Deutsche Bank Markets Research

Europe United Kingdom Consumer Staples Beverage





Date 29 July 2014

Recommendation Change

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Tapping into growth

More than a consumer staple

Beer shares many of the favorable characteristics inherent in consumer staples, but there are subtle differences where the details matter. Emerging market growth and the right cultural and population dynamics are available to the brewers in the right geographies. Capital intensity and affordability favor volume over pricing. The physical and local nature of beer gives brewers a "moat" around their operations protecting earnings and creating the capacity to invest for growth. These nuances also make brewers more of a company rather than a sector call. We upgrade Heineken to a Buy and downgrade Carlsberg to a Sell. We maintain Holds on ABInBev and SABMiller.

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More than a consumer staple

Beer shares many of the favorable characteristics inherent in consumer staples, but there are subtle differences where the details matter. Emerging market growth and the right cultural and population dynamics are available to the brewers in the right geographies. Capital intensity and affordability favor volume over pricing. The physical and local nature of beer gives brewers a "moat" around their operations protecting earnings and creating the capacity to invest for growth. These nuances also make brewers more of a company rather than a sector call. We upgrade Heineken to a Buy and downgrade Carlsberg to a Sell. We maintain Holds on ABInBev and SABMiller.

Industry

Beer

Embedded growth in beer

Entrenched population and GDP growth in emerging markets drives growth in consumer staples, and for brewers more so. The sizable non commercial and illicit alcohol market in Africa and to a lesser extent in Latin America and Asia provides a readily available and addressable market for conversion to beer consumption. Cultural and religious considerations boost or limit the potential. With beer considered a luxury item in emerging markets, affordability remains the biggest barrier to volume growth.

Protected moats with volume and scale

High capital intensity, the required freshness of beer, sheer bulkiness, and regulatory pressure require a greater focus on volume driven scale that can only be determined locally. The protection and leverage of that local scale drives sustainable returns allowing brewers to consistently re invest their earnings into brands, capital expenditures, market expansion and penetration into illicit alcohol markets at attractive price points.

Local scale can be enhanced with soft drinks

We see limited scope for M&A between the big four brewers, but do view soft drinks as an opportunity for the brewers to expand their scale locally in emerging as well as developed markets.

Heineken (BUY; price target €60)

Heineken now has one of the strongest embedded profiles in beer and the patience to invest in brands in and beyond Heineken for the long term. With the majority of its key markets back in growth, we upgrade to BUY and see the opportunity for the current discount to SABMiller and ABInBev to narrow.

AB InBev (HOLD; price target €85)

ABInBev remains a fairly priced solid performer with upside in Mexico, but we are concerned about the lack of category management credentials and organic opportunities outside Mexico.

Carlsberg (SELL; price target DKK525)

The opportunity and potential of Asia does not offset the structural challenges in Eastern Europe and revived competition in Russia in particular. We downgrade to SELL.

SABMiller (HOLD; price target £35)

We have not changed our long term favorable view of SABMiller which we believe is currently fairly priced by the market.

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Key Changes

Company	Target Price	Rating
SAB.L	3,000.00 to 3,500.00(GBP)	-
HEIN.AS	50.00 to 60.00(EUR)	Hold to Buy
CARLb.CO	600.00 to 525.00(DKK)	Hold to Sell
ABI.BR	70.00 to 85.00(EUR)	-
Source: Deutsche B	ank	

Top picks

Heineken (HEIN.AS),EUR53.71	Buy
Carlsberg (CARLb.CO),DKK559.00	Sell
Source: Deutsche Bank	




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
Executive summary

Brewers have and can outperform consumer staples

In March, we published our note, *Emerging Exposure*, covering the broad potential of consumer staples. Having analyzed 22 categories, the beer industry at first glance was seen as the least preferred. Backdating the analysis to a decade ago, we could have come to the same conclusion, yet beer has outperformed most staples, and on a company level, both ABInBev and SABMiller have been the top performing companies in that time.



The outperformance for brewers has been driven primarily by earnings growth, with a significant proportion driven by synergies. The brewers have also enjoyed a re-rating relative to other consumer staples sectors. Despite the growth delivered, the valuation has rarely exceeded the sector.



Consumer staples index based on a weighted average of 34 companies Source: Deutsche Bank, Datastream

Embedded growth drives company calls

Though beer has many of the favorable characteristics inherent to consumer staples, there are significant differences which ensure, we argue, a strong growth platform and sustainable returns. The embedded volume growth is driven by the right population dynamics, the opportunity to take share from illicit and non-commercial alcohol and ensuring affordability.


An additional 1 billion hectoliters of growth available

We have analyzed 194 beer markets on the impact of population growth, the opportunity to take share of non-commercial and illicit alcohol, per capita consumption potential and cultural barriers. As result, we calculated an embedded growth profile for each market which we amalgamated for the brewers proportionate to their current share.

Today, the global beer volume is 1.95 billion hectoliters (hl). If the brewers hit their full potential, we see an additional 630 million hl by 2025 and 1.1 billion hl by 2050 of embedded untapped volume. Over the next ten years, our model calculates a CAGR of 1.8% volume growth. Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for half of the potential growth and Latin America and Asia 20% each.

Embedded growth makes beer a company call

The local nature of the potential indicates that growth in beer is more of a company rather than a sector call.




Heineken is the best positioned listed brewer to grow its current platform with a 138% embedded growth by 2050. The potential suggests a 10 year CAGR volume growth of 3.6% to 2025. Both growths in population as well per capita consumption drive the potential.

Heineken and SABMiller are best positioned for embedded growth

Over the next 10 years, we see an embedded CAGR of 1.8% volume growth

We see the potential for the brewers to add 55% more volume by 2050 SABMiller is able to double their current volume base by 2050. Should they be in a position to consolidate the remaining 78% of the privately owned Castel business in Africa, the potential would increase to 150%.



10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014 DBe volumes. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014 DBe volumes. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports

Figure 6: Embedded volume CAGR									
CAGR	Castel	Heineken	SABMiller	ABInBev	Carlsberg	Molson Coors			
Population growth to 202	7.5%	2.7%	2.4%	1.2%	0.4%	0.6%			
Population 2026- 2050	3.1%	1.3%	1.2%	0.7%	-0.5%	0.8%			
Per capita growth to 2050	2.4%	1.0%	0.9%	0.1%	0.6%	-0.2%			
10 year CAGR to 2025	9.3%	3.6%	3.2%	1.3%	1.0%	0.5%			
35 year CAGR to 2050	5.3%	2.5%	2.2%	0.7%	0.7%	0.3%			
10 year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe base. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe base. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports									

ABInBev sees limited embedded growth. We see a ten year CAGR of 1.3% volume growth and a 30% total upside by 2050. Similarly Carlsberg is in the same position, with population shrinkage resulting in real beer consumption declines in key markets.

Population dynamics drives future consumption

Population growth drives consumer staples growth and the embedded growth for brewers. The key cohort for beer consumption sits between the ages of 20 to 35 year olds- where consumption patterns and brand loyalty gets established. In the same age group, the number of drinking occasions and volume per occasion peaks.

Sub Saharan Africa will see a population boom favorable to beer. Today, 17% of those consumers are 20 to 29 – a number that will grow both in absolute terms as well as relatively by 2025. Similar figures apply to parts of Latin America and Asia, including India.

Population growth in the 20 to 35 year olds cohort is most relevant to beer consumption

Heineken and SABMiller have a 10 year embedded volume CAGR of 3.6% and 3.2% respectively.






In contrast, markets like Russia will go negative. Today, Russian males 20-29 year old make up 18% of the population, a number that decline to 11% by 2025 in addition to real population declines. Perhaps not as dramatic, but declines will be seen in most developed markets as well as China and Brazil which does not bode well for established brewers in those markets.

Converting cheaper alcohol to beer consumption

Beer takes share from a readily addressable market in the form of cheaper, often illicit and non-commercial alcohol. The level of local alcohol in a market is strongly correlated to national income as per Figure 9.




This readily available market accounts for over 50% to 90% of alcohol consumption in Africa, with growing markets like Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia particularly attractive. Other emerging markets have lower, but nevertheless interesting figures which range from 15% to 40%. Markets like Latin American Ecuador and Peru and Asian markets such as Myanmar and Cambodia looking interesting to the brewers.

Beer is a luxury

The barrier to conversion from illicit alcohol to beer is the affordability of beer. Per capita consumption in a market is relation to the amount of time a consumer has to work to afford a beer. As seen in Figure 11, the first inflection point for growth acceleration is around 120 minutes of work to afford a beer.



Figure 11: Minutes worked for a beer in (close up of 134 markets)



Per capita consumption inflections points are at 120 and 30 minutes worked for a beer

Close up of <200 minutes worked for a beer. All 134 markets extend to 2500 minutes of work, with the majority in Africa. Adjusted to exclude Islamic nations. Based on national income and ILO standards for working hours. Source: Deutsche Bank, World Bank, Euromonitor, Plato Logic, ILO


A second inflection can be found at 30 minutes worked for a beer. Not only does beer consumption accelerate to the levels seen in developed markets, consumers also move up in the portfolio towards more premium brands.

There are market dependent limits to per capita growth

There is a limit to how much alcohol and beer one can drink. For beer, the per capita average of 10 liters of pure alcohol translates to 200 liters which approximates consumption in core beer markets such as Germany and Czech.

As markets mature, our analysis indicates a range of 70-90 liters per capita being the developed market norm over time. For most emerging markets with favorable population and illicit alcohol profiles, this is a growth destination; for developed markets this may translate into more declines.

On average, consumers drink 10 liters of absolute alcohol per year



There are also further physical and cultural limits to growth. As an Asian norm, China is close to reaching this point as in Figure 13. Restrictive environments will continue to severely limit per capita growth in India, though this is somewhat offset as a market with the most significant population growth.


Protected earnings and reinvestment

The local moat around brewers

Growth in beer carries a cost which requires investment ahead of demand. Fortunately, the inherent local nature of beer protects the established local interests of the global brewers.

Being low value, high volume and bulky limits the physical range of beer brands. Moving a truck or shipping container is a costly business relative to other staples as in Figure 14. Beer is also a live product- lager does not get better with age and deteriorates the moment it leaves the factory gates. With some notable exceptions, international brand localize their production as soon as it is feasible to increase margins and ensure product quality.

Being a product with much greater emotional and social value, beer has greater passion point rooted in national and increasingly local values as demonstrated by the recent craft beer phenomenon.




Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, Euromonitor, worldfreightrates.com

As one of the largest cost to brewers, taxation and excise needs to be nationally and increasingly regionally influenced. Excise rates differ significantly by states in the USA often dependent on the influence of local powerful distributors on their local congressman and senators. As in Figure 15, similarly in India, the local states have vested interests in maintaining their large share of direct and indirect revenue.

Regulation and beer's emotional properties anchor the category locally

Beer's bulkiness and need to be fresh requires local production close to final consumption







Investing for future growth will bring sustainable returns

The protective moats around earnings give brewers the cash flow to invest ahead of demand for future growth. Successful brand building in beer takes time, especially in the premium segment, and often exceeding five year ROIC requirements. The seeds of some of the most successful brands take five to ten years before accelerating.

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
Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, company reports, Euromonitor

Brewing is expensive and requires continual capital investment to feed the growth. As in Figure 17, brewers have the highest ratio of investment among consumer staples with a capital investment ratio which ranges from 6% to 8% of revenue. To maintain a level of necessary production and quality, a ratio of 0.9x depreciation is required, or approximately 4 to 5% of revenue. Additional investment for production, trade investment, and innovation seems to be in line with the embedded growth potential, with SABMiller and Heineken perhaps needing to spend more in the future to meet demand.

Strong moats ≠ dynamic pricing power

Though the brewers have protective moats around their operations and often have either quasi-monopolies or duopolies, this has not been extended to dynamic pricing power above inflation. In emerging markets, brewers make the conscious choice to price below inflation in order to gain share from other forms of alcohol.








In South Africa illustrated in Figure 18, three decades of pricing below inflation increased beer's share of alcohol from 18% to 59% by 2001. Sorghum beer, both commercially produced and illicit, lost the corresponding share.

To meet demand, brewers need a continual infusion of capital investment Conversely, beer can also lose share of alcohol when pricing above inflation in developed markets. In the United States, there is a 72% negative correlation between real beer pricing and beer alcohol share (Figure 19).



Beer priced below inflation from 1970 to 2000 drove market share of absolute alcohol from 45% to 55%. Subsequently, a reversal of this pricing dynamic has seen beer lose share to other alcohol. Since 2008, when the brewers started pricing on average 1.8% above CPI, beer has given up share of alcohol and now has declined to 48% share of alcohol.

The scale opportunity- locally

The biggest opportunity for beer to leverage its scale and expand its margins remains volume. Beyond beer, category expansion provides potential to drive further scale. We see limited potential for spirits in this area; a great deal of opportunity for soft drinks.


Spirits don't work with beer

The total beverage alcohol company was much touted a decade ago, but has proven to be a failure. With premium spirits being high value, low volume items, the production, distribution, and sales dynamics are diametrically opposed to a successful beer business. Whenever there have been combinations, beer loses. This is most apparent in Africa as in Figure 20. The beer businesses which Diageo runs in Africa have dramatically underperformed their peers over the last five years.

When spirits and beer combine operations, beer tends to lose

Pricing below inflation also allows beer to gain share in developed markets





Breweries in Tanzanian Shillings. Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg, Datastream, Company reports.

Diageo beer assets attractive


We view the production assets of Diageo as an attractive investment to any of the four brewers, both as a means of consolidating their position or as an entry point into Africa. The Guinness brand itself will have a sizeable premium and we would assume Diageo would not part with it. It is a very profitable licensing model with the extract being supplied including taxation benefits from Ireland

We value the consolidated beer operational footprint of Diageo in the range of \$5- \$6 billion. To attain our valuation, we used sum of the parts methodology. For the three listed entities in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya, based on previous transactions in beer, assumed that any acquirer would pay a 30% premium on enterprise value of the admittedly high local market capitalization. We derived a value of the operations in Cameroon on revenue estimates and we assumed a 50% value premium on the Ethiopian business purchased in 2012.

Soft drinks do work with beer

In contrast, with both soft drinks and beer being low value, high volume items, the synergies in the value chain drive margin expansion on both product lines. In emerging markets, this has proven to be a winning model with margins exceeding stand alone soft drinks businesses as in Figure 21.

We value Diageo's Africa beer assets between \$5 and \$6bn which we believe would be attractive to any of the four brewers



Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, Bloomberg, Datastream, company reports. Companies calendarized to full year 2013.

In the case of AmBev, a combination of own soft drinks and more favorable terms from Pepsico helps them drive EBIT margins on the soft drinks P&L alone in the 40% range. Coca Cola bottlers tend to share more of the profit pool with their partner, but those who have combined their operations see EBIT margins approaching 20%. Stand alone bottlers perform below this ratio with Coca Cola Hellenic currently experiencing a 7% EBIT margin.


Combining CCH with the brewers value accretive

We see an opportunity to combine beer and soft drinks operations in fragmented developed markets such as Europe, where brewer's margins and costs are also under pressure. Though the Coca Cola Company will have a final say on any potential bottler/brewer consolidation, we do believe that both bottlers such as Coca Cola Hellenic and brewers would be better served should they combine operations. A fully leveraged deal would be naturally accretive.

Soft drinks and brewer combinations in fragmented developed markets would benefit both parties

We see Coca Cola Hellenic as an attractive asset for any brewer to leverage scale in fragmented markets





The brewer stocks

Heineken (BUY; price target €60)

Based on its embedded growth profile being in the right places, patient brand building extended to the broader portfolio and an excessive discount to peers, we upgrade Heineken from a HOLD to a BUY with a €60 price target.

In our view, Heineken is the best positioned listed brewer to grow their current platform with a with an embedded growth profile which should deliver 3.6% annual volume growth in the next ten years. The company has a proven model of patient brand development being extended to wider global and regional premium portfolios.

Cycling soft comparatives, the company will additionally benefit from favorable macro in key markets, stabilization in Western Europe and strong growth in Mexico and Nigeria. We also see further scope for cost savings as the company extends its programs beyond Europe.

Carlsberg (SELL; price target DKK525)

We downgrade Carlsberg from HOLD to SELL with a price target of DKK525. We see limited medium and long term volume growth for Carlsberg and see at best an embedded growth which will add 1% of volume per annum over the next ten years.

Despite its further and encouraging diversification into Asia and solid performance in the tough Eastern European markets, we believe that Russia will continue to be a problem which extends beyond regulatory issues. A resurgent Efes will potentially disrupt pricing discipline and market share gains.

ABInBev (HOLD; price target €85)

We have upgraded our price target on ABInBev, but believe the stock is fairly valued and remains a HOLD. The embedded volume growth profile is much behind Heineken and SABMiller.

We see further opportunity in Mexico beyond synergies in driving its top line, leveraging the brand equity of Bud Light in Northern Mexico. Negative population dynamics, strong per capita consumption and high margins limit upside in Brazil. The USA is unlikely to see further margin expansion as the cost to play in innovation and a need to abate market share losses will need additional investment.

Unless it steps beyond the beer category, large scale M&A is unlikely in the near term.

SABMiller (HOLD; price target £35)

We updated our price target and have not changed our long term favorable view of SABMiller which we believe is fairly priced by the market.

29 July 2014 Beverage Beer

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Rating Buy

Europe Netherlands

Consumer Staples Beverage Company Heineken

Reuters HEIN.AS

Bloomberg HEIA NA

In all the right places

Upgrading to BUY with price target of €60

Based on its embedded growth profile being in the right places, we upgrade Heineken from a HOLD to a BUY with a €60 price target.

Strong embedded growth profile and margin mix

Heineken is best positioned listed brewer to grow their current platform with a with an embedded growth profile which should deliver 3.5% annual volume growth in the next ten years and more than double volumes by 2050. With half of EBIT coming from relevant higher margin emerging markets, we see an acceleration of margins and profitability.

Patient brand building beyond the Heineken brand

With a proven model of patient brand development on the Heineken brand; the rewards are enjoyed today with further opportunity in new markets such as Mexico and Brazil. This model is being effectively expanded to regional premium brands driving further higher margin growth.

2014 green shoots

Cycling soft comparatives, the company will benefit from favorable macro in key markets, stabilization in Europe and strong growth in Mexico and Nigeria.

Valuation and risk profile

We base our €60 price target on a DCF-model, the core assumptions behind which are a WACC of 7.85% and a terminal growth rate of 2.0%. We view our terminal growth rate of 2.0% as conservative number below the company's embedded volume growth rate Our downside risks include consumer sentiment in developed markets, emerging market volatility in Asia and Africa, currency risk, and competitive dynamics in Mexico.

