEC NGL's and non-conventional oil	4.1	0.2	4.3	0.7	5.0	0.4	5.4	0.2	5.6	0.0	5.6	0.2	5.8	0.2	6.0
Total Non-OPEC supply	54.5	0.9	55.4	2.0	57.4	0.4	57.8	0.7	58.5	1.4	59.9	2.2	62.1	1.1	63.2
Call on OPEC crude (and stocks)	31.6	-2.2	29.4	0.5	29.9	0.4	30.3	0.2	30.5	-0.2	30.3	-1.2	29.1	0.1	29.2
OPEC Crude Oil Supply	31.2	-2.5	28.7	0.5	29.2	0.7	29.9	1.4	31.3	-0.8	30.5	-0.2	30.3	0.6	30.9
Implied World Oil Stock Change	-0.4		-0.7		-0.7		-0.4		0.8		0.2		1.2		1.7
EIA World Oil Supply-Demand balance (March 2015):															
	2008	Change	2009	Change	2010	Change	2011	Change	2012	Change	2013	Change	2014	Change	2015
OECD Demand	47.6	-2.2	45.4	0.7	46.1	-0.3	45.8	0.1	45.9	0.2	46.1	-0.3	45.8	0.2	45.9
Non-OECD Demand	38.2	0.7	38.9	2.1	41.0	1.5	42.5	0.8	43.3	1.2	44.4	2.0	46.4	0.8	47.2
Total Demand	85.8	-1.5	84.3	2.7	87.1	1.2	88.3	0.9	89.2	1.3	90.5	1.7	92.2	1.0	93.1
Non-OPEC Supply (Incl all Biofuel)	49.7	0.8	50.5	1.3	51.8	0.2	52.0	0.7	52.7	1.5	54.1	2.4	56.6	1.0	57.6
OPEC NGL's and non-conventional oil	4.5	0.3	4.8	0.8	5.5	-0.3	5.3	0.5	5.8	0.4	6.1	0.3	6.4	0.1	6.4
Total Non-OPEC supply	54.1	1.1	55.2	2.1	57.3	-0.1	57.2	1.2	58.4	1.8	60.2	2.7	62.9	1.1	64.0
Call on OPEC crude (and stocks)	31.7	-2.6	29.1	0.7	29.8	1.3	31.1	-0.3	30.8	-0.5	30.2	-1.0	29.2	-0.1	29.1
OPEC Crude Oil Supply	31.3	-2.2	29.1	0.1	29.2	0.7	29.9	1.4	31.3	-0.8	30.5	-0.2	30.3	0.6	30.9
Implied World Oil Stock Change	-0.4		0.0		-0.6		-1.1		0.6		0.2		1.1		1.8





Non-OPEC Supply Growth Seen Fading & Demand Stronger

- Lower prices will stimulate demand growth and reduce supply growth




Historically Core OPEC Takes Most of the Needed Cuts

- In 2001-02 the price fell 47% and in 2008-09 the price fell 74%




Flattish E&P CAPEX Does Not Equal No Production Growth

- CAPEX down 50% from 1982 to 1987 but non-OPEC growth not negatively affected until from 1986 to 1989



Flattish E&P CAPEX Does Not Equal No Production Growth

- The lag effects are quite large – Falling CAPEX in the early 1980's led to flattening growth 4-5 years later



China Becoming Cleaner?

- Coal production growth used to be correlated with electricity output growth – but this is no longer the case

April 24, 2014 1:30 pm

China law change opens way to huge fines for polluters

China has been gradually releasing more data on air quality and last week released an alarming report on **soil pollution** that had been previously classed as “secret”. Earlier this year, the government began direct emissions monitoring at the nation’s largest factories.




China has passed long-delayed revisions to an environmental law that will allow more punishing fines for polluters, removing what many saw as a major barrier to cleaning up the country’s poisoned air, water and soil.

The revised draft of the 25-year-old Environmental Protection Law, passed by a legislature committee this afternoon, sets no limit on fines for polluters. Previous caps on fines were so low that it was often cheaper to pay the fines than install or operate emissions-reducing equipment.

Chinese Electricity Output & Coal Output

Percent, year-on-year, monthly data, 3 months mavg




Source: Datastream, Thompson Reuters

— Electricity production (LHS) — Coal production (RHS)

Chinese Net Coal Imports

Volume in tens of thousand metric tonnes




Source: Datastream, Thompson Reuters

Sources: Financial Times, Thompson Reuters Datastream

Torbjørn Kjus – torbjorn.kjus@dnb.no – Telephone: +47 24 16 91 66


MARKETS

General Intro To The Oil Market




Key Growth Products Are Naphtha, Diesel & LPG

- Of these only the diesel part is dependent on crude oil feed and refineries




Growing Part Of Global Oil Demand Not Covered By Refineries

- The world needs a gradually less share of crude oil to cover global oil liquids demand



Global Unplanned Outages Are At A Historically High Level



- If you are bullish for the next three years the premise must be further increased outages in our opinion. Will that happen?



