# The <br> <br> MARKETS NOW 

 <br> <br> MARKETS NOW}

The triumph of 'value'

Tim Price, Director of Investment, PFP Group

Twitter: @timfprice

## Problem \#1

Most of the developed world is drowning in debt..

Net foreign assets of various countries as \% of GDP


Source: IMF, Stratton Street Capital

# Problem \#1 <br> Most of the developed world is drowning in debt.. 

"America is deeply insolvent, and for that matter, so are most of continental Europe, the U.K. and Japan."

- Paul Singer, Elliott Management.


## Problem \#2

Interest rates in their historical context


* Variously the Bank Rate, Minimum Lending Rate, Mimimm Band I Dealing Rate, Repo Rate and Official Bank Rate.

Source: The Bank of England, Church Honse

## Yet bonds have never been more expensive..

## Interest Rates

Yield on 10 -year U.S. Treasuries, 1791 to date
Monthly bars
Linear scale

Revolution:




Yet bonds have never been more expensive..
UK long bond yield, 1750 to 2014


[^0]And stock markets aren't necessarily cheap..
Shiller p/e for the S\&P 500 index, 1881 to 2014


Source: Robert Shiller.
Mean Shiller p/e: 16.5

The pragmatic response ?

## The pragmatic response ?

## - Ignore indices

| MSCI Asia ex-Japan top 10 | Country | Comment |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Samsung Electronics | S.Korea | Low margin exporter |
| TSMC | Taiwan | Low margin exporter |
| China Mobile | China | Low margin telecoms |
| China Construction Bank | China | State run Chinese bank |
| ICBC | China | State run Chinese bank |
| AIA | Singapore |  |
| CNOOC | China | Large inefficient China oil/gas |
| Ten Cents | China | Expensive internet business |
| Hyundai | S.Korea | Low margin exporter |
| Bank of China | China | State run Chinese bank |

## The pragmatic response?

- Ignore indices


## MSCI Asia ex Japan Index

Top 10 Constituents

|  | Country |
| :--- | :---: |
| SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO | KR |
| TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MFG | TW |
| TENCENT HOLDINGS LIM(CN) | CN |
| AIA GROUP | HK |
| CHINA MOBILE | CN |
| CHINA CONSTRUCTION BK H | CN |
| ICBC H | CN |
| HON HAI PRECISION IND CO | TW |
| BANK OF CHINA H | CN |
| HYUNDAI MOTOR CO | KR |
| Total |  |

MSCI Asia Pacific Index
Top 10 Constituents

|  | Country |
| :--- | :---: |
| TOYOTA MOTOR CORP | JP |
| SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO | KR |
| COMMONWEALTH BANK | AU |
| BHP BILLITON LTD | AU |
| TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MFG | TW |
| WESTPAC BANKING | AU |
| ANZ BANKING GROUP | AU |
| TENCENT HOLDINGS LIM(CN) | CN |
| MITSUBISHI UFJ FIN GRP | JP |
| NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK | AU |
| Total |  |


| Asian Equity Fund |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| Issuers and active weights* |  |
| Top 10 issuers | $\%$ |
| Samsung Electronics Co Ltd | 6.3 |
| Industrial \& Commercial Bank of <br> China Ltd | 4.2 |
| Hutchison Whampoa Ltd | 3.6 |
| Taiwan Semiconductor Manufactur- <br> ing Co Ltd | 3.5 |
| NetEase Inc | 2.8 |
| Hyundai Motor Co | 2.7 |
| ICICI Bank Ltd | 2.7 |
| Bank Negara Indonesia Persero Tbk | 2.6 |
| PT | 2.4 |
| PetroChina Co Ltd | 2.3 |
| AIA Group Ltd |  |