Forecasts And Ratios					
Year End Dec 31	2012A	2013A	2014E	2015E	2016E
EBITDA (EURm)	3,784	4,193	4,187	4,403	4,741
EBITA (EURm)	2,666	2,941	2,951	3,200	3,465
PBT DB (EURm)	2,178	2,341	2,444	2,751	3,069
DB EPS (EUR)	2.88	2.75	2.89	3.21	3.58
OLD DB EPS (EUR)	2.53	2.75	2.87	3.19	3.55
% Change	14.2%	0.0%	0.6%	0.8%	1.0%
DB EPS growth (%)	6.7	-4.6	5.1	11.0	11.6
P/E (DB EPS) (x)	14.9	19.2	18.6	16.7	15.0
EV/EBITA (x)	14.3	14.4	14.3	12.8	11.5
DPS (EUR)	0.89	0.89	0.94	1.04	1.16
Yield (%)	2.1	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.2
Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, company data					

Price at 28 Jul 2014 (EUR)	53.71
Price Target (EUR)	60.00
52-week range (EUR)	56.04 - 44.96

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
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Key changes

Rating	Hold to Buy	1	
Target Price	50.00 to 60.00	î	20.0%
Source: Deutsche Bar	nk		

Price/price relative



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
Model updated:25 July	del updated:25 July 2014 Fiscal year end 31-Dec		2011	2012	2013	2014E	2015E	2016E
Running the numbers		Financial Summary						
Europe		DB EPS (EUR)	2.70	2.88	2.75	2.89	3.21	3.58
Netherlands		Reported EPS (EUR) DPS (EUR)	2.44 0.83	5.06 0.89	2.37 0.89	2.28 0.94	2.60 1.04	2.98 1.16
Beverage		BVPS (EUR)	17.0	20.4	19.8	21.2	22.8	24.7
Heineken		Weighted average shares (m)	585	575	575	576	576	576
	Disembergy UEIA NA	Average market cap (EURm) Enterprise value (EURm)	21,854 28,218	24,666 38,038	30,368 42,367	30,937 42,084	30,937 41,047	30,937 39,863
Reuters: HEIN.AS	Bloomberg: HEIA NA	Valuation Metrics						
Buy		P/E (DB) (x) P/E (Reported) (x)	13.8 15.3	14.9 8.5	19.2 22.3	18.6 23.5	16.7 20.6	15.0 18.0
Price (28 Jul 14)	EUR 53.71	P/BV (x)	2.11	2.48	2.48	2.53	2.35	2.17
Target Price	EUR 60.00	FCF Yield (%) Dividend Yield (%)	9.1 2.2	5.6 2.1	4.4 1.7	4.6 1.8	5.3 1.9	6.0 2.2
52 Week range	EUR 44.96 - 56.04	EV/Sales (x)	1.6	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.0	1.8
Market Cap (m)	EURm 30,937	EV/EBITDA (x)	8.2	10.1	10.1	10.1	9.3	8.4
	USDm 41,556	EV/EBIT (x)	12.3	15.4	16.2	16.1	14.3	12.7
Company Profile		Income Statement (EURm)						
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	national brewer, with significant	Sales revenue Gross profit	17,123 6,924	18,383 7,269	19,203 7,881	19,504 8,117	20,577 8,601	21,643 9,151
positions in Western and C	&E Europe, Mexico, Africa and	EBITDA	3,455	3,784	4,193	4,187	4,403	4,741
	erging markets now account for eineken's earnings, with the	Depreciation	936	1,062	1,089	1,176	1,129	1,187
emainder coming largely	from Western Europe and the	Amortisation EBIT	232 2,287	254 2,468	492 2,612	389 2,622	403 2,871	417 3,136
	and asset is Heineken itself, the d, supported by Sol, Tiger,	Net interest income(expense)	-438	-489	-532	-446	-398	-346
	ngbow cider, and a range of	Associates/affiliates	240	213	146	152	167	184
regional and local brands.		Exceptionals/extraordinaries Other pre-tax income/(expense)	-58 -6	1,229 168	-58 -61	-150 -61	-150 -50	-150 -50
		Profit before tax	1,785	3,376	1,961	1,965	2,272	2,590
Price Performance		Income tax expense	465 130	515 160	520	581 218	696	792 265
70		Minorities Other post-tax income/(expense)	130	0	223 0	218	241 0	205
60 -		Net profit	1,430	2,914	1,364	1,317	1,502	1,717
50 •	Maynor	DB adjustments (including dilution) DB Net profit	154 1,584	-1,253 1,661	221 1,585	352 1,669	350 1,852	350 2,067
40		Cash Flow (EURm)	1,001	1,001	1,000	1,000	1,002	2,007
30 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12	Jan 13 Jul 13 Jan 14	Cash flow from operations	2,751	2,492	2,627	2,952	3,111	3,406
		Net Capex	-755	-1,117	-1,294	-1,528	-1,472	-1,550
Heineken -	DJ (.STOXXE) (Rebased)	Free cash flow Equity raised/(bought back)	1,996 -649	1,375 3	1,333 -22	1,424 0	1,639 0	1,857 0
Margin Trends		Dividends paid	-483	-494	-525	-510	-553	-622
22		Net inc/(dec) in borrowings	195	3,909	-811	-914	-1,086	-1,235
20		Other investing/financing cash flows Net cash flow	-931 128	-4,553 240	291 266	0 0	0	0
18 -		Change in working capital	251	101	51	25	37	39
16		Balance Sheet (EURm)						
14		Cash and other liquid assets	813	1,037	1,290	1,290	1,290	1,290
12 + 11 12	13 14E 15E 16E	Tangible fixed assets	7,860	8,844	8,454	8,726	8,986	9,261
EBITDA Mar		Goodwill/intangible assets Associates/investments	10,835 3,363	17,688 3,728	15,934 3,212	15,625 3,210	15,305 3,208	14,974 3,205
EBITDA Wa		Other assets	4,256	4,683	4,447	4,633	4,868	5,205
Growth & Profitability		Total assets	27,127	35,980	33,337	33,484	33,656	33,851
8	_ 30	Interest bearing debt	9,387	13,491	12,226	11,312	10,226	8,991
	- 25	Other liabilities Total liabilities	7,648 17,035	9,684 23,175	8,755 20,981	8,954 20,266	9,202 19,428	9,471 18,462
6	- 20	Shareholders' equity	9,774	11,734	11,402	12,209	13,159	14,254
4	15	Minorities	318	1,071	954	1,009	1,069	1,135
2	- 10	Total shareholders' equity <i>Net debt</i>	10,092 <i>8,574</i>	12,805 <i>12,454</i>	12,356 <i>10,936</i>	13,218 <i>10,022</i>	14,228 <i>8,936</i>	15,389 <i>7,701</i>
0			0,074	12,454	10,000	10,022	0,000	7,701
11 12 13	14E 15E 16E	Key Company Metrics Sales growth (%)	6.1	7.4	4.5	1.6	5.5	5.2
Sales gro	owth (LHS) ROE (RHS)	DB EPS growth (%)	4.5	6.7	4.5 -4.6	5.1	5.5 11.0	5.2 11.6
Solvency		EBITDA Margin (%)	20.2	20.6	21.8	21.5	21.4	21.9
100		EBIT Margin (%)	13.4	13.4	13.6	13.4	14.0	14.5
120	10	Payout ratio (%) ROE (%)	34.0 14.3	17.6 27.1	37.5 11.8	41.1 11.2	39.9 11.8	38.9 12.5
80	8	Capex/sales (%)	5.0	6.8	7.5	8.1	7.4	7.4
60	6	Capex/depreciation (x)	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3
40	2	Net debt/equity (%) Net interest cover (x)	85.0 5.2	97.3 5.0	88.5 4.9	75.8 5.9	62.8 7.2	50.0 9.1
20		Net Interest cover (x)		0.0	4.9	5.9	1.2	9.1

Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank estimates


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




Stronger embedded profile in place

Heineken has significantly shifted its revenue profile towards areas of growth that are relevant to beer. Emerging markets excluding Eastern Europe now account for 45% of group revenue which we see increasing to 53% by 2018.

The result is the strongest embedded growth profile among the listed brewers. Heineken has the opportunity to more than double its volume. We see an embedded 10 year volume CAGR of 3.6%, driven by its exposure to Africa, the right places in Asia, and Mexico.



10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe volume. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports

	Total	Americas	Western Europe	Central & Eastern Europe	Africa & Middle East	Asia Pacific
Population growth to 2025	2.7%	2.0%	0.6%	-0.4%	9.2%	4.2%
Population growth to 2026-2050	1.4%	0.7%	0.1%	-0.3%	4.8%	1.3%
Per capita growth to 2050	1.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.1%	3.2%	2.3%
10 year CAGR to 2025	3.6%	2.3%	0.6%	-0.3%	11.6%	6.5%
35 year CAGR to 2050	2.5%	1.4%	0.3%	-0.3%	6.3%	3.5%


10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports

Heineken has an embedded 10 year volume CAGR of 3.6%

29 July 2014 Beverage Beer

Changed platform drives better earnings

For Heineken, its fastest growing markets are also the most margin enhancive. Asia is not burdened by the low margin mainstream businesses in China. Africa will drive the fastest growth, though some portfolio mix issues will put pressure on margin.




also have the best growth profiles

High margin Africa and Asia

The right mix and growth profile will allow Heineken to deliver EBIT and EPS growth ahead of the staples sector. Our model assumes EPS growth of 11% in the next 3 years on the 2014e base.

Figure 26: DBe 2015-2017 growth rates on 2014DBe base




We believe Heineken will deliver 12% annual eps growth in the medium term

Source: Deutsche Bank estimates

29 July 2014 Beverage Beer

Patience to invest for the long term

Sustainable brand building takes time. Heineken uses their STAR model to seed brands and has the patience to create the demand and consumer pull.




Patient brand building sees Heineken reap rewards after 5 to 7 years

Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, company reports, Euromonitor, Plato Logic, ACNielsen

As in Figure 27, after 5 to 7 years, distribution is pushed, price points are lowered, and local or licensed production are enacted which accelerates profitability.






The seeding period creates sustainable growth. Of the 50 markets where the Heineken brand exceeds 50,000hl, 37 have a ten year CAGR exceeding 4%. Only four - the Netherlands, Japan., Greece, and Switzerland - have seen a decline.

Moving to broader, premium portfolios

Historically, the mainstream portfolio has acted as a strategic slave to enhance the long term ambitions of the Heineken brand. The Heineken brand has succeeded in outpacing the organic beer growth in every set of half year results since 2004. Conversely, it could be said that the local portfolios underperformed leading to overall mediocre performance for the company.

Since being appointed in 2010, the Heineken CMO and now head of Western Europe has significantly shifted the focus and extended the BWP (Building Winning Portfolios) initiative moving the mindset of the company. Like an oil tanker, the company has slowly come around. Their global brand building skills have been more visibly applied to a broader global premium portfolio and regional premium brands.



Each region has established a broader premium portfolio. Originally established in 1932 in Singapore as a compromise with Fraser & Neave (to prevent their partner to compromise the Heineken brand), Tiger Beer is now fully managed by Heineken and complementing its Asian growth as a panregional brand. With 33% CAGR the last three years, part of the growth focus is to ensure that the gap between Heineken and mainstream remains, especially in markets such as Vietnam.


Dos Equis and Tecata in North America have maintained and even improved their momentum since entering the Heineken portfolio, with Dos Equis generating the most interesting growth of 12% CAGR since 2010.

Desperados and Affligem drive pan regional growth in Europe, and Primus and Star in Africa are all complementing the drive for Heineken. In their global portfolio, Strongbow has the opportunity to be the global leader in the fast growing cider category. Sol has recently been re-launched with healthy brand equity scores, and Amstel continues to be an accessible premium category developer.

The broader focus on driving more scalable, premium portfolios will help Heineken better leverage its operational and marketing capabilities. Heineken has extended its brand building skills to a broader premium portfolio

2014 green shoots


We see 2014 as a year of renewed growth following a weak performance in the past year as per Figure 31. In the majority of its geographies macro factors are improving, one-off issues get cycled or work in its favor and the company extends opportunities for cost savings.



The remainder of 2014 sees favorable tailwinds for Heineken

GDP underpinning recovery in key developed markets

A return of GDP growth, soft comparatives, and the benefit of Easter in key western and southern European markets will see a return of growth. Though the European region is significantly less relevant to the Heineken profile, stabilization in the region will minimize the drag on earnings.



29 July 2014 Beverage Beer

A step up of marketing spending will impact short term margins in the European region, but will also allow Heineken to reassert its leadership positions in beer and the broader alcohol landscape. The benefit of the additional marketing spend can be most recently seen in the Radler phenomenon. With Radler extensions being reproduced by the brewers like feral cats, Heineken has been the most systematic and successful in this fast growing category and see it as an additional element to win share this summer.

Mexico with more cost savings

In Heineken's biggest market Mexico, macro dynamics, cost savings and a rational pricing environment will drive positive growth in 2014. A marked rebound in GDP and the ongoing boost of government spending will drive beer growth. The company also announced in December an additional €100 million in incremental cost savings in Mexico to the initial €220m, €50m will benefit 2014.

Besides the population dynamics in Mexico, Heineken has an additional embedded growth element in the form of accelerated Oxxo and the beer centric SIX store expansion this year. With exclusive supplier contract in place till 2020, Oxxo's new store openings every 8 hours will drive and embedded 1% to 2% distribution growth in areas where the company currently under-indexes.

Nigeria

Heineken's subsidiary Nigerian Breweries has already reported a local 14% profit before tax for the first half which should translate to a +9% increase in Euros. We see further benefits for the remainder of year. In May, Heineken announced the merger of their Nigerian subsidiaries Nigerian Breweries and Consolidated. Though there will be some cost synergies, the main relevance is to accelerate growth in the economy and mainstream segments and better management against the rising threat of SABMiller. In a fragmented market that is Nigeria, a singular and importantly, controlled platform to further develop the route to market and value brand portfolio should also enhance the latent brand equity of value brands 33 Export in Ogun and Imo states and Champion Lager in Akwa Ibom states. The run up to the elections in early 2015 will see an influx of money at a consumer level, stimulating the economy, civil servant pay packages and beer sales.

Further cost savings opportunities

At our DB consumer conference in June, Heineken highlighted further opportunities to increase cost savings by extending the scope of their Global Business Services program (GBS) and Shared Services Center (HGSS). Though the benefits of previous programs (F2F, TCM I & II) have been substantial, only about a third of the €1.5bn savings have been visible to the bottom line. Mostly this is due to the structural challenges in Europe as well as the volatile input cost environment. In effect, Heineken in Europe has been running to stand still in the past five years.

We see the expansion of GBS and HGSS beyond the Europe to bring more tangible benefits to the P&L. Heineken does allocate most expansion costs to overheads and not as non-recurring and exceptionals, so a large proportion of the "savings" will be reabsorbed. We also expect a further step up in marketing to absorb some additional savings, but we assume a larger proportion of the savings to be visible in profitability.


We expect further cost savings benefits as programs expand globally.

Mexico and Nigeria should have strong upside in 2014

Valuation

Valuation gap not reflective of embedded growth

Considering its embedded growth profile, we also believe that the discount implied by the relative valuation to SABMiller and ABInBev is excessive. Currently Heineken trades at a 17% and 14% discount to the two brewers respectively and 13% discount to our broader consumer staples universe. With an EV/EBITDA ratio additionally significantly below ABI and SABMiller, we believe shrinkage to the discount is warranted.



Price Target of €60

We base our €60 price target on a discounted cash flow model.

For all our brewers and spirits companies, we have assumed a risk free rate of 4.0% and an equity premium of 4.3%. For Heineken, the resultant WACC is 7.83% which incorporates a levered beta of 1.18, and net debt / EV ratio of 20%. Our medium term cash flow models growth of 5% a year, and a post year-10 terminal growth rate of 2.0%. We view our terminal growth rate of 2% as conservative number below the company's embedded volume growth rate.

TP per Share (€)							WACC
Terminal Growth Rate	7.07%	7.32%	7.57%	7.82%	8.07%	8.32%	8.57%
2.75%	84.37	78.85	73.94	69.54	65.58	62.01	58.77
2.50%	79.98	74.95	70.46	66.41	62.76	59.45	56.43
2.25%	76.01	71.41	67.28	63.54	60.15	57.07	54.25
2.00%	72.41	68.18	64.35	60.89	57.73	54.85	52.22
1.75%	69.11	65.20	61.66	58.43	55.49	52.79	50.31
1.50%	66.09	62.46	59.16	56.15	53.39	50.85	48.52
1.25%	63.30	59.93	56.84	54.02	51.42	49.03	46.83

Risks to our valuation

Key downside risks include the economic environment in Europe, competitor activity in key markets (Europe plus the Americas, Africa and Asia), and volatility in input costs and currency. Additional potential risk factors include overpayment for an acquisition target and the fact that institutional shareholders remain in a minority position.



Europe Denmark

Consumer Staples Beverage

Reuters CARLb.CO

Company

Carlsberg

Bloomberg CARLB DC

In all the wrong places

Downgrade to SELL with a price target of DKK525

We downgrade Carlsberg from HOLD to SELL with a price target of DKK525. Despite its further and encouraging diversification into Asia and solid performance in the tough Eastern European markets, we believe that Russia will continue to be a problem which extends beyond regulatory issues.

Limited embedded growth

We see limited volume growth for Carlsberg and see at best an embedded growth which will add 1% of volume per annum over the next ten years. Despite encouraging performance and potential in Asia, the population and consumption dynamics in Europe will inhibit any volume growth.

Russia will get worse, not better

Though most regulations have been put into place, population dynamics and competitive pressures will continue to put pressure on Russian performance. A resurgent Efes we believe will potentially disrupt pricing discipline and market share dynamics.

Valuation and risks

We base our price target on a DCF-model, the core assumptions behind which are a WACC of 7.90% (incorporating a levered beta of 1.18, net debt / EV ratio of 20%, risk-free rate of 4.00% and 4.30% cost of debt), medium-term cash flow growth of 5% a year, and a post year-10 terminal growth rate of 1.5%. We view our terminal growth rate of 1.5% in line with the leverage the company could attain above its embedded volume growth rate to 2050 of 1.0%. Upside risks include strong Russia growth, currency tailwinds and market share gains in Europe.

Forecasts And Ratios 2012A 2013A 2014E 2015E 2016E Year End Dec 31 13,676 13,336 13,476 13,821 14,241 EBITDA (DKKm) 9,685 9,353 9,372 9,592 9,884 EBITA (DKKm) 7 913 7 847 7 780 8 0 8 2 8 5 5 1 PBT DB (DKKm) 37.71 36.00 37.09 38.48 40.73 DB EPS (DKK) 36.00 37.71 38.22 42.00 46.31 OLD DB EPS (DKK) 0.0% 0.0% -3.0% -8.4% -12.1% % Change 5.8 47 -1.6 3.8 5.8 DB EPS growth (%) 14.5 13.7 13.5 15.0 15.1 P/E (DB EPS) (x) 12 2 139 132 12.6 12.0 EV/EBITA (x) 10.45 6.00 8.00 8.80 9.50 DPS (DKK) 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 1.2 Yield (%) Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, company data

Price at 28 Jul 2014 (DKK)	559.00
Price Target (DKK)	525.00
52-week range (DKK)	607.00 - 513.50

Tristan Van Strien


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Gerry Gallagher

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Key changes			
Rating	Hold to Sell	ţ	
Target Price	600.00 to 525.00	Ļ	-12.5%
Source: Deutsche F	ank		

Price/price relative



11

12

3.1

5.8

20.0

13.9

25.6

7.9 7.9

1.3

33.7

7.4

Model updated:24 July 2014	Fiscal year end 31-Dec	2011	2012	2013	2014E	2015E	2016E
Running the numbers	Financial Summary						
Europe	DB EPS (DKK)	34.04	36.00	37.71	37.09	38.48	40.73
Denmark	Reported EPS (DKK) DPS (DKK)	33.69 5.50	36.68 6.00	35.74 8.00	36.37 8.80	38.48 9.50	40.73 10.45
Beverage	BVPS (DKK)	431.8	460.6	444.6	473.1	502.9	534.2
5	Weighted average shares (m)	153	153	153	153	153	153
Carlsberg	Average market cap (DKKm)	74,651 115,146	73,980 118,596	86,017 130,432	85,266 123,841	85,266 121,190	85,266 118,258
Reuters: CARLb.CO Bloomberg: CARLB DC	Enterprise value (DKKm)	115,140	116,590	130,432	123,041	121,190	110,200
Sell	Valuation Metrics P/E (DB) (x)	14.4	13.5	15.0	15.1	14.5	13.7
1	P/E (Reported) (x)	14.5	13.2	15.8	15.4	14.5	13.7
Price (28 Jul 14) DKK 559.00	P/BV (x)	0.94	1.20	1.35	1.18	1.11	1.05
Target PriceDKK 525.00	FCF Yield (%) Dividend Yield (%)	5.6 1.1	6.2 1.2	3.1 1.4	3.8 1.6	4.7 1.7	5.1 1.9
52 Week range DKK 513.50 - 607.00	EV/Sales (x)	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7
Market Cap (m) DKKm 85,266	EV/EBITDA (x)	8.6	8.7	9.8	9.2	8.8	8.3
USDm 15,359	EV/EBIT (x)	11.9	12.2	13.9	13.2	12.6	12.0
	Income Statement (DKKm)						
Company Profile	Sales revenue	63,561	66,468	64,350	66,941	69,065	71,180
Carlsberg is an international brewing company which markets the Carlsberg and Tuborg brands as well as other	Gross profit EBITDA	34,444 13,416	35,452 13,676	35,660 13,336	37,556 13,476	38,723 13,821	39,708 14,241
regional beers. Key markets for the business are Russia	Depreciation	3,521	3,752	3,733	3,845	3,960	4,079
and Ukraine (around 37% of EBIT, Carlsberg has a leading	Amortisation	259	239	250	259	268	278
volume share in Russia), and Western Europe. Carlsberg	EBIT	9,636	9,685	9,353	9,372	9,592	9,884
also has a growing presence in Asia, including markets such as Western China, India, Vietnam, Malaysia and Laos	Net interest income(expense)	-2,028	-1,776	-1,506	-1,592	-1,510	-1,333
as well as a dominant position in Malawi.	Associates/affiliates	180	108	370	398	418	439
·	Exceptionals/extraordinaries Other pre-tax income/(expense)	-268 10	85 4	-435 0	-145 0	0 0	0
	Profit before tax	7,350	7,998	7,412	7,635	8,082	8,551
Price Performance	Income tax expense	1,838	1,861	1,833	1,964	2,083	2,203
	Minorities	543	638	478	502	527	553
1050	Other post-tax income/(expense)	0	0	0	0	0	0
900 -	Net profit	5,149	5,607	5,471	5,567	5,891	6,234
750	DB adjustments (including dilution)	54	-103	301	110	0	0
600	DB Net profit	5,203	5,504	5,772	5,677	5,891	6,234
450	Cash Flow (DKKm)						
300 Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13 Jul 13 Jan 14	Cash flow from operations	8,232	9,242	8,312	9,082	9,485	10,012
	Net Capex	-4,053	-4,627	-5,638	-5,804	-5,491	-5,631
Carlsberg — OMX Copenhagen 20 (Rebased)	Free cash flow	4,179	4,615	2,674	3,278	3,994	4,382
Margin Trends	Equity raised/(bought back) Dividends paid	-49 -763	-25 -839	-70 -915	0 -1,220	0 -1,342	0 -1,450
	Net inc/(dec) in borrowings	-1,003	2,473	-114	-2,058	-2,652	-2,932
23	Other investing/financing cash flows	-2,130	-4,000	-3,318	0	0	_,
21	Net cash flow	234	2,224	-1,743	0	0	0
	Change in working capital	-282	641	-50	16	5	96
17	Balance Sheet (DKKm)						
15	Cash and other liquid assets	3,145	5,760	3,714	3,714	3,714	3,714
14	Tangible fixed assets	31,848	31,991	33,482	34,508	35,106	35,725
11 12 13 14E 15E 16E	Goodwill/intangible assets	89,041	91,216	91,895	92,569	93,234	93,889
EBITDA Margin EBIT Margin	Associates/investments	5,779	6,422	2,359	2,638	2,930	3,237
Growth & Profitability	Other assets	17,901	18,576	19,688	20,342	20,753	21,137
Letoward er fondomey	Total assets Interest bearing debt	147,714 36,239	153,965 40,058	151,138 40,211	153,771 38,153	155,737 35,501	157,701 32,569
8	Other liabilities	39,846	40,058	39,428	39,647	39,585	39,558
6 8	Total liabilities	76,085	80,315	79,639	77,800	75,086	72,127
4 8	Shareholders' equity	65,866	70,261	67,811	72,158	76,706	81,491
2 8	Minorities	5,763	3,389	3,688	3,813	3,945	4,084
0 8 8	Total shareholders' equity Net debt	71,629	73,650	71,499	75,971	80,651	85,574
		33,094	34,298	36,497	34,439	31,787	28,855
11 12 13 14E 15E 16E	Key Company Metrics						

Key Company Metrics

Sales growth (%) DB EPS growth (%)

EBITDA Margin (%)

EBIT Margin (%)

Payout ratio (%)

Capex/sales (%)

Capex/depreciation (x)


Net debt/equity (%)

Net interest cover (x)

Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank estimates

ROE (%)

Solvency



13

Sales growth (LHS)

14E

15E

16E

ROE (RHS)

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-3.2 4.7

20.7

14.5

22.3

7.9

9.0

1.5

6.2

51.0

4.0

-1.6

20.1

14.0

24.1

8.0

8.7

1.4

45.3

5.9

3.2

3.8

20.0

13.9

24.6

7.9

8.0

1.3

39.4

6.4

4.6

5.8

20.6

14.6

16.3

8.2

7.6

1.3

46.6

5.5

5.8

-4.0

21.1

15.2

16.3

7.9

6.8

1.1


46.2

4.8

A limited embedded volume growth profile

We see limited volume growth for Carlsberg and see at best an embedded growth which will add 1% per annum over the next ten years. We believe Malawi will be delivering more incremental volume by 2050 than all of Eastern and Western Europe together. That is less a reflection of the potential of Malawi, but more of the lack of growth to be seen in the latter markets

Figure 38: Carlsberg embedded volume growth profile




10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe volume. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports

Growing and declining in the wrong directions


As in Figure 39, we see faster growth rates in lower margin regions and declines in high margin regions.