MARKETS


A 50% Reduction In Activity Will Stop Growth For A Year

- But then growth will again resume even without any new increase in activity




	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Accumulated production start up	34,990	111,135	315,805	540,845	895,865	1,483,200	2,343,105	3,212,225	4,233,150	4,818,545	5,400,545	5,982,545	6,564,545	7,146,545	7,728,545
Net production end of year	12,958	56,099	153,325	200,925	319,684	549,501	781,988	919,758	1,144,924	1,030,928	1,066,056	1,127,178	1,194,095	1,259,431	1,323,216
Accumulated decline	22,032	55,036	162,480	339,920	576,181	933,699	1,561,117	2,292,467	3,088,226	3,787,617	4,334,489	4,855,367	5,370,450	5,887,114	6,405,329
Yearly start up	34,990	76,145	204,670	225,040	355,020	587,335	859,905	869,120	1,020,925	585,395	582,000	582,000	582,000	582,000	582,000
Total yearly production decline	22,032	33,004	107,444	177,441	236,261	357,518	627,418	731,350	795,759	699,390	546,872	520,879	515,083	516,664	518,215
Decline vs new start up	63%	43%	52%	79%	67%	61%	73%	84%	78%	119%	94%	89%	89%	89%	89%
Yearly net production increase		43,141	97,226	47,599	118,759	229,817	232,487	137,770	225,166	-113,995	35,128	61,121	66,917	65,336	63,785



Financial Oil Positions NYMEX (WTI, RBOB, Heating Oil)



Net 'Money Managers' Exposure on ICE Brent



Gross 'Non-Commercial' Exposure London/New York



US Fuel Efficiency Standards To Significantly Improve By 2025

-CAFE-standards to reach 48.7 MPG by 2025

The formal proposal follows President Obama's agreement with 13 major automakers, announced in July, to gradually boost these vehicles' fuel economy to the equivalent of 54.5 miles per gallon -- up from the current standard of 27.3 mpg. Last year, the administration finalized rules to hike the standard to 35.5 mpg by 2016.




CAPTION By Brendan Smialowski, Getty Images

Source: EPA/Department of Transportation Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule – July 2010

TABLE I.B.2-1—AVERAGE REQUIRED FUEL ECONOMY (mpg) UNDER FINAL CAFE STANDARDS

	2011-base	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Passenger Cars	30.4	33.3	34.2	34.9	36.2	37.8
Light Trucks	24.4	25.4	26.0	26.6	27.5	28.8
Combined Cars & Trucks	27.6	29.7	30.5	31.3	32.6	34.1



Source: Annual Energy Outlook – EIA April 2013

Table 1. NHTSA projected average fleet-wide CAFE compliance levels (miles per gallon) for passenger cars and light-duty trucks, model years 2017-2025, based on the model year 2010 baseline fleet

Model year	Passenger cars	Light-duty trucks	Combined
2017	39.6	29.1	35.1
2018	41.1	29.6	36.1
2019	42.5	30.0	37.1
2020	44.2	30.6	38.3
2021	46.1	32.6	40.3
2022	48.2	34.2	42.3
2023	50.5	35.8	44.3
2024	52.9	37.5	46.5
2025	55.3	39.3	48.7

MARKETS

CONTACTS & DISCLAIMER

Oslo, Sales & Trading

Nils Fredrik Hvatum	+47 24 16 91 59
Kenneth Tveter	+47 24 16 91 69
Jesper Meyer Hatletveit	+47 24 16 91 53
Nils Wierli Nilsen	+47 24 16 91 61
Andre Rørheim	+47 24 16 91 64
Erik Warren	+47 24 16 91 46

London, Sales

Ane Tobiasen	+44(0) 20 7621 6082
--------------	---------------------

Singapore, Sales

Seng Leong Ong	+65 622 480 22
----------------	----------------

New York, Sales

Fredrik Sagen Andersen	+1 212 681 3888
------------------------	-----------------