## Asia Pacific Fund

## Holdings

1. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
2. Samsung Electronics
3. Jardine Strategic Holdings
4. Hyundai Motor
5. Fortune Real Estate Investment Trust
6. AIA Group
7. China Petroleum \& Chemical
8. Hankook Tire
9. Techtronic Industries
10. Swire Properties
Asia Pacific Fund
Top 10 Holdings (\%) ..... Fund
Samsung Electronics ..... 5.6
Taiwan Semiconductor Manu ..... 3.7
Commonwealth Bank Of Australia ..... 3.0
Sk Hynix Inc ..... 2.7
China Construction Bank ..... 2.6
Industrial \& Commercial Bank OfChina ..... 2.5
Westpac Banking Corp. ..... 2.1
Mediatek Inc. ..... 1.9
Hyundai Motor Co. Ltd. ..... 1.8
Macquarie Group Ltd ..... 1.8
Asia Pacific Fund
Top 10 holdings ..... (\%)
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing ..... 3.3
Samsung Electronics ..... 3.0
DBS Group ..... 2.8
BHP Billiton ..... 2.7
Amcor ..... 2.6
Cheung Kong ..... 2.6
Ezion ..... 2.5
PetroChina ..... 2.5
Commonwealth Bank of Australia ..... 2.3
Kasikornbank ..... 2.2

## The pragmatic response ?

- Ignore indices
- Concentrate on value
"Investors do not make mistakes, or bad mistakes, in buying good stocks at fair prices. They make their serious mistakes by buying poor stocks, particularly the ones that are pushed for various reasons. And sometimes - in fact very frequently - they make mistakes by buying good stocks in the upper reaches of bull markets."
- Benjamin Graham.


## The pragmatic response?

- Ignore indices
- Concentrate on value

Why owning popular global brands can be dangerous

Fortune Magazine's ‘Ten Stocks To Last The Decade’ (14 Aug 2000)
August 14, 2000
I. Nokia (\$54)
2. Nortel Networks (\$77)
3. Enron (\$73)
4. Oracle (\$74)
5. Broadcom (\$237)
6.Viacom (\$69)
7. Univision (\$1|3)
8. Charles Schwab (\$36)
9. Morgan Stanley (\$89)
10. Genentech (\$150)

## The pragmatic response ?

- Ignore indices
- Concentrate on value


## Why owning popular global brands can be dangerous

Fortune Magazine's 'Ten Stocks To Last The Decade’ (14 Aug 2000)
August 14, $2000 \quad$ Closing Prices December 19,2012
I. Nokia (\$54) I. Nokia (\$4.22)
2. Nortel Networks (\$77) 2. Nortel Networks (\$0)
3. Enron (\$73)
4. Oracle (\$74)
5. Broadcom (\$237)
6.Viacom (\$69)
7. Univision (\$113)
8. Charles Schwab (\$36)
3. Enron (\$0)
4. Oracle (\$34.22)
5. Broadcom (\$33.28)
6.Viacom (\$54.17)
9. Morgan Stanley (\$89)
7. Univision (\$0)
8. Charles Schwab (\$|4.61)
10. Genentech (\$150)
9. Morgan Stanley (\$14.20)

Portfolio lost $\mathbf{7 4 . 3 \%}$ with three bankruptcies and one bail-out.

## The pragmatic response?

- Ignore indices
- Concentrate on value
- Don't buy rubbish
- Don't overpay for the good stuff

The top ten holdings of a popular global equity fund

| Stock | Price / book | Price / earnings |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Microsoft | 4.3 | 16.8 |
| Reckitt Benckiser | 6.2 | 20.2 |
| Dr Pepper Snapple | 5.6 | 18.4 |
| Unilever | 6.7 | 20.6 |
| Stryker | 3.4 | 17.2 |
| Imperial Tobacco | 5.5 | 13.3 |
| Kone | 10.8 | 20.5 |
| Pepsico | 6 | 20.4 |
| Becton Dickinson | 4 | 18.1 |
| Intercontinental Hotels | $\mathrm{N} / \mathrm{A}$ | 25.1 |

The pragmatic response?

- Ignore indices
- Concentrate on value
- Don't overlook Asia


## The pragmatic response ?

- Ignore indices
- Concentrate on value
- Don't overlook Asia



## Feeding the Orang-utans in Omaha Zoo



## Some metrics naturally lend themselves to value investing

Compound average annual rates of return across various strategies for the $\mathbf{5 2}$ years ending in December 2003

(Source: What Works on Wall Street by James P. O'Shaughnessy, Third Edition, McGraw-Hill 2005)

## Invest with real value specialists

## What we require of the stocks we seek:



- Businesses in understandable economic sectors not prone to dramatic change, ideally with 'wide moats'
- Typically low price / book; low price / earnings; low price / sales ratios
- Shares trading at a meaningful discount to assessed intrinsic value, with a 'margin of safety'
- Unconstrained, index-blind bottom-up value