Carlsberg has an embedded 10 year volume CAGR of 1% As a result, Carlsberg should continue to lag behind the staples sector. Our model assumes annual EPS growth of 5% in the next 3 years.






We believe that Carlsberg will deliver 5% annual EPS growth in the medium term

European declines

Over the past 20 years, Denmark has seen per capita beer consumption decline 45%, the worst performing market globally. Carlsberg's issues in its home market are being replicated across its wider European footprint.



Eastern Europe is expected to have strong population declines in the 20 to 34 year old cohort

30-34 age cohort


25-29 age cohort

The developed markets will move towards stabilized per capita rates of 80 to 85 liters per capita. Its Eastern European markets will see limited upside from here on as real population declines will have a negative impact on beer consumption. Recently, Carlsberg has taken a more practical approach in Poland and understood the realities of the changing retail and consumer environment better than its competitors, as a result winning share. However, as per Figure 42, the number of 20 to 35 year olds in Poland is expected to decline 3% per year until 2025. It is a structural reality which is difficult to overcome.

Russia will not get better

Like Eastern Europe, the Russian population dynamics are negative. Key drinkers in the 20 to 29 year old age group will decline a third by 2025 and Russian male life expectancy is not expected to improve making it hard to sell beer to those who are not alive.

All the issues impacting Russia seem to have washed out – kiosks closures, outdoor drinking bans. Excise is being "normalized" to global standards. At first glance (Figure 43), beer is entering an advantaged position in excise relative to Vodka- increases in the latter will have a greater impact. However, we estimate that half of Vodka's production avoids paying their full complement of taxes and view it unlikely for that to change.



More concerning is the lack of influence on the legislative environment. All the brewers have issues in their biggest markets – ABInBev on unexpected tax increases before the world cup, SABMiller with shebeen closures in South Africa during election cycles, Heineken dealing with excise increases in the Netherlands. A seat at the table is vital for those discussions which seem to be lacking in Russia. In the coming years, further PET bans are expected by 2016, automatic batch counters will be required, the minimum drinking age increased. The biggest "win" in Russia has been the recent lifting of the ban on beer sales in football stadium, though that seems to have been more through the influence of Sepp Blatter and FIFA, rather than the brewers.

Efes re-awakened will create headwinds for Carlsberg

For Carlsberg, a bigger concern will be the competitive environment in Russia. Besides the four main players- Carlsberg, ABInBev, Heineken and Efes-, Russia has a further 34 large breweries and 69 medium scale breweries. As the main players "behave" and exit large PET packagings in the economy segment and questionable marketing practices, the slack will be picked up by local brewers at the bottom end creating further price pressure.

The main competition in the near future will come from Efes who have lost significant share – at the time of the merger with SABMiller a supposed 19% market share reduced to 13%. Following a network optimization reducing its cost base and creating more efficient operations, the Anadolu Efes group has also instituted some key management changes including the recent appointment of a new managing director in Russia with a proven track record

Post the installment on new management, we expect Efes to be a more formable competitor to Carlsberg in Russia 29 July 2014 Beverage Beer /

in beer and tough operational and regulatory environments. We believe this will bring further pressure on Carlsberg.

Asia looks great, but is it enough?

Carlsberg has built a strong business in Asia. The current Chongqing integration in China will bring benefits, their footprint in India improved for access to more reasonable states, and small markets from Nepal to Vietnam starting to make a sizable contribution. We also believe Carlsberg will be very active in the latter region to see more M&A, but remain cautious on the multiples to be paid to play.

Valuation

Price target of DKK525

We base our DKK525 price target on a discounted cash flow model.

For all our brewers and spirits companies, we have assumed a risk free rate of 4.0% and an equity premium of 4.3%. For Carlsberg, the resultant WACC is 7.90% which incorporates a levered beta of 1.18, and net debt / EV ratio of 20%. Our medium term cash flow models growth of 5% a year, and a post year-10 terminal growth rate of 1.5%. We view our terminal growth rate of 1.5% in line with the leverage the company could attain above its embedded volume growth rate to 2050 of 1.0%.

Figure 45: Carlsberg target price sensitivities								
TP per Share (DKK)							WACC	
Terminal Growth Rate	7.15%	7.40%	7.65%	7.90%	8.15%	8.40%	8.65%	
2.25%	713	669	629	594	561	531	504	
2.00%	678	638	601	568	538	510	484	
1.75%	647	609	575	544	516	490	466	
1.50%	617	583	551	522	495	471	448	
1.25%	591	558	528	501	476	453	432	
1.00%	566	535	507	482	458	436	416	
0.75%	542	514	488	463	441	421	401	
Source: Deutsche Bank								

Risks to our valuation

Key upside risks relate to macroeconomic factors and competitive dynamics in Russia, input costs, currency movement, and the volume outlook and market share gains in Carlsberg's mature Western European markets. Additionally, further M&A activity, particularly in Asia, can change the investment profile for Carlsberg.

We have a positive view of Carlsberg's Asian platform, but do not believe it will have a significant impact in the near future



Rating Hold

Europe Belgium

Consumer Staples Beverage

Company ABInBev

Bloomberg

ARI BR

Limited upside, but cash is nice

Reuters

ABI.BR

Maintain our HOLD, adjusting our target price to €85

We have upgraded our price target on ABInBev, but believe the stock is fairly valued and remain a HOLD. The embedded volume growth profile is considerably behind Heineken and SABMiller, with Mexico providing the much needed upside.

Mexico to drive more value, limited upside to Brazil, USA

We see further opportunity in Mexico beyond synergies in driving its top line, leveraging the brand equity of Bud Light in Northern Mexico. Negative population dynamics, strong per capita consumption and high margins limit upside in Brazil. The USA is unlikely to see further margin expansion innovations and a need to abate market share losses will need additional investment.

Value investors and cash generators

Unless it steps beyond the beer category, large scale M&A is unlikely in the near term. Instead, we see ABInBev returning more cash to shareholders, with the most likely form being dividend in the same manner as the top staples companies.

Valuation and risks

We base our €85 price target on a DCF-model, the core assumptions behind which are a WACC of 7.97% and a terminal growth rate of 1.5%. We view our terminal growth rate of 1.5% slightly above the leverage the company could attain above its embedded volume growth rate. Our upside/downside risks include the level of concentration in a few markets, level of cost savings achieved in Mexico, currency instability, government taxation and incentives, consumer sentiment in Brazil and the USA and M&A.

Forecasts And Ratios					
Year End Dec 31	2012A	2013A	2014E	2015E	2016E
EBITDA (USDm)	15,525	17,191	19,345	20,740	21,982
EBITA (USDm)	12,779	14,204	16,358	17,679	18,873
PBT DB (USDm)	10,431	11,718	13,833	15,354	16,933
DB EPS (USD)	4.42	4.81	5.38	5.79	6.38
OLD DB EPS (USD)	4.42	4.81	5.03	5.69	6.20
% Change	0.0%	0.0%	7.0%	1.8%	3.0%
DB EPS growth (%)	10.7	8.8	11.8	7.7	10.3
P/E (DB EPS) (x)	17.2	20.0	20.4	18.9	17.2
EV/EBITA (x)	14.2	16.4	15.6	14.1	13.0
DPS (USD)	2.18	2.72	3.23	3.76	4.47
Yield (%)	2.9	2.8	2.9	3.4	4.1
Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, company data					

Price at 28 Jul 2014 (EUR)	81.63
Price Target (EUR)	85.00
52-week range (EUR)	85.13 - 67.04

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
Gerry Gallagher

Research Analyst (+44) 20 754-50251 gerry.gallagher@db.com

Key changes



Price/price relative



	/
)15E	2016E


$ \begin{array}{c} \text{Eucly} \\ \text{Belgium} \\ \text{Belgium} \\ \text{Bevarage} \\ \hline \\ \text{Anheuser-Busch InBev} \\ \text{Returns: ABL8B} \\ \text{Bioomberg: ABL8B} \\ \text{For all 23 Jul 14} \\ \text{ER B 5103} \\ \text{Target Price} \\ \text{EUR 67.04-85.13} \\ \text{Market Cap (m)} \\ \text{EUR 713.033} \\ \text{USDm 173.033} \\ USDm 173.$	Model updated:24 July 2014	4	Fiscal year end 31-Dec	2011	2012	2013	2014E	2015E	2016E
	Running the numbers		Financial Summary						
Belgium belgiu	Europe		- ()						6.38
$ \frac{Bit Vit align}{Anheuses-Eusch InBev} \\ Reuters: ABLBR Bloomberg: ABLB B Bloomberg: ABLB B Hold States and the set of the set of$	Belgium								6.38 4.47
Anheuser-Busch InBev Auser Statement (USDm) 90.482 152.34 175.000 176.000	Beverage		BVPS (USD)	23.5	25.7	31.4	34.0	36.7	39.4
Routers: ABLBR Bloomberg: ABLB Hold File Fil	<u> </u>	Bev							1,605 176,009
Hold Find Find <t< td=""><td>1</td><td></td><td>Enterprise value (USDm)</td><td>147,903</td><td>180,868</td><td>232,387</td><td>254,384</td><td>249,961</td><td>245,237</td></t<>	1		Enterprise value (USDm)	147,903	180,868	232,387	254,384	249,961	245,237
Price (28 Jul 14) EUR B5.00 P/BV (w) 15.6 17.3 11.0 20.9 18.9 Price (28 Jul 14) EUR B5.00 P/BV (w) 2.61 3.38 3.39 3.22 2.9 3.9 Divide of Vield (%) 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.4 Divide of Vield (%) 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.4 Divide of Vield (%) 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.4 3.5 1.4 7 Divide of Vield (%) 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.4 Divide of Vield (%) 2.3 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.2 1.10 Bit structure of the out on the out of the o				14.2	17.2	20.0	20.4	19.0	17.2
Target Price Figure 1 Price EVR 65 / View (%) 52 Week range EUR 67 / View (%) 53 8 4.5 5.4 5.1 4.7 View (%) 54 8 4.5 5.4 5.1 4.7 View (%) 56 11.7 11.3 5 13.2 12.1 View (%) 56 11.7 11.5 13.2 12.1 1 View (%) 56 11.2 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5	Hold		P/E (Reported) (x)	15.6	17.3	11.0		18.9	17.2
$ \begin{array}{c} \mbox{loc} \mathbf{L} $	Price (28 Jul 14)	EUR 81.63							2.78
$ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c}$	Target Price	EUR 85.00							6.1 4.1
Market Cap (m) EURn 131,033 EV/EBITDA (a) 9.6 11.7 13.5 13.2 12.1 USDm 176,009 USDm 176,009 II.7 14.2 16.4 15.6 14.1 Company Profile Sales revenue 39,046 39,758 43,196 49,744 53,186 66 AB Inflav is the world's largest braver, formed from the group also has a significant creat acquisition of Gruppo Models in Mosico addition 22,807 22,408 23,341 36,878 33 Transch Grupp also has a significant creat acquisition for Gruppo Models Anonica, in Cambridge Madwards 15,525 17,179 19,184 20,740 21,21 Number Schward Charles Market, Bul Light, Stak Anois and Becks, mice addition 6,253 27,86 2,444 2,655 3,532 33 Price Performance 0 <td>52 Week range</td> <td>EUR 67.04 - 85.13</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>4.4</td>	52 Week range	EUR 67.04 - 85.13							4.4
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Company Profile Sales reserve 39,048 49,196 49,176 18,257 11,191 19,366 20,170 12 10,177 11,204 11,191 19,366 20,170 12 40,477 12,207 12,779 14,204 11,538 17,759 18 40,477 14,204 11,538 17,759 18 10,477 11,8358 12,858 12,759 12,746 12,858 12,759 13,304 11,45,358 17,559 11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,11,		USDm 176,009		11.7	14.2	16.4	15.6	14.1	13.0
	Company Profile				00 750			== +==	=
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			•				-		2,751
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34 34 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>Change in working capital</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>144</td><td>89</td><td>87</td></td<>			Change in working capital				144	89	87
$ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c}$			Balance Sheet (USDm)						
32 11 12 13 14E 15E 16E 20,889 27,283 28,096 28 Growth & Profitability EBITDA Margin EBITDA Margin For (137) 99,265 99,364 99,455 99 Growth & Profitability Total assets 7,044 14,207 587 597 608 10 0 0.0165 44,341 49,126 50,408 45,984 41 0 0 0.0165 44,341 49,126 50,408 45,984 41 0 0.0165 44,341 49,126 50,408 45,984 41 0.0165 44,341 49,126 50,408 45,984 41 0.0165 44,341 49,126 50,408 45,984 41 0.0165 44,341 49,126 50,408 45,984 63 10 0 0.0165 44,341 49,126 50,408 45,885 63 0.011 10.01168 71,333 77,168 86,358 86,358 63,635 71 11 12				5.320	7,051	9.839	9,839	9.839	9,839
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $				16,022	16,461	20,889	27,283	28,096	28,832
Growth & Profitability Other assets 8,921 8,765 11,086 11,811 12,340 12 20 12,427 122,621 141,666 148,895 150,338 151 10 10 10 11,213 12,227 122,621 141,666 148,895 150,338 151 11 11,213 12,227 122,621 141,666 148,895 150,338 151 10 10 10 10 10 11,218 32,827 37,232 38,101 38,719 39 10 10 10 10 11,811 12,940 12 12 11,11 12,940 12 12 13,11 14,940 14,941 14,941 14,941 14,941 14,941 14,941 12,940 14,941 14,941 150,948 41,941 150,948 41,941 150,948 16,959 36,145 31 11 12 13 14E 15E 10 10 148,454 37,290 39,237 40,569 36,145 31 11 12 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>-</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>99,539</td></td<>			-						99,539
Growth & Profitability Total assets 112,427 122,621 141,666 148,895 150,338 151 1	EBITDA Margin	EBIT Margin							619 12,932
$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} & 1 \\ & 20 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 11 \\ & 12 \\ & 13 \\ & 14E \\ & 15E \\ & 10 \\ & 11 \\ & 12 \\ & 13 \\ & 14E \\ & 15E \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 11 \\ & 12 \\ & 13 \\ & 14E \\ & 15E \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 11 \\ & 12 \\ & 13 \\ & 14E \\ & 15E \\ & 10$	Growth & Profitability								151,761
15 30 25 20 10 30 25 20 10 Total liabilities 32 71,383 77,168 80,358 88,509 84,703 80 10 25 10 20 15 Shareholders' equity 37,492 41,154 50,365 54,584 58,885 63 10 10 10 10 50 10 50 71 33,552 4,299 4,943 5,802 6,750 77 11 12 13 14E 15E 16E 71 34,845 37,290 39,287 40,569 36,145 31 Key Company Metrics Sales growth (%) 7.6 1.8 8.6 15.2 6.9 DB EPS growth (%) 27.7 10.7 8.8 11.8 7.7 EBITDA Margin (%) 39.3 39.0 39.8 38.9 39.0			Interest bearing debt	40,165	44,341	49,126	50,408	45,984	41,260
15 25 26 37,492 41,154 50,365 54,584 58,855 63 10	20								39,397
10 20 10 37,492 41,134 50,303 53,604 56,605 67,50 7 10 10 15 10	15								80,657
5 10 10 10 10 41,044 45,453 55,308 60,386 65,635 71 0 11 12 13 14E 15E 16E Net debt 34,845 37,290 39,287 40,569 36,145 31 Key Company Metrics Sales growth (LHS) Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4">Colspan="4"Colspa="4"Colspan="4"Colspa="4"Col	10	- 20							63,307 7,796
3 34,845 37,290 39,287 40,569 36,145 31 0 11 12 13 14E 15E 16E Key Company Metrics Sales growth (LHS) Sales growth (%) 7.6 1.8 8.6 15.2 6.9 DB EPS growth (%) 27.7 10.7 8.8 11.8 7.7 EBITDA Margin (%) 39.3 39.0 39.8 38.9 39.0									71,103
11 12 13 14E 15E 16E Key Company Metrics Sales growth (LHS) → ROE (RHS) Solvency Sales growth (%) 7.6 1.8 8.6 15.2 6.9 DB EPS growth (%) 27.7 10.7 8.8 11.8 7.7 EBITDA Margin (%) 39.3 39.0 39.8 38.9 39.0		- 5	Net debt				40,569		31,421
Sales growth (LHS) ROE (RHS) Sales growth (%) DB EPS growth (%) 7.6 1.8 8.6 15.2 6.9 Solvency EBITDA Margin (%) 27.7 10.7 8.8 11.8 7.7			Key Company Metrics						
Solvency DB EPS growth (%) 27.7 10.7 8.8 11.8 7.7 Solvency EBITDA Margin (%) 39.3 39.0 39.8 38.9 39.0				7.6	1.8	8.6	15.2	6.9	5.5
		LHS) ROE (RHS)	DB EPS growth (%)	27.7	10.7	8.8	11.8	7.7	10.3
EPIT Margin (0/) 00.0 00.1 00.0 00.0 00.0	Solvency								39.2
	100	19							33.6 68.6
									17.1
60 8 Capex/sales (%) 8.6 8.2 9.0 8.0 7.5		- 8							7.0
6 Capex/depreciation (x) 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3									1.3
40 84.9 82.0 71.0 67.2 55.1 20 2 Net interest cover (x) 4.9 5.4 5.7 6.5 7.6									44.2 9.7
					0.4	0.7	0.0	7.0	0.7
11 12 13 14E 15E 16E Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank estimates			Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank es	unates					




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Margin Trends








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ABInBev with mixed opportunities

Limited embedded potential

ABInBev sits in the biggest market profit pools, but we see limited upside volumetrically on its current base in those areas.



ABInBev has 30% upside between now and 2050 on embedded volume, with most of the volume driven by population dynamics in Mexico. Along with Carlsberg, it has the lowest CAGR growth rate of the brewers.

A mixed medium term growth profile

As in Figure 47, we see a mixed growth profile, with Mexican and Asian growth offsetting the lower rates of growth in high margin Latin America.


Figure 47: 2015-2017DBe revenue growth rates on 2014DBe base year



ABInBev has a 10 year embedded volume CAGR of 1.3% 29 July 2014 Beverage Beer

ABInBev should continue to be able to deliver EBIT and EPS growth ahead of the staples sector. Our model sees annual EPS growth of 9% in the next 3 years.