Oslo, Research

Torbjørn Kjøs	+47 24 16 91 66
Karl Magnus Maribu	+47 24 16 91 57

This note (the "Note") must be seen as marketing material and not as an investment recommendation within the meaning of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act of 2007 paragraph 3-10 and the Norwegian Securities Trading Regulation 2007/06/29 no. 876. The Note has been prepared by DNB Markets, a division of DNB Bank ASA, a Norwegian bank organized under the laws of the Kingdom of Norway (the "Bank"), for information purposes only. The Note shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. The Bank, its affiliates, and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees or agents (individually, each a "DNB Party"; collectively, "DNB Parties") do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness or availability of the Note. DNB Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions, regardless of the cause, nor for the results obtained from the use of the Note, nor for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Note is provided on an "as is" basis. DNB PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE NOTE'S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR THAT THE NOTE WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall DNB Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs) in connection with any use of the Note, even if advised of the possibility of such damages. Any opinions expressed herein reflect the Bank's judgment at the time the Note was prepared and DNB Parties assume no obligation to update the Note in any form or format. The Note should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. No DNB Party is acting as fiduciary or investment advisor in connection with the dissemination of the Note. While the Note is based on information obtained from public sources that the Bank believes to be reliable, no DNB Party has performed an audit of, nor accepts any duty of due diligence or independent verification of, any information it receives. Confidentiality rules and internal rules restrict the exchange of information between different parts of the Bank and this may prevent employees of DNB Markets who are preparing the Note from utilizing or being aware of information available in DNB Markets/the Bank which may be relevant to the recipients of the Note.

The Note is not an offer to buy or sell any security or other financial instrument or to participate in any investment strategy. Distribution of material like the Note is in certain jurisdictions restricted by law. Persons in possession of the Note should seek further guidance regarding such restrictions before distributing the Note.

The Note is for clients only, and not for publication, and has been prepared for information purposes only by DNB Markets - a division of DNB Bank ASA registered in Norway with registration number NO 984 851 006 (the Register of Business Enterprises) under supervision of the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (Finanstilsynet), The Monetary Authority of Singapore, and on a limited basis by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority of the UK, and the Financial Supervisory Authority of Sweden. Details about the extent of our regulation by local authorities outside Norway are available from us on request.

Information about DNB Markets can be found at dnb.no.

Additional information for clients in Singapore

The Note has been distributed by the Singapore Branch of DNB Bank ASA. It is intended for general circulation and does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of any particular person. You should seek advice from a financial adviser regarding the suitability of any product referred to in the Note, taking into account your specific financial objectives, financial situation or particular needs before making a commitment to purchase any such product.

You have received a copy of the Note because you have been classified either as an accredited investor, an expert investor or as an institutional investor, as these terms have been defined under Singapore's Financial Advisers Act (Cap. 110) ("FAA") and/or the Financial Advisers Regulations ("FAR"). The Singapore Branch of DNB Bank ASA is a financial adviser exempt from licensing under the FAA but is otherwise subject to the legal requirements of the FAA and of the FAR. By virtue of your status as an accredited investor or as an expert investor, the Singapore Branch of DNB Bank ASA is, in respect of certain of its dealings with you or services rendered to you, exempt from having to comply with certain regulatory requirements of the FAA and FAR, including without limitation, sections 25, 27 and 36 of the FAA. Section 25 of the FAA requires a financial adviser to disclose material information concerning designated investment products which are recommended by the financial adviser to you as the client. Section 27 of the FAA requires a financial adviser to have a reasonable basis for making investment recommendations to you as the client. Section 36 of the FAA requires a financial adviser to include, within any circular or written communications in which he makes recommendations concerning securities, a statement of the nature of any interest which the financial adviser (and any person connected or associated with the financial adviser) might have in the securities.

Please contact the Singapore Branch of DNB Bank ASA at +65 6212 0753 in respect of any matters arising from, or in connection with, the Note.

The Note is intended for and is to be circulated only to persons who are classified as an accredited investor, an expert investor or an institutional investor. If you are not an accredited investor, an expert investor or an institutional investor, please contact the Singapore Branch of DNB Bank ASA at +65 6212 0753.

We, the DNB group, our associates, officers and/or employees may have interests in any products referred to in the Note by acting in various roles including as distributor, holder of principal positions, adviser or lender. We, the DNB group, our associates, officers and/or employees may receive fees, brokerage or commissions for acting in those capacities. In addition, we, the DNB group, our associates, officers and/or employees may buy or sell products as principal or agent and may effect transactions which are not consistent with the information set out in the Note.

Additional Information, including for Recipients in the In the United States:

The Note does not constitute an offer to sell or buy a security and does not include information, opinions, or recommendations with respect to securities of an issuer or an analysis of a security or an issuer; rather, it is a "market letter," as the term is defined in NASD Rule 2211.