## Invest with real value specialists

## What we require of the funds we seek:



- High quality, honest, motivated owner-managers
- An explicit commitment to value investing on the continuum between Ben Graham and Warren Buffett
- Boutique funds, not capacity-constrained leviathans


## There is real value in Japan



- 25 years in the wilderness
- 57\% of Topix companies are covered by 2 or fewer analysts
- The BoJ has pledged to double the Japanese monetary base (so hedge your yen exposure)


## Compelling returns from Ben Graham ‘Net-Net’ investing

Net-Net stocks in the US between 1970 and 1983

Mean return for the index: 11.5\% per annum

Mean return for Ben Graham 'Net-Nets': 29.4\% per annum
(Source: Professor Henry Oppenheimer: ‘Ben Graham's Net Current Asset Values: A Performance Update’)

Net-Net stocks globally between 1985 and 2007

Mean return for the index: 17\% per annum

Mean return for Ben Graham 'Net-Nets': 35\% per annum
(Source: James Montier: ‘Graham's Net-Nets: Outdated or Outstanding ?’)

## Invest with real value specialists

## Fund statistics for a dedicated Japan value fund

| Comparisons - domestic and global markets |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Net Cash (\% of Market Cap) | Avg P/E ex Net Cash (x) | EPS growth 2013/14 <br> (\%) | Median Price/ Book (x) | Div Yield <br> (\%) |
| Fund | 62 | 4.9 | 38.2 | 1.0 | 1.9 |
| Topix 500 | -11 | 19.7 | 14.3 | 1.2 | 1.8 |
| Topix Small | 9 | 14.7 | 6.5 | 0.9 | 1.7 |
| S\&P 500 | -18 | 21.1 | 15.2 | 3.1 | 1.9 |
| US Small Cap - <br> Russell 2000 | -14 | 17.8 | 6.1 | 2.1 | 0.2 |
| Stoxx 600 | -21 | 20.7 | 11.7 | 2.3 | 2.4 |
| Asia ex Japan 500 largest | -22 | 21.1 | 13.6 | 2.5 | 2.4 |
| MSCI Emerging <br> Markets | -33 | 19.5 | 9.8 | 1.7 | 2.9 |