We believe ABInBev will deliver 9% eps growth in the medium term

Mexico will drive more value


In our view, ABInBev will continue to deliver and do what it says. Mexico will deliver its synergies, though we do not believe that it will exceed its targets. The operational costs of Gruppo Modelo are already some of the lowest amongst brewers and it is unlikely there will be a Zoo or amusement park that can be sold.

We do see greater potential upside in Mexico, not on costs, but rather on the revenue line. Bud Light is the largest imported premium brand in Mexico with tremendous latent brand equity having been established over two decades. The strong brand equity is primarily in the North where is can more effectively compete against Heineken. Higher prices in that area as well as bigger distribution drop sizes will allow ABInBev to accelerate its top line at a lower cost. Additionally, Bud Light is currently distributed in non-returnable formats missing out on 80% of the market; hence moving to the returnable format will further enhance profit potential.

Brazil has bigger issues than football

Brazil remains a strong cash cow. The self-imposed 70% market share limit helps. It prevents the company from having to go after the last 30% which often has higher costs associated to it, due to the cost of serving more rural markets or the cost of investment that is required to build premium brands. Another factor helping the profitability helping the operation are the various tax incentives for capital expenditures. As a group, it applies mostly to production facilities and trade capital investments in Brazil and China boosting group by EBIT 4% and LatAm North margins by around 350bps.


Mexico has top line opportunity in the Lights category



More concerning is the embedded growth profile for ABInBev. Brazil will begin to see real population declines in the key age cohorts. Population will shrink as the profile ages. Between now and 2025, we also see more than a 150bps decline in the key 20 to 29 years old age group. Per capita consumption for 15 and over sits at 90 liters, at the high end globally. Regional variation does exist, but this will require greater investment to attain. With negative population dynamics, we see limited upside.

Can they build beer in the USA?

ABInBev are not known as category developers and have a mixed track record of developing brands. This is perhaps a necessary quality needed for the most globally dynamic beer market where the category is in danger of losing relevance amongst millennial. The success stories in premium have been mostly built by previous management- Stella's rise attributable to the patient outlet development run by the old Interbrew.



We believe that many of the innovations in the USA hasten consumers out of the beer category

Liquid innovation in the USA has been mostly focused on making beer not taste like beer- Cranberry, Apple, and hard liquor cocktail profiles do not encourage consumers to stay in the category- it rather hastens their exit. As


Figure 51 indicates, through the push of distribution each of their innovation hit significant Nielsen share within three months. After initial trial, most of their launches had a repeat purchase rate of 30% or less leading to a slow decline the remainder of the year and creating a "hard comp" for the next year.

They have also been costly innovations and difficult to sustain in a Zero Based Budgeting environment. Hard comparatives from the previous year should not be difficult if the innovations continue to grow in year two and beyond as they should. As result, we seen an environment where margins wills be under pressure as sustained investment is needed and pricing opportunity more muted in the near future.


Value investors and cash deliveries

ABInBev is a committed value investor and we view any large scale M&A in beer at the current multiples as highly unlikely. ABInBev does dream big, and its dreams are most likely to be outside the limited confines of the beer category.

ABInBev will continue its record of a strong conversion to free cash flow with one of the strongest profiles in staples as per Figure 52. When looking at free cash flow yield to valuation, ABInBev remains one of the most attractive cash generators.







Note: IMT and BAT 2014 Bloomberg consensus figures. All others 2014 DB estimates Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, Datastream, company reports, Bloomberg

The company has stated their desire to return cash to shareholders in the form of dividend along the lines of the top consumer staples companies. Though it is unlikely the company will return to the 80% payout ratio seen in 2007, it would result in a 3.8% dividend yield which equates ABInBev to the likes of Unilever and Nestle and approaches the tobacco companies. Considering the returns the likes of BAT have delivered over the past decade, a similar investment profile may prove attractive.

Valuation

Price Target of €85

We base our €85 price target on a discounted cash flow model

For all our brewers and spirits companies, we have assumed a risk free rate of 4.0% and an equity premium of 4.3%. For ABInBev, the resultant WACC is 7.97% which incorporates a levered beta of 1.20, and net debt / EV ratio of 20%. Our medium term cash flow models growth of 5% a year, and a post year-10 terminal growth rate of 1.5%. We view our terminal growth rate of 1.5% is slightly above the leverage the company could attain beyond its embedded volume growth rate.

TP per Share (€)							WACC
Tr per Share (£)							VVACC
Terminal Growth Rate	7.22%	7.47%	7.72%	7.97%	8.22%	8.47%	8.72%
2.25%	109.0	103.3	98.2	93.5	89.2	85.4	81.8
2.00%	104.5	99.3	94.5	90.1	86.2	82.6	79.2
1.75%	100.4	95.5	91.1	87.0	83.3	79.9	76.8
1.50%	96.6	92.1	87.9	84.1	80.7	77.5	74.5
1.25%	93.1	88.9	85.0	81.4	78.2	75.1	72.3
1.00%	89.9	85.9	82.2	78.9	75.8	73.0	70.3
0.75%	86.8	83.1	79.7	76.5	73.6	70.9	68.4
Source: Deutsche Bank							

Risks to our valuation

Our upside/downside risks include the level of concentration in a few markets, level of cost savings achieved in Mexico, currency instability, government taxation and incentives, consumer sentiment in Brazil and the USA and M&A.

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Rating Hold

Europe United Kingdom

Consumer Staples Beverage



Bloomberg SAB LN

Maintain our hold

Maintain our HOLD and update our target price to £35

Reuters

SAB.L

We have not changed our long term favorable view of SABMiller which we believe is fairly priced by the market. We have updated out target price to £35.

The right exposure to growth

SABMiller remains the best positioned with a profound level of embedded growth. The recent amalgamation of the South African and Africa divisions should bring further top and cost line benefits.

Short term headwinds to continue

The current management and business model transition will bring certain disruptions delivering short term headwinds. The European division will continue to be a concern.

Valuation model update

We have updated our valuation model and rolled forward our DCF resulting in a target price adjustment from £30 to £35. Our long term growth parameters remain intact, but we have taken a more nuanced view of F15 performance and are below consensus. We base our price target on a DCF-model, the core assumptions behind which are a WACC of 7.89% (incorporating a levered beta of 1.18, net debt / EV ratio of 20%, risk-free rate of 4.00% and 4.30% cost of debt), medium-term cash flow growth of 5% a year, and a post year-10 terminal growth rate of 2.0% . We view our terminal growth rate of 2% as conservative number below the company's embedded volume growth rate of 2.5%. Our upside/downside risks include government taxation, consumer sentiment in Latin America and Africa, developed markets competitive pressures and M&A, real and perceived.

Forecasts And Ratios					
Year End Mar 31	2013A	2014A	2015E	2016E	2017E
EBITDA (USDm)	5,709	5,720	6,149	6,527	6,989
EBITA (USDm)	4,786	4,800	5,202	5,551	5,984
PBT DB (USDm)	4,057	4,035	4,574	5,093	5,598
DB EPS (USD)	2.34	2.39	2.57	2.78	3.02
OLD DB EPS (USD)	2.34	2.39	2.70	3.02	-
% Change	0.0%	0.0%	-4.9%	-7.9%	-
DB EPS growth (%)	10.3	2.0	7.4	8.3	8.7
P/E (DB EPS) (x)	18.8	20.9	22.0	20.3	18.7
EV/EBITA (x)	14.3	15.5	15.5	14.2	12.9
DPS (USD)	1.01	1.05	1.13	1.22	1.33
Yield (%)	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.4
Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, company data					

Price at 28 Jul 2014 (GBP)	3,330.00
Price Target (GBP)	3,500.00
52-week range (GBP)	3,460.00 - 2,661.00

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
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Gerry Gallagher

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Price/price relative



0

13

Net debt/equity (LHS)

	/
16F	2017E

Model updated:24 July 2014	Fiscal year end 31-Mar	2012	2013	2014	2015E	2016E	2017E
Running the numbers	Financial Summary						
Europe	DB EPS (USD)	2.13	2.34	2.39	2.57	2.78	3.02
United Kingdom	Reported EPS (USD) DPS (USD)	2.64 0.91	2.02 1.01	2.09 1.05	2.30 1.13	2.51 1.22	2.75
Beverage	BVPS (USD)	15.8	16.6	16.5	1.13	20.1	1.33 21.7
<u> </u>	Weighted average shares (m)	1,583	1,590	1,597	1,596	1,598	1,600
SABMiller	Average market cap (USDm)	57,608	70,189	79,821	90,197	90,197	90,197
Reuters: SAB.L Bloomberg: SAB LN	Enterprise value (USDm)	60,940	68,339	74,328	80,770	79,075	77,146
Hold	Valuation Metrics P/E (DB) (x)	17.1	18.8	20.9	22.0	20.3	18.7
	P/E (Reported) (x) P/BV (x)	13.8 2.54	21.9 3.18	23.9 3.03	24.6 3.03	22.5 2.81	20.5 2.60
Price (28 Jul 14) GBP 3,330.00		2.54 5.8	5.0	3.03	3.03	4.2	2.60 4.6
Target Price GBP 3,500.00	FCF Yield (%) Dividend Yield (%)	2.5	2.3	2.1	2.0	4.2	4.6 2.4
52 Week range GBP 2,661.00 - 3,460.00	EV/Sales (x)	3.6	3.9	4.4	4.5	4.2	3.8
Market Cap (m) GBPm 53,135	EV/EBITDA (x)	11.8 15.3	12.0 15.6	13.0 16.7	13.1 16.7	12.1	11.0
USDm 90,197	EV/EBIT (x)	15.3	15.0	10.7	10.7	15.2	13.7
Company Profile	Income Statement (USDm)	40 740	47.005	40 704	47 770	40.004	
SABMiller is a global brewer with a strong bias towards	Sales revenue Gross profit	16,713 10,088	17,385 10,657	16,704 10,424	17,778 11,258	18,901 11,991	20,088 12,798
emerging markets, having expanded rapidly over the last	EBITDA	5,169	5,709	5,720	6,149	6,527	6,989
two decades from its South African roots into the US, Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia. In addition to its	Depreciation Amortisation	909 273	867 450	854 427	880 429	906 431	933 433
beer business, the group is a large Coca-Cola bottlers, with	EBIT	3,987	4,392	4,439	4,841	5,190	5,623
significant operations in Africa and, through its stake in Efes, exposure to Coca-Cola Icecek. SAB also owns some	Net interest income(expense)	-540	-738	-645	-628	-459	-386
legacy hotel and gaming assets in South Africa. Key	Associates/affiliates Exceptionals/extraordinaries	1,152 1,004	1,213 -188	1,226 -197	1,203 0	1,282 0	1,363 0
international brands include Peroni, Pilsner Urquell, Miller Genuine Draft and Grolsch.	Other pre-tax income/(expense)	1,004	0	0	0	0	0
	Profit before tax	4,451	3,466	3,597	4,213	4,732	5,237
Price Performance	Income tax expense Minorities	1,126 256	1,192 237	1,173 269	1,405 293	1,632 315	1,796 341
4000	Other post-tax income/(expense)	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Net profit	4,221	3,250	3,381	3,718	4,067	4,463
2800	DB adjustments (including dilution)	-821	522	484	436	436	436
2400	DB Net profit	3,400	3,772	3,865	4,154	4,503	4,899
	Cash Flow (USDm)						
Jul 11 Jan 12 Jul 12 Jan 13 Jul 13 Jan 14	Cash flow from operations Net Capex	4,844 -1,523	4,969 -1,445	4,364 -1,415	5,172 -1,688	5,555 -1,793	6,000 -1,847
SABMiller FTSE 100 INDEX (Rebased)	Free cash flow	3,321	3,524	2,949	3,484	3,762	4,153
Margin Trends	Equity raised/(bought back)	124	85	24	0	0	0
	Dividends paid Net inc/(dec) in borrowings	-1,324 8,861	-1,517 -460	-1,640 -1,244	-435 -3,935	-1,864 -1,695	-2,020 -1,929
36	Other investing/financing cash flows	-11,189	-279	-180	886	-203	-203
32	Net cash flow Change in working capital	-207 <i>304</i>	1,353 <i>-39</i>	-91 <i>168</i>	0 -8	0 - <i>18</i>	0 -16
28		504	-00	700	-0	-70	-70
24	Balance Sheet (USDm)						
20	Cash and other liquid assets Tangible fixed assets	745 9,299	2,171 9,059	2,081 9,065	2,081 9,569	2,081 10,141	2,081 10,729
12 13 14 15E 16E 17E	Goodwill/intangible assets	30,029	29,497	27,029	26,688	26,350	26,014
EBITDA Margin EBIT Margin	Associates/investments	10,600	11,119	11,531	10,825	11,221	11,628
Growth & Profitability	Other assets Total assets	4,978 55,651	4,448 56,294	4,045 53,751	4,232 53,396	4,406 54,198	4,612 55,063
	Interest bearing debt	19,226	18,548	17,047	13,112	11,418	9,488
15 20	Other liabilities	10,412	10,286	9,222	9,249	9,253	9,292
10 15	Total liabilities Shareholders' equity	29,638 25,073	28,834 26,372	26,269 26,319	22,361 29,754	20,671 32,121	18,780 34,741
5 - 10	Minorities	940	1,088	1,163	1,280	1,406	1,542
0	Total shareholders' equity <i>Net debt</i>	26,013 <i>18,481</i>	27,460 <i>16,377</i>	27,482 <i>14,966</i>	31,034 <i>11,031</i>	33,527 <i>9,337</i>	36,283 <i>7,407</i>
-5		10,401	10,377	14,300	11,031	3,337	7,407
12 13 14 15E 16E 17E	Key Company Metrics	40 A		0.0		0.0	~ ~ ~
Sales growth (LHS) ROE (RHS)	Sales growth (%) DB EPS growth (%)	10.4 11.7	4.0 10.3	-3.9 2.0	6.4 7.4	6.3 8.3	6.3 8.7
Solvency	EBITDA Margin (%)	30.9	32.8	34.2	34.6	34.5	34.8
80 20	EBIT Margin (%) Payout ratio (%)	23.9 34.1	25.3 49.4	26.6 49.6	27.2 48.5	27.5 47.9	28.0 47.7
	ROE (%)	17.9	49.4 12.6	12.8	48.5	13.1	13.3
60 15	Capex/sales (%)	9.8	8.5	8.9	9.5	9.5	9.2
40 10	Capex/depreciation (x) Net debt/equity (%)	1.7 71.0	1.6 59.6	1.6 54.5	1.8 35.5	1.8 27.8	1.8 20.4
20 - 5	Net interest cover (x)	7.4	6.0	6.9	7.7	11.3	14.6

Source: Company data, Deutsche Bank estimates

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15E

16E

Net interest cover (RHS)

0

17F

Model updated:24 July 2014

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
Running the numbers		Financial Summary
Europe		DB EPS (USD) Reported EPS (USD)
United Kingdom		DPS (USD)
Beverage		BVPS (USD)
SABMiller		Weighted average shares (r Average market cap (USDm
Reuters: SABJ.J	Bloomberg: SAB SJ	Enterprise value (USDm)
Hold		Valuation Metrics
Inolu		P/E (DB) (x)
Price (28 Jul 14)	ZAR 597.90	P/E (Reported) (x) P/BV (x)
Target Price	ZAR 630.00	FCF Yield (%)
52 Week range	ZAR 471.26 - 627.36	Dividend Yield (%)
Market Cap (m)	ZARm 954,039	EV/Sales (x)
	USDm 90,930	EV/EBITDA (x) EV/EBIT (x)
Company Profile		Income Statement (US

SABMiller is a global brewer with a strong bias towards emerging markets, having expanded rapidly over the last two decades from its South African roots into the US, Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia. In addition to its beer business, the group is a large Coca-Cola bottlers, with significant operations in Africa and, through its stake in Efes, exposure to Coca-Cola loceek. SAB also owns some legacy hotel and gaming assets in South Africa. Key international brands include Peroni, Pilsner Urquell, Miller Genuine Draft and Grolsch.






Margin Trends



Growth & Profitability







			5	Net debt/equity (%) Net interest cover (x)
4	15E	16E	17E	Source: Company data, D
HS)	N	et interes	t cover (RHS)	


mpson	
51886	harold.thompson@db.com

						/
Fiscal year end 31-Mar	2012	2013	2014	2015E	2016E	2017E
Financial Summary DB EPS (USD) Reported EPS (USD) DPS (USD) BVPS (USD) Weighted average shares (m) Average market cap (USDm) Enterprise value (USDm)	2.13 2.64 0.91 15.8 1,583 57,461 60,793	2.34 2.02 1.01 16.6 1,590 70,153 68,303	2.39 2.09 1.05 16.5 1,597 79,545 74,052	2.57 2.30 1.13 18.6 1,596 90,930 81,503	2.78 2.51 1.22 20.1 1,598 90,930 79,808	3.02 2.75 1.33 21.7 1,600 90,930 77,879
Valuation Metrics P/E (DB) (x) P/E (Reported) (x) P/BV (x) FCF Yield (%) Dividend Yield (%)	17.1 13.8 2.53 5.8 2.5	18.8 21.8 3.19 5.0 2.3	20.8 23.8 3.03 3.7 2.1	22.2 24.8 3.06 3.8 2.0	20.5 22.7 2.84 4.1 2.1	18.9 20.7 2.63 4.6 2.3
EV/Sales (x) EV/EBITDA (x) EV/EBIT (x)	3.6 11.8 15.2	3.9 12.0 15.6	4.4 12.9 16.7	4.6 13.3 16.8	4.2 12.2 15.4	3.9 11.1 13.9
Income Statement (USDm) Sales revenue Gross profit EBITDA Depreciation Amortisation EBIT Net interest income(expense) Associates/affiliates Exceptionals/extraordinaries Other pre-tax income/(expense) Profit before tax Income tax expense Minorities Other post-tax income/(expense) Net profit	$\begin{array}{c} 16,713\\ 10,088\\ 5,169\\ 909\\ 273\\ 3,987\\ -540\\ 1,152\\ 1,004\\ 0\\ 4,451\\ 1,126\\ 256\\ 0\\ 4,221 \end{array}$	$17,385 \\ 10,657 \\ 5,709 \\ 867 \\ 450 \\ 4,392 \\ -738 \\ 1,213 \\ -188 \\ 0 \\ 3,466 \\ 1,192 \\ 237 \\ 0 \\ 3,250 \\ \end{array}$	16,704 10,424 5,720 854 427 4,439 -645 1,226 -197 0 3,597 1,173 269 0 3,381	17,778 11,258 6,149 880 429 4,841 -628 1,203 0 0 4,213 1,405 293 0 3,718	$18,901 \\ 11,991 \\ 6,527 \\ 906 \\ 431 \\ 5,190 \\ -459 \\ 1,282 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 4,732 \\ 1,632 \\ 315 \\ 0 \\ 4,067 \\ \end{array}$	20,088 12,798 6,989 933 433 5,623 -386 1,363 0 0 5,237 1,796 341 0 4,463
DB adjustments (including dilution) DB Net profit	-821 3,400	522 3,772	484 3,865	436 4,154	436 4,503	436 4,899
Cash Flow (USDm) Cash flow from operations Net Capex Free cash flow Equity raised/(bought back) Dividends paid Net inc/(dec) in borrowings Other investing/financing cash flows Net cash flow Change in working capital	4,844 -1,523 3,321 124 -1,324 8,861 -11,189 -207 <i>304</i>	4,969 -1,445 3,524 85 -1,517 -460 -279 1,353 -39	4,364 -1,415 2,949 24 -1,640 -1,244 -180 -91 <i>168</i>	5,172 -1,688 3,484 0 -435 -3,935 886 0 - <i>8</i>	5,555 -1,793 3,762 0 -1,864 -1,695 -203 0 -18	6,000 -1,847 4,153 0 -2,020 -1,929 -203 0 -16
Balance Sheet (USDm) Cash and other liquid assets Tangible fixed assets Goodwill/intangible assets Associates/investments Other assets Total assets Interest bearing debt Other liabilities Total liabilities Shareholders' equity Minorities Total shareholders' equity <i>Net debt</i>	745 9,299 30,029 10,600 4,978 55,651 19,226 10,412 29,638 25,073 940 26,013 <i>18,481</i>	2,171 9,059 29,497 11,119 4,448 56,294 18,548 10,286 28,834 26,372 1,088 27,460 <i>16,377</i>	2,081 9,065 27,029 11,531 4,045 53,751 17,047 9,222 26,269 26,319 1,163 27,482 <i>14,966</i>	2,081 9,569 26,688 10,825 4,232 53,396 13,112 9,249 22,361 29,754 1,280 31,034 <i>11,031</i>	2,081 10,141 26,350 11,221 4,406 54,198 11,418 9,253 20,671 32,121 1,406 33,527 <i>9,337</i>	2,081 10,729 26,014 11,628 4,612 55,063 9,488 9,292 18,780 34,741 1,542 36,283 <i>7,407</i>
Key Company Metrics Sales growth (%) DB EPS growth (%) EBITDA Margin (%) EBIT Margin (%) Payout ratio (%) ROE (%) Capex/depreciation (x) Net debt/equity (%) Net interest cover (x)	10.4 11.7 30.9 23.9 34.1 17.9 9.8 1.7 71.0 7.4	4.0 10.3 32.8 25.3 49.4 12.6 8.5 1.6 59.6 6.0	-3.9 2.0 34.2 26.6 49.6 12.8 8.9 1.6 54.5 6.9	6.4 7.4 34.6 27.2 48.5 13.3 9.5 1.8 35.5 7.7	6.3 8.3 34.5 27.5 47.9 13.1 9.5 1.8 27.8 11.3	6.3 8.7 34.8 28.0 47.7 13.3 9.2 1.8 20.4 14.6

Deutsche Bank estimates


Embedded growth with the option to add more


SABMiller embedded growth rate of 3.2% in volume over the next ten years. It has the potential to add 145 million hl by 2025 and 280 million hl by 2050. Should SABMiller find an opportunity to consolidate Castel in its numbers, this would add another 180 million hl of embedded volume by 2050 led by markets Ethiopia, DRC, and Madagascar.



10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe volume. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports

SABMiller should deliver EBIT and EPS growth ahead of the staples sector. Our model sees annual EPS growth of 8% in the next 3 years.





Valuation

We base our price target on a DCF-model, the core assumptions behind which are a WACC of 7.89% (incorporating a levered beta of 1.18, net debt / EV ratio of 20%, risk-free rate of 4.00% and 4.30% cost of debt), medium-term cash flow growth of 5% a year, and a post year-10 terminal growth rate of 2.0%. We view our terminal growth rate of 2% as conservative number below the company's embedded volume growth rate of 2.5%.

Figure 58: SABMi	ller targe	et price s	ensitiviti	es			
TP per Share (£pence)							WACC
Terminal Growth Rate	7.14%	7.39%	7.64%	7.89%	8.14%	8.39%	8.64%
2.75%	4,606	4,345	4,113	3,905	3,717	3,547	3,394
2.50%	4,400	4,162	3,948	3,756	3,583	3,426	3,282
2.25%	4,212	3,994	3,798	3,620	3,459	3,312	3,178
2.00%	4,042	3,841	3,659	3,494	3,344	3,207	3,081
1.75%	3,886	3,700	3,531	3,377	3,237	3,108	2,990
1.50%	3,742	3,570	3,412	3,268	3,137	3,016	2,904
1.25%	3,610	3,449	3,302	3,167	3,043	2,929	2,823
Source: Deutsche Bank							

Our upside/downside risks include government taxation, consumer sentiment in Latin America and Africa, developed markets competitive pressures and M&A, real and perceived.

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Affordability drives growth

Beer is a luxury for many consumers. The alternatives drunk by most EM consumers are priced below beer and often illicit and unhygienic products. This market is particularly sizable in Africa, and to a lesser extent in Asia and Latin America, giving brewers an addressable illicit alcohol market from which to gain share. The key barrier to gaining this share is affordability where two hours of work to afford a beer is the inflection point for beer market growth.

Beer is a luxury product

To the vast majority of the world's consumers, beer is a luxury product and an entry point to commercially branded goods. Unlike most staples, beer serves an already established need provided by alcohol and offers a safer and more hygienic choice to illicit alcohol. The barrier for consumers to enter the category is a factor of price and income.

Beer is expensive relative to alternatives

Beer is expensive, especially compared to alternatives in the illicit alcohol area. Those alcohol types that do tend to be commercial priced below beer often do not pay the full complement of taxes or follow regulations to the letter. As indicated in Figure 60, the pricing ladder in alcohol is logarithmic. Unfortunately, for most consumers, their income growth is not.

Figure 60: Emerging market pricing ladder (mainstream beer =100)

Price index to absolute alcohol equivalent

5000	Premium scotch
2000	Standard scotch
500	Entry level international scotch
300	Local entry level international spirit
250	Imported international premium
160	Locally brewed international premium
140	Taxed local spirits
130	Regional premium beer
120	Local premium beer
110	Mainstream beer in premium pack
100	Mainstream beer
80	Economy barley beer
70	Local adjunct clear beer
60	Non-tax paid local spirits
50	Commercial sorghum beer
30	illicit sorghum beer
20	illicit fruit wine
10	illicit distilled alcohol

Johnny Walker Blue Johnny Walker Black Johnny Walker Red Jameson's Heineken Peroni Konyagi Castle Lager Ndovu/Tusker

Tanzania example

Kilimanjaro one way Safari Lager Kibo lager Eagle Extra IMFL sachets Chibuku Busaa Urwaga Chang'aa

Beer is first luxury product

most consumers can afford

Figure 59: Sorghum beer Busaa



Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, company report, market visits

The movement between alcohol categories requires a multiple of one's income. The gap between illicit spirits and mainstream beer has a multiple of two to three times. The gap between beer and international spirits has an additional factor of 5 times and up.

The addressable alcohol market for the taking

A world of non-commercial alcohol

Almost every market has a form of non-commercial alcohol produced locally. Often, these are rooted in local traditions and norms and very much priced below beer.

North America has had Rye Whiskey and Gin historically in the Appalachians; Latin America is known for its distilled spirits made from sugarcane such Aquardiente or Cachacha. Russia is known for its Samogon Vodka. Eastern and Southern Europe have their various fruit brandies such as Palinkas; India has palm wine in the form of Arrack and their own form of neutral spirit from molasses collectively known as Indian Made Foreign Liquor; and Africa has a multitude of concoction from fruit wines to local millet as in Figure 61.

Figure 61: Millet beer in Uganda




Source: Deutsche Bank, personal collection.

The size of the illicit alcohol market is a function of national income. In Figure 62, we reviewed 156 markets and found illicit unrecorded alcohol most prevalent in countries with a low GDP per capita. The outliers with high illicit alcohol compared to their relatively high income such as Iraq, Turkmenistan and Botswana tend to have restrictions on commercial alcohol products-perhaps an unintended consequence of public policy.

Local, often illicit alcohol tends to be priced significantly below beer



Figure 62: Unrecorded/illicit alcohol as a function of income



In poorer markets, the noncommercial alcohol market is 80% of alcohol consumption

Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, WHO, World Bank

Africa has the largest addressable market for alcohol

The biggest market for illicit and non-commercial alcohol is sub-Saharan Africa. The alcohol drunk in most of these markets are long alcohol drinks with alcohol content similar to lager beer, 3% to 6%. These drinks are consumed in social situations as seen in Figure 63.

Figure 63: Malwa beer consumption Uganda-




Source: Deutsche Bank, personal collection courtesy of Richard Scott

In Uganda, this social ritual takes the form of sharing a pot of Malwa, a fermenting porridge beer made from Maize with long straws. This well entrenched social drinking culture is inherently favorable to the sociability occasion in beer.

As per Figure 64, the informal, non-commercial alcohol market in sub-Saharan Africa is four to five time larger in absolute alcohol terms to the formal market.

Non-commercial alcohol is drunk in the similar social occasions as with beer

Figure 64: Beer share of total alcohol in Africa




Illicit alcohol variety in Africa from Angola to Zambia

Until recently, Angola was mostly a wine market- concentrated wine was primarily imported from Portugal, diluted to 12% and often mixed with Coca Cola to hide the flavor and make a local concoction named Catemba. In the last decade, the shift to beer has made Angola one of the highest per capita markets in Africa. However, in most markets from Zambia to Nigeria, illicit alcohol is more than 60% of the segment giving beer a large addressable market.

Latin America's addressable market more formalized

Latin America's local alcohol market is more defined, with fewer illicit alcohol operators and a more formalized local spirits industry. Though the sector has professionalized with decent packaging and drink offerings, tax collection and hygienic standards remains an issue

Figure 65: Beer share of total alcohol in Latin America




The opportunity is less moving consumers into the beer category, but rather expansion of more occasions where beer is relevant. The white spirits are preferred at both festivals and at-home consumption- an opportunity for brewers to expand their reach.

Satisfying reward after a hard day's work

How much do you have to work for your beer?

Blocking the entry from alcohol into the beer category is affordability. It is a question of how long one has to work for a beer. The amount of work required for a beer is strongly correlated to the per capita consumption in a market.






As per Figure 67, at around 120 minutes, beer consumption in market hits an inflection point. Consumption accelerates as more consumers within a market enter the category and more occasions become relevant to beer moments.


120 and 30 minutes of work for a beer are key inflection points for per capita beer growth

Figure 67: Minutes worked for a 50cl beer - inflection points



At 30 minutes, another inflection point of acceleration as habits are entrenched and wider portfolio choices become an option including premium beers.





Based on national income and ILO standards for working hours. Source: Deutsche Bank, World Bank, Euromonitor, Plato Logic, ILO



Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America require long hours...

The global overview in Figure 68 finds that in most African markets, consumers must work more than two hours up to full day or longer to afford a decent beer at the end of the day. Similarly in India and part of Asia, beer finds itself unaffordable. In the case of India, this is a function of income, but also absolute pricing due to excessive excise taxation and lack of scale. Latin America appears to be sitting in a space of acceleration- most market require between 30 and 90 minutes of work. This also bodes well for the development of the premium market which is currently underrepresented on the continent.


...and the US, Europe and Australia spare a few minutes for a beer

Expectedly, in developed markets, beer is seen affordable. This is both a function of income such as in Australia where high wages offset the relative high beer pricing, but also a feature of compressed competitive pricing seen in Eastern Europe and low excise regimes such as in the US. The favorable excise treatment for the US beer market means an American has to work less than 10 minutes for his beer. However, it is unlikely that the average Texan is willing to pay more just because someone in Burkina Faso has to do so.

National variation drives portfolio development

Within markets variation exist on the affordability of a beer, with income disparity exacerbated in emerging markets with high GINI/income disparity.

Figure 69: Affordability disparity within a country for a 50cl beer in a 134 markets




Affordability is also relativethe price for a beer outside their own country is not necessarily relevant to a consumer



In about a fifth of the markets in Figure 69, a beer is comfortably within reach of over 90% of the population for two hours of work or less. For the remaining 80% of the countries in the world, a significant slice of the population cannot. Additionally, within every market there is a slice of the population who can afford a beer for less than 30 minutes of work and for whom a premium beer is a serious option. In two thirds of the world, at least 5% of the population can be considered in that category- enough to make a premium brand viable.

A willingness to sacrifice pricing for volume

Figure 70 shows the proportion of the population in a selection of markets who can comfortably afford a beer for a certain amount of time worked. In the case of Nigeria, the two hour inflection point indicates 15% of the drinking population are in the category.



With a beer price reduction of 10% as in Figure 71, in the case of Nigeria, another 5% of consumers would be able to afford to enter the category –that equates to an additional 7 million consumers for Nigeria.

As discussed further on, pricing below inflation or finding alternative routes to deliver more accessible products enables more consumers to enter the beer category. It also requires the brewers to be ruthlessly efficient to ensure that leverage is captured and margin expands with the additional volume, despite the lack of dynamic pricing.

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There simply being more people drives more growth in staples, which holds true for beer. However, the population growth effect for beer is greater in certain geographies. There also a limit to how much the human body can drink, and per capita beer and alcohol consumption moderates at a certain point. Additionally, cultural and religious barriers need consideration when assessing the potential of a market.


Population growth as a driver of beer

More people = more consumption

As we discussed in our note *Emerging Exposure*, population growth benefits consumer staples. The World Bank estimates world population will grow by 960m -14% between 2012 and 2025; from 7.05bn to 8.00bn.

Population growth is the single biggest driver of staples growth


Figure 72: Global population growth to 2025




However, not all population growth is equal and relevant to beer. For the brewers, how many of the 950m will be relevant to the beer category? Taking into account physical and cultural limitations, which markets are actually relevant to the brewers?


Population growth in the right age cohort

A typical beer consumer has around 7 occasions per month for drinking beer and drinks an average of 2 beers each time. Variation exists among markets with sunnier climates over-indexing on frequency of occasions and colder and poorer markets over-indexing on intensity and volume per occasion as per Figure 73.





Data in 21 markets from TNS Synovate omnibus Source: Deutsche Bank estimates based on regular beer consumption usage. TNS, mixed years



We would expect that during the lifespan of a typical beer consumer in the developed market (>150 liters per annum, one beer per day), he or she would drink around 3500 liters in their lifetime. With most large breweries producing over 10,000 liters per single brew cycle, there are few who are able to drink a brewery dry, despite valiant efforts.

Three-quarters of a consumer's lifetime beer consumption occurs between the ages of 20 and 40 years. Both the number of occasions for beer consumption and the intensity per occasion peak during that period.

The relevance of population growth to brewers is the 20 to 34 year old cohort. Lifetime consumption habits are entrenched, brand loyalty is developed, and the greatest amount of volume is consumed. Those brewers in areas with a growing population profile in this cohort will have an advantaged position with embedded growth.

Population growth in the 20-34 age cohort drives beer volume growth




Most developed markets have


negative population dynamics

as it relates to beer

Most developed markets in a negative space

Beer drinkers in Western Europe are dying, literally. The key cohort of drinkers in markets such as Germany, Italy and Japan is declining at a rapid pace. As in Figure 75 and Figure 76, population age pyramids with a "broad shoulder" profile show an older population twice the size of the more relevant key younger drinkers. By 2025, 20 to 29 year olds only make up less than 10% of consumers in a declining overall population.





Positive immigration enhancing key developed markets

There are a few developed markets which are forecast to grow their populations and more importantly, maintain the vital 20-29 year old cohort. Immigration from beer drinking cultures creates a "beehive" profile.



Beer manufacturers in the USA benefit from favorable growth amongst Hispanic consumers, particularly in the sun-belt states. Both the United Kingdom and Australia benefit from immigration from beer drinking cultures.

Eastern Europe not a good place to be for brewers

Eastern Europe is not a good place to be for brewers. Though nominally seen as emerging markets, for brewers, these markets have hit their peak and will likely see further reductions. By 2025, we expect Russia (143m to 131m; -12m/-8%), Ukraine (45.6m to 39.8m; -5.8m/-13%), and Poland (38.5m to


Eastern Europe is seeing real declines in the 20-34 age cohort 36.9m; -1.6m/-4%) to show a real population decline. Furthermore, the numbers of drinkers in the key age groups will likely decline and their age profiles more closely resemble that of Japan and Germany.





Of particular concern are Poland and Russia - both markets which are significant to three of the four big brewers. It is unlikely that real volume growth will return to those markets.

Africa the place to be

In contrast, the truly exciting markets are in Africa, and to a lesser extent Latin America and parts of Asia. The current 215 million consumers in the 20 to 34 year old age cohort in sub-Saharan Africa are expected to grow by an additional 7 million per year, then expand to over 300 million by 2025 and close to half a billion by 2050.







Source: Deutsche Bank, World Bank

Source: Deutsche Bank, World Bank

Coupled with rising GDP growth and low per capita consumption, we expect population growth in Africa will drive consumer staples growth, with the prime beneficiary being brewers.

Mixed profiles at home


Whilst Heineken and Carlsberg face the typical European profile at home, for ABInBev and SABMiller, their home markets should deliver some upside. Brazil will likely have moderate population growth by 2025, but will start seeing declines as today's unborn will be hitting their thirties in 2050.




South Africa looks better positioned. Though not in line with the type of population growth north of the Limpopo population, growth has rebounded as the "born-frees" drive consumption over the next decade.

Tale of two countries: India and China

Population growth in the most populous nations will go in contrasting directions, with India expected to surpass China in absolute terms by 2028. Though both markets will continue to have 18% of their populations in the 20 to 29 year age group, shrinkage in younger age profiles in China will likely see a decline in this beer drinking cohort by 2050.






As detailed in the next section, we do not expect India's per capita consumption to expand significantly. However, the sheer magnitude of the population growth does create an attractive proposition for the brewers.

Per capita consumption- what is the physical limit?

How much can one really drink?

The human body needs approximately 3 liters of liquid a day, or just over 1000 liters per year. Two thirds is normally ingested in the course of the day ranging from food to brushing one's teeth. The remaining third of this is normally commercial drinks ranging from bottled water to strong spirits. Pure alcohol forms approximately 1% of the total liquid intake. In those markets where alcohol is available, around 10 liters per annum of pure absolute alcohol gets ingested per year.



The range of alcohol consumption varies greatly between males and females with the highest countries reaching close to 25 liters of pure alcohol for males, though the average for most beer drinking nations tends to fluctuate between 10 and 15 liters.


Figure 89: Absolute Alcohol and equivalents in select markets				
	Absolute Alcohol	Beer	Wine	White Spirits
	Male Ltr	Equivalent Ltr	Equivalent Ltr	Equivalent Ltr
Russia	23.9	478	191	9.6
Poland	19.8	396	158	7.9
Czech Republic	18.6	372	149	7.4
South Africa	18.4	368	147	7.4
France	17.8	356	142	7.1
Australia	17.3	346	138	6.9
United Kingdom	16.5	330	132	6.6
Switzerland	15.2	304	122	6.1
Nigeria	14.9	298	119	6.0
Uganda	14.4	288	115	5.8
Brazil	13.6	272	109	5.4
USA Source: Deutsche Bank estin	13.5 nates, WHO	270	108	5.4

Every absolute liter of alcohol converts to about 20 liters of beer. Looking at key markets in Figure 89, this would translate to 270 to 480 liters of beer should beer have a 100% of share of throat. Assuming a market like Czech where beer has a 70% share of alcoholic throat, the 19 liters of absolute

alcohol a year equates to about 300 liters of beer- reasonably in the range of a typical male beer drinker in the Czech Republic with a daily habit of two mugs of Gambrinus in Kutná Hora.

Bigger people can drink more beer


Body weight plays a strong determinant to the level of alcohol which can reasonably be processed. The Widmark formula is used to calculate the estimated peak blood alcohol concentration (BAC) as well as a method set the limit for drinking and driving legislation as detailed in Figure 90. On the scale, the range to reach a level of reasonable inebriation is between 0.05 g/dl to 0.08 g/dl.



Depending on one's weight, gender and body composition, a BAC of 0.05 is reached when consuming between two to four standard beers in a two hour window.

Applying the formula to a set of developed and mature beer markets only using the average male weight in a market, we find a strong correlation between the number of drinks to hit the "inebriation" point and the per capita consumption in the market. Nations with heavier people drink more beer.

Additionally, further alcohol consumption limits are imposed by the presence in the body, the proportion, and also the mutations of alcohol dehydrogenases (ADH). ADH is the enzyme for the conversion between alcohols and aldehydes as it reduces nicotinamide adenine dinucleotides (NAD⁺ to NADH) - the breakdown of alcohols in the liver and the lining of the stomach. Its presence and form varies amongst different population groups. The average weight in a country is a determinant of beer consumption levels






The range of per capita beer consumption

In Figure 92, we observe a wide range of per capita consumption. Notable is its mirror image to Figure 70- markets where beer is more affordable tend to have higher per capita consumption. The Czech Republic still leads globally in consumption with a 170liters pcc - this is however a 15% drop from its peak.

Meet me in the middle of Switzerland?


In recent note, *Emerging Exposure*, we cited the possibility that all beer markets, both developed and developing, may eventually meet in the middle.



Source: Deutsche Bank, Euromonitor, index takes DM in 1998 as the base at 100

Most developed markets have been on a decline in per capita consumption since their peak year. Belgium peaked in 1974, the UK and USA in 1981. Western Europe and the Nordic regions have seen on average a total decline of 20% in per capita consumption over the past two decades.






Denmark has seen the largest relative decline in per capita consumption over the last two decades

As in Figure 94, the worst performance has been Denmark which has seen per capita consumption almost halve.

Perhaps, the midpoint of convergence for all markets will be Switzerland which has all the hallmarks of the perfect mature market. Being one of the highest GDP per capita markets, it is no longer dependent on GDP growth for beer consumption nor is it in danger of losing share to other forms of alcohol.

Being somewhat Germanic, Switzerland has a strong beer culture. At the same time, it has a well entrenched wine culture, both local and imported. In addition, there is a stable local spirit presence, with each canton proudly proclaiming a world famous concoction which to the astonishment of the local populace is yet to transcend cantonal borders. The result is stability in shares of alcohol.




The market also has a stable duopoly with two global players – Carlsberg and Heineken – engaged in a rational pricing environment leading to solid margins. The market has a healthy international premium market with Heineken and Carlsberg brewed locally and accounting for 20% share, but the bulk of the market remains in mainstream and local premium variants such as Feldschlossen and Eichof. Despite the ubiquitous presence of cheap German brewers across the border and a market dominated by a few retailers, private label beer has hovered around 10%. The much cited regulations from drunk driving to opening hours have been rationally enacted.


The end result is a stable beer market where capita consumption has hovered between 70 and 80 liters over the last decade and beer has maintained a consistent share of alcohol. We would therefore assume that most core beer markets will eventually settle within that range as they mature.

Switzerland can be seen as the future norm for European beer markets

Central/Eastern Europe and Russia beyond maturity

Central Europe has an entrenched beer culture. The entry of the global brewers in the post-communist era and the subsequent professionalization of the brewing industry accelerated the category switch from local, often unregulated vodka in Eastern Europe. Today, per capita consumption has matched and often exceeded developed markets.






It is unlikely the East European markets will return to their pre-recession peaks. Population dynamics are inherently negative. As in Figure 97, the key drinking age cohort of 20 to 34 years olds will shrink 2 to 4% per year. Combined with the structural shift of beer consumption from the on-premise/out of home to the organized off-premise retail, the brewers' ability to directly influence the consumer's purchasing behavior will further diminish. As Eastern Europe progresses further, legislative pressure from marketing to sales restriction to packaging restrictions as most vividly illustrated in Russia will further inhibit any per capita growth. The road to Switzerland is not far off.

Per capita consumption in Eastern Europe is on a negative trajectory

Cultural limits on beer

The limitations of religion

Beer misses out on the large swaths of the growing population normally attractive to consumer staples. Of the one billion new consumers by 2025, 35% are in Islamic markets. Large markets such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh who together will add almost 100 million new consumers can be considered off-limits for the alcoholic portfolio of the brewers.



Excludes India (182 million additional population by 2025; 13% Muslim) Source: Deutsche Bank, CIA world fact book, Pew forum, World Bank


The Islamization of Northern Africa can also be a limiting factor. With the expectation that Nigeria will add more than 70 million people by 2025, half the population of Nigeria is Muslim. The belief system, however, is primarily from the less restrictive Sunni of the Maliki school established in the early parts of the 19th century as part of the Sokoto Caliphate. Strict adherence to alcohol usage is somewhat limited with most Nigerians taking a more liberal interpretation.

It is also notable that in some African markets, beer is used as a tool to differentiate population groupings. As part of establishing their national identity and to differentiate themselves from their Islamic, northern counterparts, the new nominally Christian nation of South Sudan desired a brewery even before officially becoming a country. Going around Juba in South Sudan, the bars are known as "Pork & Beer" shops firmly entrenching their non-Islamic belief system.

The Islamization of Africa restricts beer growth to an extent

Committed abstainers from alcohol

The correlation of abstention from alcohol is heavily correlated to religious influence but extends further among women. As per Figure 100, 60% of the global population does not drink alcohol, primarily concentrated in the Middle East and Asia. Figure 101 shows that 71% of women have not drunk alcohol in the last 12 months versus 52% of men. The spreads tend to be largest in south East Asia where 95% of women abstain.







Figure 101: Male & Female non drinkers last 12 months

Many limits to growth in India, but still attractive

Formal and informal cheap spirits make up the vast majority of alcohol consumption in India. 93% of alcohol consumption mostly two types of molasses type spirit drinks known either as Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) or Country Liquor. The former has some of the major spirits groups taking part including Diageo taking ownership of USL including one of the world's largest whiskey brands, Bagpiper, though their definition of whiskey may be debated.




The potential of India severely inhibited by cultural and regulatory hurdles

These forms of liquor will likely continue to dominate as the primary occasion for drinking in the lower income groups in India is one that centers on quick consumption to attain the effect from alcohol, rather than as part of an extended social occasion. It also fundamentally changes the beer market - there has been a notable shift from mild beer (<5% alcohol) to strong beer (>5%, usually around 7.5% alcohol), which currently accounts for 75% of beer consumption India.

More fundamental in the conversion of local and illicit alcohol to beer is the presence of key beer drinking occasions. As a publicly bought and publicly consumed good, the primary occasion for beer consumption is refreshment in a social setting. This typically involves mostly male bonding while drinking alcohol. As incomes rise, there is a natural movement from illicit drinks in a social setting towards beer.

The absence of such an occasion as is the case in India makes a similar pattern unlikely. In such a situation, conversion from prevalent country liquor and other homemade products to beer will probably not happen as these drinks are often not drunk in social and public settings.





Strong population growth and a doubling of per capita consumption on a very low base will likely drive beer volume growth in India

The lack of retail outlets selling alcohol coupled with heroic corruption limits growth further. India has around less than one outlet selling alcohol per 20,000. In contrast, for most European and Latin American markets this ratio exceeds one per thousand.

We do not expect the type of per capita consumption seen in Europe or China in the next 10 years, 20, or 50 years. Aside the above mentioned lack of occasions, tight regulations and vested interests will continue to hamper growth and limit a brewer's ability to leverage scale across state borders. We would modestly assume that overall per capita consumption will double by 2050 from the current base of 2.5 liters.




Spirits will continue to be the prime form of alcohol in India



However, despite the low per capita growth, the sheer population growth in India should drive embedded volume growth. India is projected to add over 30 million new consumers by 2025 in the key beer drinking age 20 to 35 year old cohort. As per Figure 103, we see a 10 year CAGR of 5.4% making it an attractive market to the brewers despite the limitation.


We estimate India has a ten year embedded volume of CAGR 5.4%



Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, Canadean, company presentations, India Statistical Office

Chinese growth halted


Chinese beer consumption has grown strongly (per caps compounding at 23% pa) over 15 years off an extremely low base. Much of this historic growth has been driven by occasions involving food - relatively low alcohol and low bitterness of Chinese beer sees beer play a prime role as an accompaniment in daily meals. Per caps of around 45 liters are hitting the normalized rates of developed Asiatic markets such as Japan at 55 liters. There is a high differential between the different provinces in China, with high levels of consumption very much geared towards the coastal areas and the industrial provinces.



We expect that population dynamics will negatively impact growth - the one child policy and urbanization has effectively reduced population growth among the 20-34 year olds vital for beer - a 2 to 3% decline. The younger cohort is decelerating faster than South Korea and Japan as per Figure 106.

Whereas India's beer market will most likely grow based on population, China has an opportunity to better leverage scale, especially on the top line. Dominant positions enable a shift of margin in the value chain from distributors and retailers to brewers. Markets where the brewers achieve 70% provincial share, margins are more normalized and in the 20 to 30% range. Those brewers who have clear leading positions in the provinces are best positioned to leverage their market power.

Limited per capita growth and population control limit the upside on volume for China




Dominant leadership positions based on 2x size of next competitor Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, China National Bureau of Statistics Company reports



Beer market typologies

We reviewed the potential and limitations of each beer market. When combining the potential to gain share of alcohol, particularly from informal, non-commercial alcohol, the level of affordability and the societal limitations imposed by culture, physicality and religion, we established nine types of beer market typologies for beer markets as per the table in Figure 108 and Figure 109.





We defined 9 beer market typologies based on their per capita beer consumption potential

Figure 109: Potential embedded per capita consumption market typologies

Potential PCC range

	(15+ in liters)	
Core beer cultures	100-125	Germanic beer tradition - Czech, Germany, Poland
Anglo-Saxon-Slavic	75-95	Europe and Anglo immigrant nations
Latin American	80-95	Latin American markets gaining from other alcohol
South & Central Africa	70-95	Sub Saharan Africa with beer low % of alcohol
East Asia	45-70	Asian markets with Japan as beacon
Wine culture	40-75	Southern Europe & parts of Latin America
North Africa	30-60	Large Islamic populace such as Nigeria & Ethiopia
South Asia	0-10	Cultural and regulatory challenges- India
Alcohol restricted markets Source: Deutsche Bank	0-5	Mostly strong Islamic markets

Combined with consumer insights and expert interviews, we used the typologies to assess the potential per capita consumption potential of 194 global markets. Along with the population dynamics, we have developed an embedded growth model of each market which helps determine the global volume potential for each of the brewers under our coverage.

Market typology

The embedded growth


Taking our beer market typologies and population dynamics into account in 194 markets, we have modeled the embedded volume growth of our brewers based on their current market share and find Heineken and SABMiller as the brewers with the most advantageous profile. We think ABInBev and Carlsberg are more limited in their potential growth.

Who has the embedded growth?

Embedded growth makes beer a company call

The specificity of the potential indicates that growth in beer is more a company rather than a sector call.






We think Heineken is the best positioned listed brewer to grow their current platform with 138% embedded growth by 2050. The potential suggests a 10 year CAGR volume growth of 3.6% to 2025. Both growth in population as well per capita consumption drives the potential.

We estimate SABMiller is able to double the current volume base by 2050. Should they be in a position to consolidate the remaining 78% of the privately owned Castel Group business in Africa, the potential would increase to 150%.

We think Heineken and SABMiller are best positioned for embedded growth

Figure 111: Embedded volume CAGR



10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe volume. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports

CAGR	Castel	Heineken	SABMiller	ABInbev	Carlsberg	Molson Coors
Population growth to 202	5 7.5%	2.7%	2.4%	1.2%	0.4%	0.6%
Population 2026- 2050	3.1%	1.3%	1.2%	0.7%	-0.5%	0.8%
Per capita growth to 2050	2.4%	1.0%	0.9%	0.1%	0.6%	-0.2%
10 year CAGR to 2025	9.3%	3.6%	3.2%	1.3%	1.0%	0.5%
35 year CAGR to 2050	5.3%	2.5%	2.2%	0.7%	0.7%	0.3%

35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports


We think ABInBev has limited embedded growth. We see a ten year CAGR of 1.3% volume growth and a 30% total upside by 2050. Similarly Carlsberg is in the same position, with population shrinkage resulting in real beer consumption declines in key markets.

We estimate Heineken and SABMiller have 10 year embedded CAGRs of 3.6% and 3.2% respectively.

We estimate ABInBev and Carlsberg have 10 year embedded CAGRs of 1.3% and 1.0% respectively We see Heineken having an embedded growth of 130 million hectoliters by 2025 and 245 million hectoliters by 2050, more than doubling its current volume. A third of its growth is defined by the opportunity to increase per capita consumption; the right population growth in Africa and Mexico drives the bulk of the remaining growth potential.

Its African exposure is enhanced by its strong position in Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia. Additionally, Heineken is well positioned with a 5 to 10% market share throughout the continent driven by the Heineken brand. Our analysis excludes its current licensed brands by the Castel group which should provide further upside.

Figure 113: Heineken embedded growth profile




10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe volume. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, , company reports

	Total	Americas	Western Europe	Central & Eastern Europe	Africa & Middle East	Asia Pacific
Population growth to 2025	2.7%	2.0%	0.6%	-0.4%	9.2%	4.2%
Population growth to 2026-2050	1.4%	0.7%	0.1%	-0.3%	4.8%	1.3%
Per capita growth to 2050	1.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.1%	3.2%	2.3%
10 year CAGR to 2025	3.6%	2.3%	0.6%	-0.3%	11.6%	6.5%
35 year CAGR to 2050	2.5%	1.4%	0.3%	-0.3%	6.3%	3.5%

10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe volume 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume.


Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, , company reports

In Asia, Heineken benefits from being overexposed in markets with population growth such as Australia and Papua New Guinea whilst not suffering the decline in population which will likely be seen in China. Though we do not expect India to see significant growth in per capita consumption as detailed




earlier (we model consumption of 5 liters per capita by 2050), the sheer population growth provides significant upside.

The drag on Heineken's embedded growth profile is Eastern and Southern Europe. We model flat to slight declines in per capita, but significant population declines impact markets such as Poland and Spain.




We think SABMiller embedded growth has the potential to add 145 million hl by 2025 and 280 million hl by 2050. Should SABMiller find an opportunity to consolidate Castel in its numbers, we calculate this would add another 180 million hl of embedded volume by 2050 led by markets Ethiopia, DRC, and Madagascar.





10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe volume. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports


Africa and the Andean region drive the potential, and like Heineken, a third is driven by the per capita consumption. We believe the bulk of the population driven growth will be found in Africa.



We estimate SABMiller has a 10 year embedded volume CAGR profile of 3.2%


Mexico helps ABInBev, but no big chunks of growth left.

Our analysis shows that ABInBev has an embedded growth profile half the size of either Heineken or SABMiller, with an upside of 65 million by 2025 and 145 ml hl by 2050. ABInBev has the lowest per capita gap in our coverage with 14% of volume potential on that measure.




We estimate ABInBev has a 10 year embedded volume CAGR profile of 1.3%


The Latin American South and Mexico regions for ABInBev will continue to drive growth, both due to population upside.



Carlsberg, don't hope too much from Russia


Negative population dynamics in most of its footprint hampers the growth potential of Carlsberg, with the likes of Poland driving volume declines. We estimate Carlsberg has 32 million hl of embedded growth by 2025 and up to 35 million hl by 2050.





10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe volume. 35 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports

The potential for Carlsberg is primarily in driving per capita consumption in its Asian footprint with markets such as their West China exposure, India, and Nepal driving that potential.



Deutsche Bank AG/London


Where is the embedded growth?

An additional 1 billion hectoliters of growth available


Today, the global beer volume is 1.95 billion hectoliters (hl). Summing up the potential of 194 markets, we see an additional 630 million hl by 2025 and 1.1 billion hl by 2050 of embedded untapped volume.


We estimate the global beer markets has an embedded volume 10 year CAGR of 1.8%






Africa accounts for halve the world's potential growth. Asia and Latin America account for about 20% each of the potential. We think North America and Europe will be treading water, with Eastern Europe expecting real volume declines.







10 Year CAGR assumes steady state per capita consumption growth to potential on 2014DBe volume. 5 year CAGR assumes full per capita consumption potential on 2014DBe volume. Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, World Bank, Plato Logic, Euromonitor, company reports

10 year CAGR: 1.8%



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
The moat around beer

Beer is a fresh, bulky, low value, high volume product. Volume drives leverage and margin expansion and the bulkiness limits the physical range of beer brands. Brand power rooted in local tradition and regulations further makes beer a local business. The localness sustains consistent earnings, providing strong cash flows to invest in growth for both capacity and brands. Having a moat, however, does not necessarily translate into dynamic pricing power.

Beer is a volume business

Beer requires a continual reinvestment in production capacity


Beer is a capital intensive business. As per Figure 126, brewers spend anywhere from 30 to 60% of cash flows on building and maintaining capacity. Brewers consistently invest a ratio which ranges from 6 to 8% of revenue. To maintain a level of necessary production and quality, a recurring ratio of 0.9x depreciation is required, or approximately 4 to 5% of revenue.



Building a brewery is costly

The cost of development is very much regionally and size dependent, ranging from \$50/hl in China to \$130/hl in the more remote parts of Africa. As per Figure 127, the heart and large chunk of the costs of any plant, the brew house, is still very dependent on European manufacturers with German engineers being very costly to deploy.


As an example, the German manufacturer Krones Group is the core supplier for packaging expenditures in brewing. In 2013 alone, the Krones group generated $\notin 1.3$ billion of revenue on selling, installing and maintaining packaging equipment to alcohol manufacturers alone. Brewing, fermentation and storage vessels tend to be more competitive with Chinese manufactures making a significant appearance. The greatest variable in the costs, however, are the civil and structural costs which can be very regionally dependent.



Once a brewery has been sized properly and in situ, expansion is relatively simpler and less costly, furthering entrenching the moat around an existing brewer.

There are no shortcuts in making beer

Beer is a live product and takes time. A decent lager beer needs 18 hours in the brewhouse and anywhere from 12 to 40 days of fermentation and storage for maturing before being available for consumption. The key word is decent.




A good beer needs 15 to 25 days in the production cycle

Many attempts have been made to shorten the process, often resulting in barely palatable concoctions. However, the expansion of the four big brewers in every corner has ensured that good and decent beer is pretty much available anywhere.

The Nathan Method has probably been most effective in reducing the brewing cycle and has been widely adopted by all brewers. Originally implemented in the Cascade Brewery in Hobart in 1927, the method shortened fermentation from 3 months to 12 days by removing direct contact with the air and introducing the conical fermentation vessels. Popularized as a means of managing the oppressive heat in Asia, it removed the need to store and mature beer in icehouses using open horizontal tanks.



Figure 129: Staples and beer production cycles




Recent attempts to shorten the brewing process are effective in reducing the cost base of brewing, but do have a noticeable impact on quality. High gravity brewing at around 20° Plato rather than the customary 12° to 14° reduces the amount of utilities and energy required as well as increasing throughput in a brewery. The extensive use of enzymes reduces the production cycle by speeding up fermentation and maturation, but leaves a noticeable aftertaste on the palate. Both items are more common in economy brands, though some brewers use it for their full range of brands, including premium variants.

Relative to other staples, the beer production cycle is long

A need to sweat the assets

Leverage is a brewer's best friend as more volume through the brewery drives lower costs and margin expansion on a large fixed cost base. Optimal capacity utilization ranges around 85%, but this is very dependent on seasonality.



As plant utilization increases, utility efficiencies such as electrical, thermal and water usage improves dramatically. The biggest components of leverage are man-hours and fixed costs, both inside, as well as outside the plant.

To generate a return on investment at the required rate of cost of capital, acceleration of brewery utilization is required. As illustrated in Figure 132, initial margin compression can be expected when new breweries are less than 50% utilized. However, leverage accelerates above that point. More stuff through the plant, the better the margin.

Figure 132: Illustration	ve leverage impa	ict of a new brewery			
Plant peak utilization	30%	60%	90%		
Revenue index	100	200	300		
Brewing materials	15	28.2	39		
Packaging materials	15	30	44		
Electrical & thermal	10	19	26		
H2O/H2O use	5	9.5	13		
Plant fixed costs	10	18.8	25.6		
Depreciation	5	5	5		
Distribution fixed	4	5	6		
Distribution variable	2	4	6		
S&D fixed costs	15	20	25		
Marketing	10	16	20		
EBIT	9	44.5	90.4		
EBIT Margin	9%	22%	30%		
Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, illustrative data					


The more throughput in a brewery, the stronger the margin leverage

Heavy and local

Beer is bulky

Beer is a bulky business- a low value product which is costly to transport. The bulkiness of the product gives beer a protective moat around its production zone which is difficult to displace. To give an indication of the limitations, the value of transporting a container of beer from Europe to London is 2% of moving cigarettes over the same distance.


Figure 133: Retail value of a 20ft container transported across the oceans



If a 40' container can hold 1450 cases of 340ml beer, it would cost \$2000 to move across the Atlantic. This would add roughly \$15 to \$30 per hl.

The inefficiency of distributing a bulky product also creates leverage points as the operating costs of delivery are a function of distance as well as volume.

Figure 134: Operational distribution vs volume and distance




An optimal range of 300km from production plant drives the lowest operating costs with the packaging format an additional consideration.

Beer is costly to transport

An optimal range of beer distribution is around 300km from the center of production


Beer has to be fresh

The best lager beer is fresh beer. Though the "Born on Date" campaign by Anheuser-Busch to indicate the freshness did not necessarily have the desired sales impact, they did have a point. Like bread which has similar ingredients and unlike wine and spirits, beer does not get better with age; it deteriorates the moment it leaves the brewery gates. Core notes in beer such as bitterness and hoppiness deteriorate immediately while astringency and the cardboard taste one recognizes in stale beer come to the forefront.



Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, MBCo beer university, Siebel Institute of Brewing Technology

Colloidal stability is the measure used in determining the expiration dates of beer. Proteins in beer eventually conglomerate and sink to the bottom of the bottle. The colloidal haze formed by polyphenols and protein interaction does not impact the taste nor beer quality at that point, but most consumers drink with their eyes.



Colloidal stability determines the commercial shelf life of a lager, but the taste has already been long compromised

Good beer has a short shelf life limiting its range of distribution

Though the taste has already been compromised by the second month, the colloidal stability remains stable for several months until it reaches a point where it is no longer commercially acceptable - 3 to 12 months on average.


Why international premium works, sort of

A profitable exception to the above rules can exist if it implies the following:

- Significantly cheaper production and labor costs
- Beers flavor profiles that are less impacted by time
- Premium pricing
- Insignificant transport costs

Historically, Diageo and the Guinness brand have ticked 3 out of the 4 boxes above and have been able to mitigate the last one, transportation by splitting the production. The company benefits from favorable tax treatment in Ireland lowering real cost of production. The heavy and robust profile of a stout, especially with Guinness FES at 7.5% alcohol in Africa, hides flavor inconsistencies. As is common with bulk wine and coca cola, transport costs have been mitigated by separating the Guinness wort and shipping it from Ireland before being 'diluted' in situ.

Corona ticks all four boxes comfortably. Being based in Mexico, it has low production costs for a beer. Any inconsistency in flavor profile is masked with a lemon or lime. Three quarters of its international volume travels 14km from the Piedras Negra brewery. The long tail of markets with small volumes is mostly managed by entrepreneurs who are more flexible in their cost structure. Corona and Guinness have been able to overcome export barriers in beer



For Heineken, exports are a two stage model. Stage one is seeding the brand through exports at a premium index of 250 to mainstream. Once established, local production can be found from Nigeria to Curacao. The USA remains the exception to the model where all beer is imported as part of its Dutch provenance - a hangover from the 1970's when imported beers brewed locally nosedived due to perceived quality issues. It remains to be seen whether ABInBev's current experiment of brewing Beck's locally in the USA will eventually be applied to Stella Artois and Heineken.

Regulation driven locally

Beer is a visible product. It is consumed in public occasions and tends to be consumed leisurely. It is also one of largest tax contributors to governments, particularly in more developing societies. It is the local communities who determine the rules of the game ranging from opening hours to bar licensing to taxation. Regulations are determined locally, not globally.

Not a tobacco scenario

In terms of the regulatory environment, alcohol is often described as the next tobacco. The pressures are different for beer due to its local nature. In contrast to tobacco, alcohol and beer is a local issue due to its visibility in the community and local control of taxes.



Despite attempts by the WHO to similarly demonize alcohol, their Framework on Alcohol Policy is more moderate and its adoption very much limited. The stated purpose also differs significantly. Recognizing that alcohol plays a role in a quality of lifestyle and even can have some health benefits, the purpose of the framework is to reduce harmful use of alcohol by 10%, rather than the abolition and total reduction sought for tobacco.

Excise is a local game

Taxation of beer is a national, and increasingly a state and community affair. In markets where federal structures exist such as the USA, India, and Brazil, excise and licensing laws are determined at a state level.


US federal excise rate is \$18 per barrel, last raised in 1991 when it doubled. State excise is on average is around \$8.30, Ranging from \$0.59 in Wyoming to \$33 in Alaska. The three tier system helps assure that the 435 US congressmen protect entrenched rights of the local beer distributor. In the 2013 election cycle alone, 64 of the 100 Senators received sizable donations from the industry, led by the senior senator from Texas, John Cornyn of Texas with \$167,000 in total from the various alcohol lobbies. Texas also has some of the most favorable legislation for entrenched beer distributors. In Congress,

Beer's visibility makes it a magnet for regulation

Regulation in beer is driven by local, rather than global agendas

Prime driver of local regulation is excise duty

389 of the 435 of the member of congress received donations, led by Speaker of the House John Boehner with \$161,000.



Similarly in India, beer regulation is, and will continue to be, determined at a state level. The visibility that accompanies the social consumption of beer makes it more vulnerable to regulation in a country where religious sensitivities must be taken in to account. There are over 30 different excise regimes, which remain varied and unpredictable.

State level excise and regulation will hamper India's beer growth for the foreseeable future

Excise seen as a cost of sale

Though all the major brewers now report their revenues net of excise duties, the difference between gross and net revenues can (and must) be managed. Excise is a cost of sale whose implication is borne by the consumer and the same discipline that is applied to fixed cost management can be applied to government relations. This cost of sale is determined locally, not by a global procurement department, and determines the rules of the game in which brewers play.

Brand loyalty stronger in beer

Publicly bought, publicly consumed

All the brewers use similar methodologies to get to the essence of their brands. As an emotional thought on a rational differentiator, a beer brands' functional attributes and benefits of a product are laddered to an emotional benefit and create deeper loyalty to the brand as in Figure 142.

For beer, core functional attributes tend to focus from either an input which tends to be geographically defined or a process which is able to travel further. Within the vast majority of beer, provenance provides a core common threads providing a reason to believe why the beer might be superior - even Italian beers are able to command a sizable premium despite the profound lack of history or culture associated with the beer category.

Figure 142: Consum	er staples brand l	adders	
	Heineken	Dove	Dettol
Social benefit: Appear	like I know my way around		
Emotional benefit: Feels	worldly and I can navigate life	as beautiful as I am	nurturing to my loved ones
Rational benefit: Does	global refreshment	real results on real women	dis-infectment reassuringly
Product attributes: Has	International ubiquity Dutch provenance Green star bottle	Soft active ingredients 1/4 moisturizing cream	Antispectic smell Chloroxylenol Medicinal packaging
Consumer insight	Nobody wants to be a provincial amateur	There are unrealistic expectations for female beauty	Health is a priority when my loved ones get hurt
Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, co	mpany reports, Cannes Lions en	tries	


The functional attributes ladder up to benefits ranging from easy drinking refreshment in the core of the beer category to deeper flavor, and perhaps challenging profiles.

Where beer significantly differs from other staples is the depth of the emotional connection (the alcohol helps) as well as its ability to fulfill social needs. Unlike toothpaste and dishwashing tablets, that ultimate moment of consumption is most likely to occur in front of friends in a moment of judgment. It is as much a moment of badging as it is also a moment to prevent embarrassment.

Beer is one of the few consumer staples which are both publicly bought as well as publicly consumed. It also means that beer has much deeper emotional and social currency than other consumer staples categories and as such a more entrenched franchise more difficult to displace. Beer has greater emotional and social currency than other consumer staples

Private labels unable to commoditize beer

The emotional strength of beer brands can be demonstrated by the lack of private label penetration in the category. Markets where there has been a level of penetration tend to either lack an inherent beer culture, such as Spain, or have had a significant shift towards the discounter off-premise purchasing. The consumer who drinks from a 2.5 liter PET bottle of beer at home watching football on the television on his own while comfortably dressed tends to be less discriminating on the social currency of their brand choice.



Local roots will continue to drive the core of beer

Beer is rooted to in history. Based on tax records, Zatec brewery in the Czech Republic claims to have been around since 1004 A.D. (Where there is a brewery, there tends to be a local tax authority.) As markets hit a level of sophistication and more importantly consumers have to work less than 30 minutes to afford a beer, regional and international premium will continue to grow ahead of global mainstream. However, the heartland of beer is very much rooted locally.

As in Figure 143, despite consolidation over the past decade, the brewers still have over 250 brands for a single category with Carlsberg leading the pack.

The heartland of beer territory tends to also be the heartland of national identity. Budweiser and Bud Light represent Americana, Brahma the passions of Brazil and Tyskie a self-depreciating Polish identity. Though the international brands do have unrivaled quality credentials, most consumers around the world believe that the beer in their native market is superior.

With the exception of a handful of markets, the largest beer in any market is local. The exceptions are instructive by themselves. Amstel is the largest beer brand in Greece, though it can be reasoned the lack of any historic beer culture gave room to that possibility. Carling Black Label which was originally launched as "America's lustiest beer" on the back of a Marlboro-type cowboy campaign in 1966 is the biggest brand in South Africa, though it can be argued that since then any similarity to the brand in the UK or Canada has been dissipated. In Africa, there are a dozen markets where a regional brand such as

Beer strongly under-indexes in private label penetration

Globally, consumers believe their local brand is superior

Deutsche Bank AG/London

Castle Lager, Primus and Flag lead in smaller countries. It can be argued that the borders in Africa are very much an artificial creation. Even so, in the past decade, smaller local brands such as Maluti in Lesotho are growing ahead of the market sowing the seeds for brands more deeply rooted in their national identity.




Figure 145: Leading brand in a 179 beer markets

Leading brand in a market	# of market	S		
Local brand	145	Local brand champion		
Localized foreign brand	3	Carling Black Label in UK and South Africa		
		Mutzig Cameroon		
Regional African brand	15	Castle Lager southern Africa		
		Flag & Castel west Africa		
		Primus central Africa		
Global brands in non-beer cultures	10	Arab markets Jordan, Algeria; Greece		
Global brands other	6	Carlsberg/Tuborg Malaysia, Malawi, Norway		
		Coors Light Canada		
Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, company reports				

Similarly, South Sudan's largest brand Nile Special comes from neighboring Uganda, though perhaps it can be excused as the nation is only a few years old and its native beer, White Bull, born a year before nationhood.


The handful of exceptions which are difficult to rationalize tend to be Carlsberg markets. What is notable, though, is that all these markets from Norway to Malawi vastly underperform their potential based on the beer market typology and level of income.

The locality of craft beers and lifestyle choice

The craft beer acceleration in the USA has demonstrated an even deeper level of localness. Part of the craft movements in the US can be explained due to some self-inflicted harmful behavior by the established brewers. Over the past 30 years, bitterness has been actively reduced in the main brands not helped by the push behind light beers. The flavor profile in the USA has half to one third the bitterness units of a standard European lager.

Secondly, the importers have damaged the image of beer by making it less special to be from Europe. During the 90's, it became difficult to differentiate the marketing campaigns between premium and mainstream lagers as all beer tended to gravitate to the lowest common denominator of "frat boy" marketing. Instead of international premium lager being special and made by those who have known beer over several centuries (eg, Dutch and German traditions), the guy from the valley next door with hairy knees suddenly became the expert in beer having learned the brewing craft from a manual and a bearded fellow he met in the pub. The US craft beer phenomenon entrenches local credentials for beer

Figure 146: US Craft explosion or normalization



The shift in the taste profile can best perhaps be indicated by the type of raw material usage. Hops as a percentage of raw materials in US brewing have increased from 0.4% in 2000 to 1.8% of raw material input - accompanying the rise of the India Pale Ale and various, stronger, enamel cleansing versions.

Nevertheless, craft beer revitalizes a stale category in the USA and created a resurgence of interest and marketing support behind new launches by both MillerCoors and ABInBev. It is unlikely that the craft aficionado will convert to Third Shift or Shock Top anytime soon. However, a combination of retail dynamics and the core consumer who experiments and is still a volume consumer will drive large brands rather than beer types as category winners.

The craft phenomenon has also brought a wake-up call to the big brewers in other parts of the world. In Europe, variety is being provided in traditional markets, though the Radler phenomenon has the same danger of diluting real beer profiles just as premium lights have done in the USA. In emerging markets, crafts are being established. We expect this localization of beer will ultimately benefit the brewers who have the local scale, knowledge and experience.


Big moat ≠ dynamic pricing power

Having a strong moat around operation does not necessarily translate into pricing power for the brewers. Rather the pricing power is static - brewers have the ability to ensure inflationary pricing while leveraging their volume.

Beer an underperformer in staples

Relative to staples, price mix has been weak for the brewers, averaging 2.53% in US\$ over the period of 2003-2013. Despite the brewer's exposure to volatile currencies and mixed inflation environments, it has been in line with the US inflation rate over the period of 2.39%.


Figure 147: Average global staples price mix in US\$ 2003-2013



Beer has historically priced in line with inflation

Strong growth in developing and lower revenue markets such as China, also have a negative impact. Going forward based on the current growth rates, this is likely to continue as per Figure 148 below.

Figure 148: 2014-2018DBe annual geographic mix impact on brewers




Growth in emerging markets distorts the price mix

Pricing with inflation to negate currency impact

The inflationary environment in many emerging markets gives companies a pricing umbrella where regular price increases are ingrained in the market. Both customers and consumers alike have a natural expectation that pricing will increase.

Emerging market currencies fluctuate depending on changes in real interest rates, with inflation expectations driving the differential from nominal rates. The lag between the two results in a temporary mismatch which dissipates over time. The brewers are overexposed to markets with volatile currencies. However, over time, inflation and currency movements balance out. Brewers who exercise the power to price during these inflationary periods are able to maintain a static pricing environment.



Even the hyperinflationary environment displays solid static pricing power as seen in Angola. The combination of a civil war and plentiful oil led to a rapid devaluation of the official exchange rate in Angola. After dropping a few digits in 1999 where a million Angolan Kwanza equaled one new readjusted Angolan Kwanza, the spot rate stabilized at 0.25/US\$.




Figure 152: Roque Santeiro, Luanda Angola 1998




Source: Deutsche Bank, personal collection

Before it closed down in 2010, the heart of Angola's informal economy was the Luanda trading venue of Roque Santeiro which was famous for being the largest market in the world, roughly the size of a square mile. Each so-called retail outlet consisted of a dirt floor and tin sheets or tarp for roof, with abandoned shipping containers sufficing as supply depots. Beer volume traded in the market peaked to over 15 million cases per year. In 1999, the Roque Santeiro selling price for a case of beer stabilized at around Kw2.5, or \$10. Devaluation accelerated over the next 4 years as per Figure 152. However, both brewer and real beer pricing in US\$ enacted by the 300 beer traders in the market remained stable with pricing at around US inflation rates.

Beer does not exist in isolation in emerging markets....

The brewers, however, price above inflation at their peril in both developed and developing markets. Making the conscious choice to price below inflation can drive volume as per Figure 71 earlier and gain share from other forms of alcohol. As the pricing gap between illicit alcohol and beer closes, consumers willingly trade up to the more desired lager beer.




In South Africa illustrated in Figure 153, three decades of pricing below inflation increased beer's share of alcohol from 18% to 59% by 2001. After two decades, the real price of beer was half. Sorghum beer, both commercially produced and illicit, lost the corresponding share. The ability to price below inflation also required the brewery to be ruthlessly efficient and capture the margin expansion delivered by leverage.

Pricing below inflation in emerging markets brings consumers into the beer category...

Deutsche Bank AG/London

...and beer does not exist in isolation in developed markets

Conversely, beer can also gain and lose share of alcohol relative to inflation in developed markets. Beer priced below inflation from 1970 to 2000 drove beer's market share of absolute alcohol in the United States from 45% to 55%. Though not as strong as in emerging markets, we still see a 72% negative correlation between real beer pricing and beer alcohol share.




...and prevents them exiting the category as well.

More concerning is when pricing above inflation. Consumers in developed markets have more choice, and occasions for beer consumption will be dropped or replaced when more attractive pricing alternatives are available. A reversal of this pricing dynamic in the United States has seen beer lose share to other alcohol. Since 2008, brewers started pricing on average 1.8% above CPI for their portfolio, with lower end economy brands such as Keystone Light and Busch Light taking price increases of 3 to 5% above inflation. Beer has since lost share of alcohol and now has declined to 48% share of alcohol.

The protective moat around the earnings that the brewers produce also gives an ability to withstand downturns as well as reinvest ahead of demand; they have a capacity to suffer gladly today for the chance to accelerate earnings in the future.

Investing behind brands

Brand building takes time. Successful new brands endure a long timeline in building their equity. Pre-seeding a brand with the right consumers, the right outlets and marketing properties has become a pre-requisite for sustainability behind new innovations and premium brands.



Source: Deutsche Bank estimates. Plato Logic. Euromonito

The brand success stories of today have a seeding platform of five to ten years before accelerating. Blue Moon in the US is often referred to as a 20 year overnight success story. Peroni in the UK seeded into the sub-consciousness of Londoners for 20 years before becoming the leading brand in London. Stella Artois in the USA was nurtured by the former Interbrew team in the right outlets for a decade before benefitting from the ABInBev machinery. Castle Lite in South Africa took 7 years before finding its right marketing mix in 2000 eventually setting it up as a viable alternative to Amstel.


Following his stint at the van Munching & Company in the United States in the 1950's Freddy Heineken left a legacy of patient brand building which remains to this day. Perhaps frustratingly to the shorter term investor, the return on investment in the Heineken brand has a habit of delaying itself beyond the five year horizon. Helped by the awareness created by its global properties, the Heineken brand accelerates after five to ten of seeding, often at the point where the GDP in the market has reached a point where premium brand become viable - when the times worked for a beer is below 30 minutes.

Successful and sustainable premium brands in beer require time and patience

Source: Deutsche Bank estimates. Plato Logic, Euromonito

Investing ahead of demand

Beer is capital intensive, more so than other staples when looking at a proportion of revenue (Figure 157). The local nature of its business requires a heavy investment in plants, distribution and returnable packaging. The rule of thumb is for brewers to spend 4 to 5% on maintenance and replacement capital expenditure. Another 2 to 3% is expanded on growth projects.



Should we assume that all markets will reach their embedded potential by 2050, this indicates at a building cost of approximately \$100 per hl an additional \$70 billion needs to be spent in the next 35 years to keep up with demand. This translates to roughly \$1.9 billion of growth capital expenditure per annum. For Heineken and SABMiller, this translates to \$750 million and \$670million per annum - in the range, but below of the current allocated growth capital of both companies.

Investing behind cost savings and future capability?

The locality of beer creates stronger entrenched positions, but also limits the ability for the central organizations to add the level of value seen in other consumer staples. Nevertheless, most brewers have been cutting "fat" out of local operations and centralizing more functions under the guise of various programs with 3 initials - ZBB, TCM, F2F, BCP, BSP, GBS, and such.


The cost programs themselves have become a commodity. To quote ABInBev's Mr. Beto Sicupira, "costs are like fingernails; they always need to be cut." For the four big brewers, benchmarking and cost discipline is becoming the norm. There are perhaps different levels that the savings will be pushed by the different companies – e.g. some of the brewers like clean office windows, others consider it a luxury, and perhaps changing stationary and templates every few years is not the most efficient way of spending shareholder's money. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the kind of fat that was inherent in Anheuser-Busch, S&N, Fosters and Femsa can be found in the big four.

The current proposed slate of programs may prove to be more costly than the savings they envisage. Building the capabilities both locally and centrally creates a plethora of central resources and initiatives, with more bodies and capital needed locally to implement the programs. Like the supposed savings attained at a Souk in North Africa, the savings claimed are difficult to find on the bottom line.

Cost management and capability have become a commodity and table stake for the big four brewers



Figure 159: Exceptional restructuring and programs charges 2008-2013



Brewers have a recurring habit of treating restructuring and capability programs as non-recurring

Average per annum 2008-2013 Non-recurring charges relating to restructuring and transformation programs enterprise resource planning and consolidation initiatives. Source: Deutsche Bank, Company reports

To fund many of the initiatives, recurring non-recurring items are a common element below the EBIT line. Warren Buffet's "distortion du jour" has been a favorite element for brewers to spend out of sight on cost savings and IT system programs. Looking at restructuring and transformation programs specifically, we find that over the past 5 years, non-recurring charges account for 3% to almost 10% of the EBIT and more of the cash flow that could have rather been reinvested behind capacity or brands – significant in a period where there have been years the brewers beat adjusted EPS numbers by a few pennies.

The capacity to suffer gladly should not be self-inflicted nor hidden. Unilever in 2012 took the decision to ensure that restructuring costs or investments behind new enterprise resource planning systems are simply considered a cost of business rather than non-recurring items. We tend to agree.

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Leveraging scale

Brewers will continue to look at expanding their geographical reach, either by consolidating their associates and partners or with a focus on embedded high growth areas such as Asia. Any combination between the big four brewers is highly unlikely. Rather, we see further opportunity to scale up their businesses locally in new product categories, with soft drinks the core candidate.

The unattractiveness of spirits

High value, low volume with low value, high volume brings dis-synergies

Though there is some opportunity to leverage corporate skills and platforms, especially in emerging markets, a combination of beer and spirits on the same platform proves difficult and has limited benefits. Beer is a low value, high volume item which requires deep penetration into the trade. Premium spirits are high value, low volume items which require a wide top end focus. The lack of synergies is apparent through the value chain:

- Procurement needs differ, especially in packaging and quality of grains;
- Production needs and infrastructure differs, particularly in packaging;
- Warehouse management and distribution most visibly demonstrates the difference between high and low value items. Efficiencies are impacted by the low volume throughput.
- Working capital management differs stock management for beer is counted in days, with best practice focusing on low to mid single digits. Brown spirits can stay in situ for months, if not years.
- Sales model is inherently different spirits are about opening one bottle at a time versus pushing and moving multiple crates and returnable beer formats.

Premium spirits are very much a value business that require time and care from production to the sales call. The focus is weighted towards effectiveness. Beer is much more geared towards a volume business which requires speed and depth from production to the outlet. The focus is weighted towards efficiency.

Diageo's mediocre beer track record

Diageo maintains its beer operations in Africa as a desirable means to establish a spirits distribution platform. Because Diageo only owns part of the beer businesses in Nigeria and Kenya, but 100% of the spirits businesses that sit on the beer cost base, it works in their favor. Spirits do win in that scenario. Beer, however, has been the loser with particular damage to local shareholders.

Reviewing the beer operations in Africa in Figure 160 and Figure 161, Diageo has strongly underperformed. In Nigeria, Diageo's 53% owned Guinness Nigeria has seen a negative profit performance in the last five years. Heineken has delivered double digit growth in the same market. For Diageo, margins have declined 500bps over the period.

Beer and spirits do not work as a combination

Diageo's beer businesses in Africa have strongly underperformed










Figure 161: Africa subsidiaries margin performance




Companies calendarized to full year 2013. Results in Local currency. Guinness Nigeria and Nigerian Breweries in Nigerian Naira. East African Breweries in Kenyan Shillings. Tanzanian Breweries in Tanzanian Shillings. Source: Deutsche Bank, Bloomberg, Datastream, Company reports


In East Africa, the 50.03% Diageo owned East African Breweries (EABL) has also delivered a negative EBIT CAGR, while Tanzania Breweries has delivered results in the mid-teens. Margins for EABL have dropped 2200bps. Guinness Ghana has seen a similar weak performance with margins in 2013 hitting a paltry 6.6%. The company has also managed to lose almost 25% market share in the past 3 years. The spirits business is doing well. Beer is not.



The Guinness brand remains an attractive asset and it is unlikely for both historical as well as more importantly tax benefit reasons Diageo would ever sell it. However, it has woefully underperformed not just globally, but also in Africa with a paltry 3% CAGR since 2007.

For the Guinness brand, thirteen Diageo subsidiaries account for 75% of its volume, with The UK, Ireland, Nigeria, Ireland, and Cameroon its biggest markets. Fourteen breweries are located in Africa`





Since South African Breweries in 1964 was granted the first license to brew Guinness outside Ireland, there are now 66 licensees that are currently active. This group includes 15 instances of Heineken managing the brand and ten by the Castel group, the latter of which all in Africa. While a sale of the brand is unlikely, we do believe that Diageo would be better served by offloading its production assets while maintaining the very profitable license business.

\$5 to 6bn for Diageo's Africa beer business

We view the production assets of Diageo as an attractive investment to any of the four brewers, both as a means of consolidating their position or as an entry point into Africa. The Guinness brand itself will have a sizeable premium and we assume Diageo would not part with it. It already has a very profitable licensing model with the extract being supplied inclusive of sizable tax benefits from Ireland.

We estimate a potential sum of the parts value in Figure 164. Based on the EV of the listed entities in Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, the purchase price of Ambo in Ethiopia and our estimates in Cameroon, we value the consolidated beer operational footprint of Diageo to be worth between \$5 and \$6 billion. Based on historical transaction premiums in beer, we assume that any acquirer would pay a 30% premium on enterprise value of the admittedly high local market capitalization.

Excluding the Guinness brand, we value the Africa beer business of Diageo to be worth \$5 to \$6bn

Figure 164: Sum of the parts valuation of the Diageo Africa beer assets.

	local currency (million)	US\$ (million)	
ast African Breweries (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania)		KSH,	/US\$ 0.0116
Revenue	60,287	\$699	2013 calendarized
EBIT	15,268	\$177	
D&A	3,126	\$36	
EBITDA	18,245	\$212	
MV	242,768	\$2,816	
EV	245,894	\$2,852	
Diageo share of operations 54.3%	133,520	\$1,549	
Valuation at premium of 30%	173,576	\$2,013	
uinness Nigeria		٨	ı/US\$ 0.0062792
Revenue	109,532	\$688	2013 calendarized
EBIT	17,497	\$110	
D&A	30,839	\$194	
EBITDA	27,695	\$174	
MV	301,178	\$1,891	
EV	328,873	\$2,085	
Diageo share of operations 54.0%	177,690	\$1,126	
Valuation at premium of 30%	230,997	\$1,464	
uinness Ghana		GHc	/US\$ 0.4863
Revenue	319.8	\$156	FY to June 2013
EBIT	25.2	\$12	
D&A	31.7	\$15	
EBITDA	56.9	\$28	
MV	1,003.9	\$488	
EV	1,060.8	\$516	
Diageo share of operations 52.42%	556.1	\$270	
Valuation at premium of 30%	722.9	\$352	
mbo Ethiopia			US\$
Purchase price 2012		\$225	Purchase price
Diageo share of operations 100%		\$225	
Value at premium of 50%		\$338	
uinness Cameroon			US\$
Beer volume lager (hL)	950,000		Estimate
Revenue (est) @ \$175/hl (=Nigeria)		\$166	
EBITDA @25% margin (=Nigeria)	25%	\$42	
Share 100%		\$42	
Valuation at EBITDAx of 18		\$748	
otal EV Diageo beer assets		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	\$5.25
rce: Deutsche Bank estimates, company reports, Market values as of July 10, 201			

Source: Deutsche Bank estimates, company reports, Market values as of July 10, 2014.

Low value, high volume combination driving benefits

Unlike spirits, the combination of beer and soft drinks brings benefits and enables additional value through integration. With a common platform of low value, high volume products, both categories benefit on the cost component and mostly benefit through efficiency and leverage measure which include:


- Leveraging corporate skills and platforms including support services and general management. Particularly in emerging markets this proves beneficial due to the high cost of expatriate personnel;
- Centralized shared services and scale in procurement;
- Production infrastructure, with cost benefits primarily derived from shared management and utilities;
- Distribution facilities, especially depot networks and primary distribution. With an optimal primary distribution range of 300km combining the network reduces the volume per kilometer;
- Off-premise market power, becoming relevant in developed markets as a counterbalance to the growing strength seen by key accounts across Europe;
- On-premise customer service. Where both categories are present, a single delivery is cost effective. The sales call may still have to be differentiated due to the different occasions the categories serve.

The debate focuses on the effectiveness, rather than the efficiency of the combination. Franchise owners like The Coca Cola Company (TCCC) are particularly concerned that the lack of focus will damage the soft drinks portfolio in the same way that the focus on spirits damages beer.

The combination of beer and soft drinks leverages two low value, high volume platforms

A proven model in emerging market businesses

Combined beer and soft drinks has been common in emerging markets, especially smaller markets where the infrastructure leverage is most tangible.



As seen in Figure 165, operations which have combined have a record of better margin delivery. In the soft drinks P&L, Ambev's operations in Latin America with Pepsico and own soft drinks deliver EBIT margins around 40%.

In Africa, SABMiller's listed subsidiaries in Africa report margins in the 20% range (despite Coca Cola taking broader share of the profit pool than PepsiCo would). In contrast, before delisting in 2011, Coca Cola Hellenic's EBIT margins in Nigeria peaked at 6%. Similarly, but not burdened by the concentrate pricing dynamics, the listed 7-UP bottling company in 2013 reported margins of 8.6%

We think further opportunities for bottler and beer consolidation exist with family bottlers such as SABCo and the Equatorial Bottling Group in Africa as well as Arca and Andina in Latin America.


Not just for emerging markets anymore?

We see further opportunity beyond emerging markets in fragmented developed markets such as Europe. As per Figure 167, the brewers in Europe face margin pressure with high competitive intensity and increased retail power. M&A in Europe among the brewers is unlikely due to the various competition commissions potentially blocking any deal in beer. Similarly, soft drink operators find their business model under pressure as population dynamics and retail power curtails the ability to leverage their heavy cost base and extended production platform.

A potential route to better profitability in Europe is demonstrated by Royal Unibrew - the regional Scandinavian brewer. Their recent purchase of the Hartwall brewery from Heineken in Finland demonstrated an opportunity and Combining beer and soft drinks in emerging markets has significantly enhanced margins

Combining beer and soft drinks in fragmented developed markets can be a route to better profitability 29 July 2014 Beverage Beer

ability to leverage both a beer and soft drink platform - the result is better margins and profitability than Heineken has been able to achieve as a standalone business.



We estimate that combining the Pepsi business in Finland with the Hartwell brewery will deliver DKK 75m of synergies - a significant amount accounting for a third of profit, though only 3% of revenue. It will also pull Hartwell to deliver an EBIT margin improvement of 320bps.

Despite being located in the Nordics and with a significantly smaller scale than the other brewers in the region, Royal Unibrew has been able to maintain a margin level in the mid teens enhanced by its ability combine soft drinks in both Finland and Denmark.

European bottling assets available and attractive...

Beer and soft drinks have co-existed in the past under one roof, but it has tended to be an uncomfortable relationship. Britvic was spun out from the old Bass brewers, and Vrumona has been acting as the poor cousin to the Dutch Heineken operations. We see an opportunity to revitalize the model more suited to the current pressures evoked by a stronger retail trade and enable the brewers to leverage their assets more efficiently.


The German assets currently for sale by the Bottling Investment Group of Coca Cola would enable the likes of Carlsberg and ABInBev to leverage their German operations.

More interesting would be the potential of Coca Cola Hellenic. The company already bottles and distributes beer and soft drinks with Heineken in Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as more limited distribution in Switzerland. For Heineken, Carlsberg and to a lesser extent SABMiller, there is a strong overlap of operations providing an opportunity for synergies which exceed the 4% of revenue achieved by Hartwell.

The markets of Poland, Italy and Greece are of particular attraction to the brewers to help reduce their cost base. As Coca Cola has higher pulling power as a must stock brand, Russia also provides a platform for better modern trade management which continues to be the fastest growing channel in that market for both categories. Nigeria provides a platform for a proven growth model in Africa for both Heineken and SABMiller.

Coca Cola Hellenic is an attractive asset for the brewers in Europe






...but then there is the Coca Cola company

The final say over these matters, though remains The Coca Cola Company (TCCC). Though the combination works in different markets, fundamentally TCCC does not like it and believes beer benefits more than soft drinks. Though the religious fervor inside the company around the sanctity of the Coca Cola brand has abated somewhat to be more realistic, combining soft drinks and alcohol remain a taboo subject.

There is also a question of alignment. The bottlers who have a beer platform large listed tend to "step out of line", are more demanding and questioning of of the quality of marketing execution provided by TCCC, more likely to be cautious in taking on any (margin dilutive) new products, and more aggressive in terms of contract negotiations such as concentrate pricing.

This is in contrast to bottlers who are aligned. The relationship with TCCC is normally one of constructive tension, but also one of constant negotiations. Being aligned weakens the hand. The margins tend to be lower as per Figure 165 and there is a ceiling on the margin - the agreements allow for an increase of concentrate pricing at the discretion of TCCC at any time.

As discussed in our note on Coca Cola Hellenic *Not yet in love* on June 6th, this has proven to be particularly true. Fundamentally we are bears on bottlers and have CCH on a HOLD despite plenty of self help. Recent price weakness, though, and significant sugar cost reduction which accounts for 15% of cost of goods and 10% of revenue indicates a short term opportunity turn around their gross margin declines as per Figure 169 and Figure 170.



Combining CCH with the brewers is value accretive

In our simple model combining CCH assets with any of the three brewers in Europe is both margin and value accretive. We assume that synergies equal to 3% of revenues can be achieved in the production footprint, distribution leverage and to a lesser extent sales force integration. For the three brewers with a sizable European footprint, an all debt transaction at a 30% premium would be accretive in year one, with SABMiller and Heineken remaining below 4x net debt/EBITDA.

Figure 171: Coca Cola Hellenic acquisition accretion analysis

Assumptions						
2014e EV/EBITDA	9.3					
Premium	35%					
EV/EBITDA	12.6				DKK/ EUR	7.
Enterprise value	10189				EUR/ USD	0.
Interest Rate		3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	EUR/ GBP	1.3
Synergies		3%	3%	3%	USD/ GBP	1.1
Equity Issued		0	0	0		
Debt Increase		13846	10189	75973		
Share price		58.3	53.8	589		

Brewer full group accret	EUR	USD	EUR	DKK	USD	EUR	DKK
	EUK	Total Grou		DKK	03D	Pro-forma	DRP
	ссн	SAB	HEIA	CARLB	CCH + SAB		CCH + CARLE
	CCH	SAB	HEA	CARLD	CCHTSAB		CONFCARLE
Sales	6838	27923	19184	65729	37216	26023	116719
EBIT	444	6802	2880	9325	7405	3324	12636
Synergies					279	205	1530
Adj. EBIT	444	6802	2880	9325	7684	3529	14166
Interest/ Other expense	-61	-724	-507	-1518	-1209	-863	-4177
Interest rate		4.3%	4.1%	4.0%	-4.7%	-4.3%	-3.8%
Pretax Profit	383	6078	2373	7807	6476	2666	9989
Taxes	-83	-1558	-688	-1834	-1813	-773	-2347
After tax associates	12		145		12	157	12
Net Income	301	4520	1830	5973	4674	2050	7654
Minorities	0	-379	-218	-502	-379	-218	-502
Attibutable earnings	301	4141	1612	5471	4296	1831	7152
Shares	364.8	1617.6	576.9	153.1	1617.6	576.9	153.1
EPS	0.82	2.56	2.79	35.74	2.66	3.17	46.72
Accretion/ (dilution) %					3.7%	13.6%	30.7%
EBIT	444	6802	2880	9325	7405	3324	12636
D&A	367	1813	1565	4102	2313	1932	6842
EBITDA	812	8615	4445	13426	9718	5256	19478
Tax rate	24.0%	28.0%	29.0%	23.5%	28.0%	29.0%	23.5%
EBIT margin	6.5%	24.4%	15.0%	14.2%	20.6%	13.6%	12.1%
D&A/ Sales	5.4%	6.5%	8.2%	6.2%	6.2%	7.4%	5.9%
Current Net Debt	1259	11,690	9994	34621	25535	20183	110593
Net Debt/ EBITDA	1.6	1.4	2.2	2.6	2.6	3.8	5.7

	EUR	USD	EUR	DKK	USD	EUR	DK
ССН		European Reg	ion only			Pro-forma	
excludes 8.5% Nigeria	ссн	SAB	HEA	CARLB	CCH + SAB	CCH + HEIA	CCH + CARL
Sales	6257	4561	10628	53755	13064	16886	1004
EBIT	406	534	954	8868	1086	1361	118
Synergies					255	188	14
Adj. EBIT	406	534	954	8868	1341	1548	132
Interest/ Other expense	-56	-51	-274	-1128	-495	-601	-35
Interest rate		4.3%	4.1%	4.0%	-3.6%	-3.8%	-3.6
Pretax Profit	351	483	680	7740	847	948	97
Taxes	-76	-135	-197	-1818	-237	-275	-22
Net Income	275	348	483	5921	610	673	74
Shares	364.8	1617.6	576.9	153.1	1617.6	576.9	153
EPS Accretion/ (dilution) %	0.75	0.21	0.84	38.68	0.38 75.3%	1.17 39.4%	48. 25.8
EBIT	406.3	534.2	954.4	8867.5	1086.3	1360.7	11897
D&A	336.2	230	794.2	3437.1	687.1	1130.5	5944
EBITDA	742.6	764.3	1748.6	12304.6	1773.4	2491.2	17841
Tax rate	24.0%	28.0%	29.0%	23.5%	28.0%	29.0%	23.5
EBIT margin	6.5%	11.7%	9.0%	16.5%	10.3%	9.2%	13.2
D&A/ Sales	5.4%	5.0%	7.5%	6.4%	5.3%	6.7%	5.9
Current Net Debt	1259.1	1,193	6689	28193	13862	16012	977
Net Debt/ EBITDA	1.7	1.6	3.8	2.3	7.8	6.4	5

Making brewers play American Football

(A digression and apologies in advance for the heavy use of Rugby/Football/Soccer analogies.)

Rugby is a beautiful game, with some basic fundamentals not changed much over the years. There is a coach who trains the team, let's them get on with it for 40 minutes, has a pep talk, then another 40 minutes. Occasionally, he may get involved by replacing a player or two, but the game itself is pretty much played on the field. With the advent of professionalization beginning in earnest in the early 90's, improvements have been made. Post game beers have been replaced by protein shakes, cotton jerseys replaced with sleek lycra and the rudimentary weight room by state by measured isometric and high intensity regimes. The game itself, however, is still in the field with a strong degree of autonomy required of all 15 players on the field with no respite. Every player has his role, with a degree of specialization. But each one must have a general knowledge and skill level to pick up the ball, irrespective of whether defense or offense is required, and know what to do with it when the time calls for it.

The fluidity of football (soccer) makes it the beautiful game. The game over years has also moved on - it is unlikely that an Arjan Robben would light up a cigarette at halftime like Johann Cruijff used to do and Lionel Messi has a bit more respect for his own body than Maradona ever did. The tactics for the game are set before kickoff and the players are left to execute. The genius of the coach is people management and the taming of egos to deliver as a team. Louis van Gaal's biggest contribution to the Dutch team in the World Cup was to enable a set of eagles to fly in formation and make the right personnel call at the right moment, including the improbable move of changing goalies a minute before penalties.

The beauty in American Football is its strategic component. The coach/manager runs the game, having 45 players to deploy at his will for 11 positions at a time. And he does, frequently. All of them will be specialized to such a degree that it is rare for players to play both on the offense and defense and be on the field for more than ten minutes at a stretch. The genius of a Tom Landry in developing the flex defense and the motion offence brought the NFL to the dizzying (financial) heights it is today. Joe Gibbs took the Washington Redskins to three super bowl titles with three different quarterbacks. It is Vince Lombardi whose name is on the trophy, not Bart Starr. Ultimately, it is a chess game played live where the most important character in the game stands on the side line and pawns are sacrificed (and concussed) on the field for the greater good. Every play can be micro managed every moment outside the field of play, turning a 60 minute game into three hours and the final 2 minutes into 15 minutes.

In corporations, the attraction of creating a similar centralized organization to American Football is strong. With the help of Nielsen data, SAP and Oracle systems, and the increased specialization of roles, micromanagement from the centre by bright employees drive extra growth and efficiency. This practice is supported to the consumer level by Thomas Levitt's disputed theory on marketing - eventually all global consumers have common Maslovian needs which can be codified, managed from the center and be satisfied by global brands. With the help of an army of self-perpetuating management consultants who provide assurance and a guiding hand, this seems to work for many consumer staples products. The most successful cases have been those where the functional benefits are of utmost importance. Dishwashing tablets and razor blades fill a functional need - not much emotion involved.

Beer has found itself a tougher nut to crack. Nobody writes best sellers on the history of toothpaste in Kent or Texas, but they do for beer. It has strong functional benefits - refreshment, taste and yes, the impact of alcohol. The emotional components are stronger. Beer changes your mood. It creates passion, whether on local level, such as indicated by the local passion around crafts, or on a national level which is captured by the brewers under our coverage. To paraphrase Frank Zappa, you can't be a real country unless you have a football (soccer) team and a beer, though a nuclear weapon is known to help.

The consequence has been that the beer companies have relied and trusted on people and the values they hold to take ownership and ensure that locally things get done. Success has followed the ones who have the capability to react swiftly on the ground to ever changing (and perhaps irrational) emotions. Local swiftness is required to deal with issues ranging from emotive regulations to changing consumer tastes and channel dynamics. Determining the local emotional content for beer brand management in Papua New Guinea or Kathmandu from Amsterdam or Copenhagen will always be a tough task.

Professionalization of the industry has and will continue to go apace as best practice and specialists build capability for local teams in the same way that rugby has upped its practices. However, the danger is to leave the rugby playing field and to apply the rules and systems more suited for a different game. Attempting to turn the Springboks into the Dallas Cowboys or Oranje into the New York Giants may do more damage than good. 29 July 2014 Beverage Beer

The authors of this report wish to acknowledge the contributions made by Shwetha Ramachandran, Archit Agarwal and Meera Mohan, employees of Irevna Limited, a third-party provider to Deutsche Bank of offshore research support services.

Appendix 1

Important Disclosures

Additional information available upon request

Disclosure checklist			
Company	Ticker	Recent price*	Disclosure
Anheuser-Busch InBev	ABI.BR	81.63 (EUR) 28 Jul 14	1,7,14,15,17
Carlsberg	CARLb.CO	559.00 (DKK) 28 Jul 14	14
SABMiller	SAB.L	3,330.00 (GBp) 28 Jul 14	14,15,17
Heineken	HEIN.AS	53.71 (EUR) 28 Jul 14	1,7,14,15

*Prices are sourced from local exchanges via Reuters, Bloomberg and other vendors. Data is sourced from Deutsche Bank and subject companies

Important Disclosures Required by U.S. Regulators

Disclosures marked with an asterisk may also be required by at least one jurisdiction in addition to the United States. See Important Disclosures Required by Non-US Regulators and Explanatory Notes.

- 1. Within the past year, Deutsche Bank and/or its affiliate(s) has managed or co-managed a public or private offering for this company, for which it received fees.
- 7. Deutsche Bank and/or its affiliate(s) has received compensation from this company for the provision of investment banking or financial advisory services within the past year.
- 14. Deutsche Bank and/or its affiliate(s) has received non-investment banking related compensation from this company within the past year.
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- 1. Within the past year, Deutsche Bank and/or its affiliate(s) has managed or co-managed a public or private offering for this company, for which it received fees.
- 7. Deutsche Bank and/or its affiliate(s) has received compensation from this company for the provision of investment banking or financial advisory services within the past year.
- 17. Deutsche Bank and or/its affiliate(s) has a significant Non-Equity financial interest (this can include Bonds, Convertible Bonds, Credit Derivatives and Traded Loans) where the aggregate net exposure to the following issuer(s), or issuer(s) group, is more than 25m Euros.

For disclosures pertaining to recommendations or estimates made on securities other than the primary subject of this research, please see the most recently published company report or visit our global disclosure look-up page on our website at http://gm.db.com/ger/disclosure/DisclosureDirectory.egsr


Analyst Certification

The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of the undersigned lead analyst about the subject issuers and the securities of those issuers. In addition, the undersigned lead analyst has not and will not receive any compensation for providing a specific recommendation or view in this report. Tristan Van Strien

Historical recommendations and target price: Anheuser-Busch InBev (ABI.BR) (as of 7/28/2014)



Historical recommendations and target price: Carlsberg (CARLb.CO) (as of 7/28/2014)



1.	09/08/2011:	Buy, Target Price Change DKK625.00	5.	15/08/2012:	Downgrade to Hold, DKK540.00
2.	17/08/2011:	Buy, Target Price Change DKK575.00	6.	07/11/2012:	Hold, Target Price Change DKK560.00
3.	13/10/2011:	Buy, Target Price Change DKK525.00	7.	18/02/2013:	Hold, Target Price Change DKK575.00
4.	10/05/2012:	Buy, Target Price Change DKK540.00	8.	07/05/2013:	Hold, Target Price Change DKK600.00

22/11/2012:

5





Historical recommendations and target price: SABMiller (SAB.L) (as of 7/28/2014)

Historical recommendations and target price: Heineken (HEIN.AS) (as of 7/28/2014)

Hold, Target Price Change GBP2,800.00



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26/07/2012:	Hold, Target Price Change EUR44.00	7.	13/02/2013:	Buy, Target Price Change EUR60.00
23/09/2012:	Upgrade to Buy, Target Price Change EUR52.00	8.	25/03/2014:	Downgrade to Hold, Target Price Change EUR50.00

4.

Buy: Based on a current 12- month view of total share-holder return (TSR = percentage change in share price from current price to projected target price plus pro-jected dividend yield), we recommend that investors buy the stock.

Sell: Based on a current 12-month view of total shareholder return, we recommend that investors sell the stock

Hold: We take a neutral view on the stock 12-months out and, based on this time horizon, do not recommend either a Buy or Sell.

Notes:


1. Newly issued research recommendations and target prices always supersede previously published research.

2. Ratings definitions prior to 27 January, 2007 were:

Buy: Expected total return (including dividends) of 10% or more over a 12-month period Hold: Expected total return (including dividends) between -10% and 10% over a 12month period

Sell: Expected total return (including dividends) of -10% or worse over a 12-month period





European Universe

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