## Invest with real value specialists

## Company statistics for a North American holding company operating in financial services and insurance

| Corporate Performance |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (in US\$ millions, except as otherwise indicated) ${ }^{(1)}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Book value per share share | $\begin{gathered} \text { Closing } \\ \text { share } \\ \text { price } \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{array}{r} \text { Net } \\ \text { arnings } \end{array}$ | Total assets | Investments | $\begin{gathered} \text { Net } \\ \text { deb } \end{gathered}$ | Common shareholders equity | $\begin{gathered} \text { Shares } \\ \text { out } \\ \text { standing } \end{gathered}$ | Earnings per pere |
| As at 1985 | nd for the | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ars ended } \\ & 3.25^{(3)} \end{aligned}$ | ember 12 | (1) | 30 | 24 | - | 8 | 5.0 | (1.35) |
| 1986 | 4.25 | 12.75 | 39 | 5 | 93 | 69 | 4 | 30 | 7.0 | 0.98 |
| 1987 | 6.30 | 12.37 | 87 | 12 | 140 | 94 | 5 | 46 | 7.3 | 1.72 |
| 1988 | 8.26 | 15.00 | 112 | 12 | 201 | 112 | 27 | 60 | 7.3 | 1.63 |
| 1989 | 10.50 | 18.75 | 109 | 14 | 210 | 113 | 22 | 77 | 7.3 | 1.87 |
| 1990 | 14.84 | 11.00 | 167 | 18 | 462 | 289 | 83 | 82 | 5.5 | 2.42 |
| 1991 | 18.38 | 21.25 | 217 | 20 | 447 | 295 | 58 | 101 | 5.5 | 3.34 |
| 1992 | 18.55 | 25.00 | 237 | 8 | 465 | 312 | 69 | 113 | 6.1 | 1.44 |
| 1993 | 26.39 | 61.25 | 267 | 26 | 907 | 641 | 119 | 211 | 8.0 | 4.19 |
| 1994 | 31.06 | 67.00 | 465 | 28 | 1,549 | 1,106 | 166 | 280 | 9.0 | 3.41 |
| 1995 | 38.89 | 98.00 | 837 | 64 | 2,105 | 1,222 | 176 | 346 | 8.9 | 7.15 |
| 1996 | 63.31 | 290.00 | 1,082 | 111 | 4,216 | 2,520 | 282 | 665 | 10.5 | 11.26 |
| 1997 | 86.28 | 320.00 | 1,508 | 152 | 7,149 | 4,054 | 370 | 961 | 11.1 | 14.12 |
| 1998 | 112.49 | 540.00 | 2,469 | 280 | 13,640 | 7,868 | 830 | 1,365 | 12.1 | 23.60 |
| 1999 | 155.55 | 245.50 | 3,906 | 43 | 22,229 | 12,290 | 1,249 | 2,089 | 13.4 | 3.20 |
| 2000 | 148.14 | 228.50 | 4,157 | 76 | 21,668 | 10,400 | 1,252 | 1,941 | 13.1 | 5.04 |
| 2001 | 117.03 | 164.00 | 3,953 | (407) | 22,184 | 10,229 | 1,194 | 1,680 | 14.4 | (31.93) |
| 2002 | 125.25 | 121.11 | 5,105 | 253 | 22,173 | 10,597 | 1,603 | 1,760 | 14.1 | 17.49 |
| 2003 | 163.70 | 226.11 | 5,731 | 289 | 24,877 | 12,491 | 1,961 | 2,265 | 13.8 | 19.51 |
| 2004 | 162.76 | 202.24 | 5,830 | 53 | 26,271 | 13,461 | 1,966 | 2,606 | 16.0 | 3.11 |
| 2005 | 137.50 | 168.00 | 5,901 | (447) | 27,542 | 14,869 | 1,984 | 2,448 | 17.8 | (27.75) |
| 2006 | 150.16 | 231.67 | 6,804 | 228 | 26,577 | 16,820 | 1,614 | 2,662 | 17.7 | 11.92 |
| 2007 | 230.01 | 287.00 | 7,510 | 1,096 | 27,942 | 19,001 | 1,207 | 4,064 | 17.7 | 58.38 |
| 2008 | 278.28 | 390.00 | 7,826 | 1,474 | 27,305 | 19,950 | 413 | 4,866 | 17.5 | 79.53 |
| 2009 | 369.80 | 410.00 | 6,636 | 857 | 28,452 | 21,273 | 1,071 | 7,392 | 20.0 | 43.75 |
| 2010 | 376.33 | 408.99 | 5,967 | 336 | 31,448 | 23,300 | 1,255 | 7,698 | 20.5 | 14.82 |
| 2011 | 364.55 | 437.01 | 7,475 | 45 | 33,407 | 24,323 | 2,056 | 7,428 | 20.4 | (0.31) |
| 2012 | 378.10 | 358.55 | 8,023 | 527 | 36,945 | 26,094 | 1,921 | 7,655 | 20.2 | 22.68 |
| 2013 | 339.00 | 424.11 | 5,945 | (573) | 35,959 | 24,862 | 1,753 | 7,187 | 21.2 | (31.15) |
| Compound annual growth |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

- Compound annual growth of $21.3 \%$ in book value per share - over nearly 30 years
- Business currently trades on a price / book of 1.26x
- Price / earnings ratio of 8
(1) All share references are to common shares; Closing share price is in Canadian dollars; per share amounts are in US dollars; Shares outstanding are in millions.
(2) IFRS basis for 2010 to 2013; Canadian GAAP basis for 2009 and prior. Under Canadian GAAP, investments were generally carried at cost or amortized cost in 2006 and prior.


## Invest with real value specialists

Share price performance for a Dutch holding company with diversified business interests (vs AEX Index)


- Annualised share price growth of over 16\% - over 25 years
- Price / earnings ratio of 14
- Dividend yield of 4\%


## And finally..

"..I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and David Dodd wrote 'Security Analysis' [and ever since Ben Graham followed up with 'The Intelligent Investor], yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that I've practised it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult..
"There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham and Dodd will continue to prosper."

- Warren Buffett in the Appendix to 'The Intelligent Investor'.


## Questions?

Disclaimer:

Trust no-one.



[^0]:    Source: Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse

